PATRICIA S. HARRIS, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Johna Lee Ann Davis ("Davis"), in her appeal of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (defendant "Colvin") to deny her claim for Disability Insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI), contends the decision by the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") that she could perform her past relevant work was erroneous because: (1) the ALJ relied on testimony from a vocational expert without resolving a possible conflict between the expert's testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles; (2) there is not substantial evidence to show Davis can perform sedentary work; (3) there is not substantial evidence to show Davis has no significant mental impairment; and (4) the ALJ's credibility analysis was flawed. The parties have ably summarized the medical records and the testimony given at the administrative hearing conducted on April 8, 2015. (Tr. 25-48). The Court has carefully reviewed the record to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support Colvin's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Administrative hearing: Green testified she was 41 years old, with a high school education followed by an eighteen month "career" course. (Tr. 31). Green lived with her sons, who were 10 and 16. She previously worked as a legal secretary, publisher relations worker, safety coordinator, and as an office manager. Green was let go from her last job, with her employer telling her "it just wasn't working." (Tr. 43). She collected unemployment for a few months after her last employment. Green stated she is unable to work full time because she cannot "sit for very long, stand for very long, walk very far due to my back and leg, buttocks, foot." (Tr. 38). Green had two back surgeries (a diskectomy and a disk implantation) in 2009 and 2010. She estimated she could stand for 30 minutes, then would need to sit down for 10 minutes, and that she needs a nap during the day. She testified she could not lift more than a gallon of milk. She takes pain medication and Prozac, and described a side effect of spending a great deal of time in the bathroom. Finally, she described being forgetful and struggling with concentration. A vocational expert was called, and the ALJ posed a hypothetical question containing the following assumptions: the claimant was Green's age, with her employment background, deals with mild to moderate pain, can only occasionally climb, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl, could perform sedentary work lifting no more than 10 pounds, standing/walking no more than 2 hours, with no more than a half hour at a time, and she would have the ability to get up and stretch and sit back down, with very limited overhead reaching (no more than 1/3 of the day). The vocational expert testified such a worker could perform the jobs of legal secretary, publisher relations worker, and office manager. (Tr. 27-47).
ALJ's Decision: In his May 2015
The hypothetical question posed by the ALJ included a limitation for Davis to only occasionally reach overhead, which the ALJ defined as no more than 1/3 of the work day. (Tr. 46). The vocational expert testified Davis could perform three of her past jobs (legal secretary, publisher relations worker, and office manager). Davis contends it was error for the ALJ to rely on the expert's testimony because the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") describes these jobs as requiring the ability to engage in frequent reaching. Davis cites Kemp ex rel. Kemp v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 630 (8
This is a challenge to the RFC determination made by the ALJ. Initially, we note that the RFC need not mirror the findings of any one physician, as the ALJ is not bound to choose any one physician and adopt his/her findings as the appropriate RFC. Instead, it "is the ALJ's responsibility to determine a claimant's RFC based on all relevant evidence, including medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and claimant's own descriptions of his limitations." Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8
The ALJ considered Davis' mental impairments (depressive disorder, pain disorder not otherwise specified, and adjustment disorder with depressed mood) both singly and in combination, determining that they did not constitute a severe impairment. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ addressed the four broad functional areas commonly known as the "paragraph B" criteria. The ALJ found Davis had mild limitations in activities of daily living, social functioning, and with concentration, persistence, or pace, and that Davis had experienced no episodes of decompensation. The ALJ thoroughly discussed the findings of Dr. Samuel B. Hester ("Hester"), who performed an April 2014 psychological consultative examination, diagnosing Davis with pain disorder and adjustment disorder and finding she could cope with the mental demands of basic work-like tasks. (Tr. 591-599). The ALJ gave Hester's opinion "some weight," but departed from Hester's findings in concluding Davis could cope with the mental demands of all work tasks rather than just basic work tasks. The ALJ's departure was based upon Davis' lack of any mental health treatment, the absence of any testimony to psychological limitations, and her improvement when her treating family practitioner prescribed Prozac in 2014. These are valid considerations, and the ALJ's consideration of these issues, and his overall assessment of Davis' mental impairments, is supported by substantial evidence. There is no merit in this claim.
In summary, we find the ultimate decision of Colvin was supported by substantial evidence. We are mindful that the Court's task is not to review the record and arrive at an independent decision, nor is it to reverse if we find some evidence to support a different conclusion. The test is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision. See, e.g., Byes v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 913, 915 (8
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the final decision of Colvin is affirmed and Davis' complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERD.