J. THOMAS RAY, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Larry Lenn Moore, Jr. ("Moore") is a prisoner in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On November 17, 2015, he commenced this pro se § 1983 action alleging that Defendants Food Service Coordinator Felicia King ("King"), Jail Administrator Matt Hall ("Hall"), and Sheriff Marty Boyd ("Boyd") violated his constitutional rights while he was an inmate in the Craighead County Detention Center ("CCDC"). Docs. 1 & 6. By way of relief, Moore seeks $50,000 in unspecified damages. Id.
During screening mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court: (1) dismissed, without prejudice, all of Moore's claims against Hall and Boyd; and (2) allowed Moore to proceed with his claim that King sexually harassed him in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
King has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the sexual harassment claim, along with a supporting Statement of Undisputed Facts and Brief. Docs. 50 & 51. Moore has filed a Response, a Brief in Support, and a Statement of Disputed Facts. Docs. 52, 53, & 54. King has filed a Reply. Doc. 55. Thus, the issues are fully joined and ripe for resolution.
The facts,
1. In August of 2015, jail administrators assigned Moore to work in the CCDC kitchen as a cook, which Moore characterizes as a "beneficial trusty position." Doc. 6 at 3.
2. Moore was supervised in the CCDC kitchen by King, who was the Food Service Coordinator. Her duties included preparing and serving meals, as well as "oversee[ing] all general kitchen operations." Doc. 51, Ex. 2 at 2. King was employed by Tiger Correctional Services, Inc., a private company that had an "exclusive" contractual agreement to provide food services to inmates at the CCDC. Doc. 51, Ex. 1 at 1.
3. While working in the CCDC kitchen, King "coerced" Moore into having a sexual relationship with her by giving him Xanax and threatening to fire him from his position as a cook. Doc. 6 at 2-3.
4. Moore admits that he "fell in love" with King and that "things started getting serious." Doc. 1 at 4.
5. However, sometime in November of 2015, Moore decided to "distance himself" from King because he "was afraid of getting in trouble." Id.
6. On or about November 5, 2015, Moore ended his sexual relationship with King. Doc. 6 at 2. Later that day, Moore "was terminated by King from his position in the Jail's kitchen." Doc. 54 at 2. Moore immediately told Officer Peaster and Jail Administrator Hall that King fired him because he ended his sexual relationship with her and that she had given him Xanax to entice him into having sexual relations. Doc. 6. Officer Peaster gave Moore a drug test, which confirmed that he had recently taken Xanax. Id. Hall then began a "C.I.D." investigation, which ultimately resulted in King's termination. Id.
King argues that she is entitled to summary judgment because: (1) she was not acting under color of state law; and (2) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Moore, do not establish a constitutional violation.
A § 1983 action can only be filed against a state actor, such as an employee of a state or local government, or a person acting under Acolor of state law.@ See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Scheeler v. City of St. Cloud, Minn., 402 F.3d 826, 830 (8th Cir. 2005). The parties agree that King was not a "state actor," because she was not employed by Craighead County. However, they disagree as to whether King was acting under "color of state law."
A private party acts under color of state law, and thus may be sued under § 1983, when she "performs a function traditionally exclusively reserved for the state." Reasonover v. St. Louis Cnty., Mo., 447 F.3d 569, 584 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)). In West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988), the Court concluded that a private physician acted under color of state law when he contractually agreed to provide medical care to state prisoners. The Court supported its decision by noting that:
Id. (emphasis added).
As in West, it is undisputed that the CCDC had an "affirmative obligation" to provide food services to the detainees and prisoners in its custody. The parties agree that CCDC "delegated" that function to Tiger Correctional Services, Inc., which was contractually obligated to provide food services at that facility. Doc. 51, Ex. 1. King was employed by Tiger Correctional Services, Inc., as its Food Service Coordinator at the CCDC. In that position, King had the authority to "oversee general kitchen operations." Doc. 51, Ex. 2 at 2. By acting in this capacity, King was performing a "function traditionally exclusively reserved for the states." Reasonover, 447 F.3d at 584. Thus, as a matter of law, King was acting under color of state law in overseeing the general operations of the CCDC kitchen.
King argues that she was not acting under color of state law because she had no custodial or supervisory control over Moore. That argument was squarely rejected by the Court in West: "custodial and supervisory functions are irrelevant to the assessment [of] whether the particular action challenged was performed under color of state law."
Trial courts in the Eighth Circuit have also consistently "found that contracted food service providers at correctional facilities are government actors for purposes of § 1983 liability because the food service provider has assumed the state's constitutional obligation to provide a nutritionally adequate diet to inmates."
Because King clearly was "acting under color of state law" while she worked in the CCDC kitchen, her first ground for summary judgment is without merit.
A claim for relief under § 1983 must be premised on a deprivation of right secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Gatlin ex rel. Estate of Gatlin v. Green, 362 F.3d 1089, 1093 (8th Cir. 2004). King argues that Moore's § 1983 claim fails because he did not have a constitutional right to work in the CCDC kitchen. See Lomholt v. Holder, 287 F.3d 683, 684 (8th Cir. 2002); Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.3d 446, 450 (8th Cir. 1992).
King's argument misconstrues the constitutional basis for Moore's claim. As explained during the screening process, Moore is alleging that King violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from sexual harassment. In Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 1338 (8th Cir. 1997), the Court recognized that:
Id. (internal citations omitted).
In Freitas, a male prisoner ("Mr. Freitas") engaged in a sexual relationship with a female guard ("Ms. Howard"), who was his work supervisor. Id. After several months, Mr. Freitas ended the relationship when he learned that Ms. Howard was seeing other men, and he reported her conduct to the warden. Mr. Freitas then filed a § 1983 claim for damages, alleging Ms. Howard violated his Eighth Amendment rights by sexually harassing him. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Freitas's sexual harassment claim because he failed to prove that his sexual relationship with Ms. Howard was involuntary:
Id. at 1339 (emphasis added).
Unlike in Freitas, Moore specifically alleges that King coerced him into a nonconsensual sexual relationship by giving him Xanax and threatening to terminate his "beneficial trusty position" as a cook in the CCDC kitchen. Depending on how the Court finds the facts, Moore's allegations of coercion may or may not be "unsubstantiated."
Finally, King argues that Moore's sexual harassment claim fails, as a matter of law, because she did not terminate Moore from working in the CCDC kitchen, something she lacked the authority to do. However, in her Answer, King unequivocally states that: "I fired him [Moore]." Doc. 33 at 1. King also states that, on or about November 7, 2015, she told Officer Peaster that: "I no longer wanted inmate Moore in the kitchen, that he was fired, and to send a replacement." Id. (emphasis added).
King's argument is also legally flawed. Moore is raising an Eighth Amendment sexual harassment claim, not a wrongful termination claim. Thus, the relevant issue is whether King used the potential loss of Moore's preferential job assignment as a coercive tool to force him to engage in sex with her.
Because almost all of the relevant facts surrounding Moore's constitutional claim are in dispute, this case must proceed to trial.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT King's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 50) is DENIED.
Thus, the parties hotly dispute the relevant facts giving rise to the alleged constitutional violation. Under King's version of the facts, she is entitled to summary judgment because Moore's constitutional rights were not violated. However, Moore disputes those facts and offers a different version of events that, if accepted as true, would entitle him to prevail on his § 1983 sexual harassment claim. Obviously, to resolve this constitutional question, the Court must make numerous findings of fact, something it is prohibited from doing under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
King also cites two cases holding that supervisors in prison work release programs were not acting under color of state law when they allegedly terminated prisoners from their discretionary work release jobs in mining and manufacturing plants. See King v. Hilgert, No. 4:13CV3061, 2015 WL 1119451 (D. Neb. Mar. 11, 2015) (unpublished opinion); Harper v. Bellew, No. 4:10CV04063, 2010 WL 6609928 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 20, 2010) (unpublished opinion). However, both of those cases are clearly distinguishable because mining and manufacturing are not functions "traditionally exclusively reserved for the states," and the state does not have an "affirmative obligation" to provide work to prisoners.
While some federal courts and state legislatures have determined that prisoners and detainees cannot voluntarily consent to sexual activity with their captors, Freitas remains binding precedent as to § 1983 sexual harassment claims raised in the Eighth Circuit. See Cotton-Schrichte v. Peate, No. 07-4052, 2010 WL 5423737 at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 23, 2010) (unpublished opinion) (holding that, although the Missouri criminal law provided that all sexual acts between prisoners and prison staff were non-consensual, a prisoner still must prove non-consent in order to prevail on a § 1983 sexual harassment claim). Thus, Moore cannot prevail on his sexual harassment claim if the evidence at trial establishes that he engaged in "welcome and voluntary sexual interactions" with King. See Freitas, 103 F.3d. at 1339.
