J. THOMAS RAY, Magistrate Judge.
The following Recommended Disposition ("Recommendation") has been sent to United States District Judge Billy Roy Wilson. You may file written objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of fact.
Pending before the Court is a § 2254 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Charles Edward Robinson ("Robinson"), an Arkansas Department of Correction ("ADC") inmate. Doc. 1. Before addressing Robinson's habeas claims, the Court will review the procedural history of the case in state court.
On December 8, 2014, Robinson appeared in Pulaski County Circuit Court and pleaded guilty to charges in three separate cases:
Before entering those guilty pleas, Robinson and his attorneys signed Plea Statements in each of his cases. Those Plea Statements, marked Court's Exs. 1, 2 & 3, are attached to this Recommendation.
On January 15, 2015, Robinson appeared with his attorneys for a sentencing hearing in the three cases.
Robinson did not pursue a direct appeal of his convictions or sentences.
On April 13, 2015, Robinson filed a timely pro se Rule 37 petition in the trial court, arguing that his attorneys were constitutionally ineffective in all three cases. Doc. 10-5. However, his only specific claims were that: (1) Hudson failed to inform him that the prosecutor had made a plea offer of a fifteen-year sentence, with five years suspended, in Case No. 60CR-11-3885; and (2) his attorneys "coerced" him into pleading guilty.
On March 10, 2016, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order denying Rule 37 relief. Robinson v. State, 2016 Ark. 110, 486 S.W.3d 201.
On February 6, 2017, Robinson filed this § 2254 habeas action. Doc. 1. The Court has liberally construed his pro se habeas papers as raising two claims: (1) his attorneys were constitutionally ineffective in advising him to plead guilty in the three cases (Doc. 1 at 5; Doc. 14 at 6-7);
In her Response, Respondent argues that the § 2254 action should be dismissed because the Arkansas Supreme Court reasonably adjudicated Robinson's ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his Rule 37 proceedings. Doc. 10.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends that Robinson's § 2254 Petition be denied, and that the case be dismissed, with prejudice.
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985), the Court held that review of a challenge to a guilty plea, based on ineffective assistance of counsel, is governed by the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a defendant must establish: first, that the attorney's conduct fell below "an objective standard of reasonableness"; and, second, that the attorney's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant's defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.
Under the Strickland standard, counsel is "strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment," and the burden to show otherwise "rests squarely on the defendant." Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 17 (2013). "`Surmounting Strickland `s high bar is never an easy task,' and the strong societal interest in finality has `special force with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas.'" Lee v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 1958, 1967 (2017) (citations omitted). A guilty plea and representations made by a defendant during plea-taking create a "strong presumption of verity" and pose "a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977).
Finally, while the Strickland/Hill standard is deferential, in and of itself, federal habeas review is "doubly deferential" when a state court has made a final adjudication of a habeas petitioner's ineffective-assistance claims.
According to the state court records, Robinson signed a Plea Statement in each of his three cases on December 8, 2014. Court's Exs. 1, 2 & 3. The Plea Statements explicitly provided that Robinson: (1) had been charged as a habitual offender in all three cases; (2) was facing a sentence of up to life imprisonment in Case No. 60CR-11-3885; and (3) was facing a sentence of up to thirty years in Case Nos. 60CR-13-851 and 60CR-13-933. Id.
In each Plea Statement, Robinson acknowledged, by checking "yes" and writing his initials, that: (1) he understood the minimum and maximum possible sentences he was facing; (2) he understood he was waiving his right to a trial by jury and his right to appeal any adverse determination; (3) he fully understood the charges against him; (4) he had fully discussed his case with his attorney and was satisfied with the attorney's services; (5) his plea had "not been induced by any force, threat or promise, apart from a plea agreement"; (6) he understood that, regarding the sentence to be imposed, the trial court was not required to carry out any understanding between him, his attorney and the prosecuting attorney; and (7) he believed that, if his case went to trial, the State could meet its burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Finally, by signing his name at the end of each Plea Statement, Robinson explicitly acknowledged that: "I am aware of everything in this document. I fully understand what my rights are, and I freely, knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty because I am in fact guilty as charged." Id. Each Plea Statement was also signed by either Ms. Hudson or Ms. Duncan, the attorneys who represented Robinson in those cases. As his attorneys, they attested that they had "carefully and completely" explained the Plea Statement in each case to Robinson and that he appeared to "fully understand all of it." Id.
According to the state court records, the same day Robinson and his attorneys executed the Plea Statements, they appeared in the trial court, where Robinson entered guilty pleas in all three cases.
In his Rule 37 petition, Robinson raised some, but not all, of his current § 2254 habeas arguments regarding the allegedly ineffective assistance of his attorneys in advising him to plead guilty. Specifically, the Court finds that the following § 2254 arguments were presented by Robinson in his Rule 37 petition, and adjudicated by the state courts: Hudson was "so caught up in her feelings" that she overlooked flaws in his case and exhibited unprofessional conduct; both attorneys used an unrelated murder case to "persuade and manipulate" him to plead guilty in the three cases at issue here; both attorneys consulted with the prosecutor about the unrelated murder case, which was "unethical"; he entered a "duress" guilty plea; Hudson coerced him into pleading guilty by "degrading" him and using "derogatory language"; and his attorneys failed to advise him that he would be receiving a 60-year sentence.
In addressing Robinson's Rule 37 claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Arkansas Supreme Court correctly recited Strickland's two-part test. Robinson, 2016 Ark. 110, at 3-4, 486 S.W.3d at 204. The Court noted the trial court's finding that "Robinson's allegation of coercion was contradicted by plea statements executed by him." Id., 2016 Ark. 110, at 3, 486 S.W.3d at 204. The Court went on to hold:
Id., 2016 Ark. 110, at 5-6, 486 S.W.3d at 205.
Although the Arkansas Supreme Court did not address any allegations of coercion regarding Duncan's representation, the trial court had expressly rejected Robinson's assertion that the prosecutor and his two attorneys (both Duncan and Hudson) used the "unrelated murder case" to persuade him to plead guilty in the cases where they represented him. The trial court rejected this as "a conclusory statement with no support in the record." Doc. 10-6 at 2. The trial court also specifically held that this allegation against Duncan was inconsistent with Robinson's plea statement in the two cases where she represented him. Id.
As an initial matter, neither the trial court nor the Arkansas Supreme Court specified whether it was rejecting Robinson's "coercion" claim because he had failed to demonstrate deficient performance, under the first prong of the Strickland/Hill analysis, or because he had failed to demonstrate prejudice, i.e., but for counsel's conduct, he would have insisted on proceeding to trial instead of pleading guilty in all three of his cases. However, under § 2254(d)'s deferential review standard, it is the petitioner's burden to show that "there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief," regardless of whether the state court "reveals which of the elements in a multipart claim it found insufficient." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98 (emphasis added). A federal habeas court must determine "what arguments supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with" a prior Supreme Court holding. Id. at 102.
To receive Rule 37 relief from the state courts, Robinson had to show that: (1) his counsel provided deficient assistance; and (2) he was prejudiced as a result. Id. at 104. Because the Court finds that the state courts could have reasonably concluded that his attorneys provided adequate representation in advising him to plead guilty, it is not necessary to address the prejudice element.
Importantly, Robinson has not provided nor pointed to any evidence supporting the § 2254 claims he is asserting in this action.
As discussed, the contemporaneous evidence, from Robinson's plea and sentencing proceedings, contradicts his current allegations that his attorneys failed to properly advise him or coerced him into pleading guilty. For example, as part of his Plea Agreement in all three cases, Robinson attested, in writing, that he had fully discussed his cases with his attorneys, he was satisfied with their services, he fully understood his rights, the guilty pleas he was entering were not induced by any threats or promises, and he was "freely, knowingly and voluntarily" pleading guilty. Court's Exs. 1, 2 & 3. In addition, the court records show that he appeared in court with his attorneys and, after being advised by the trial court of the charges and his rights, he "voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly entered a . . . plea directly to the court . . . of guilty." Docs. 10-2, 10-3 & 10-4. Nothing in the trial court's contemporaneous records reflects that Robinson took any actions or made any statements indicating that he was dissatisfied with his attorneys' representation, did not understand the nature and consequences of his guilty pleas, or was entering anything other than voluntary pleas.
Robinson's conclusory allegations in this § 2254 action are simply insufficient to overcome the Strickland/Hill presumption of attorney competency, the "strong presumption of verity" accompanying a guilty plea, and the state courts' determinations that his attorneys did not "coerce" him into pleading guilty. Thus, he has failed to meet his burden of showing that the state courts' decisions were contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, any federal law, or that the decisions were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the state court record. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Similarly, the "new" arguments Robinson makes in this § 2254 action do not entitle him to federal habeas relief under the deferential standards for reviewing claims that an attorney rendered ineffective assistance in connection with entry of a guilty plea.
As discussed, the record clearly refutes Robinson's allegations that his attorneys inadequately advised him about all of the charged offenses, the possible sentences, the consequences of his guilty plea, and his habitual offender status. Importantly, as a result of his attorneys' efforts, some of Robinson's charges were reduced or dismissed in exchange for his pleas; he received an aggregate sentence that was significantly less than the statutory maximums; and the trial court agreed to run most of his sentences concurrently.
Insofar as Robinson complains that his attorneys did not adequately prepare or investigate his cases or the evidence against him, his guilty pleas waived any arguments related to the pre-plea action or inactions of his attorneys, which were not connected to the entry of his guilty pleas. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973); Thundershield v. Solem, 565 F.2d 1018, 1026-27 (8th Cir. 1977); Whitepipe v. Weber, 536 F.Supp.2d 1070, 1082-83 (D.S.D. 2007) (habeas petitioner "may only present [ineffective assistance of counsel] claims relating to the plea advice" that go to the voluntariness of the plea).
Finally, Robinson's conclusory assertion that his exposure to a life sentence amounted to unconstitutional "coercion" to plead guilty runs counter to well-established case law. "[A]n otherwise valid plea is not involuntary because [it was] induced by the defendant's desire to limit the possible maximum penalty to less than that authorized if there is a jury trial." Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 795 (1970).
Accordingly, the Court recommends that Robinson's claim, that his attorneys were ineffective in advising him to plead guilty, be dismissed as without merit.
Robinson also argues that he did not "know[] about an old plea offer . . . because of a lack of communication" with Hudson, in Case No. CR60-11-3885. Doc. 14 at 2. This is the same claim that the Arkansas Supreme Court explicitly rejected in Robinson's Rule 37 proceedings:
Robinson, 2016 Ark. 110, at 4-5, 486 S.W.3d at 204-05.
In this § 2254 action, Robinson does not address whether the Arkansas Supreme Court's ruling was contrary to established federal law, as set forth in Strickland and Frye, or argue that the ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, he has failed to meet his burden of showing that the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision (holding that his counsel was not ineffective regarding the plea offer) was: (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law; or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the state court record.
Accordingly, the Court recommends that Robinson's claim, that his attorney failed to communicate a plea offer, be dismissed as without merit.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. Robinson's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Doc. 1, be DENIED, and this case be DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE; and
2. A Certificate of Appealability be DENIED, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); § 2254 Rule 11(a).
In his Reply to Respondent's Response, Robinson presents seven more arguments in support of this claim: (1) Hudson failed to investigate a key witness; (2) Hudson coerced him into pleading guilty by degrading him, using "derogatory" language, "using his children," and threatening him with a life sentence; (3) Hudson failed to make him aware of the sentence that might be imposed if he pleaded guilty; (4) both attorneys failed to object to the "merger" of the charges in his three cases; (5) Duncan did not properly investigate witnesses or medical records; (6) his attorneys did not advise him about his habitual offender status, the possession of a firearm offense, and the firearm enhancement; and (7) his attorneys failed to adequately represent him at his plea and sentencing hearings. Doc. 14 at 6-7.
Respondent does not argue that any portion of Robinson's claim is procedurally defaulted; therefore, the Court has proceeded to the merits of all of his arguments.
