OPINION AND ORDER

SUSAN WEBBER WRIGHT, District Judge.

Marion Carter brings this action against the Pulaski County Special School District (District) alleging employment discrimination based on her race, African-American, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is a motion of the District for summary judgment [doc.#12]. Carter has responded in opposition to the District's motion and the District has replied to Carter's response. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the District's motion for summary judgment.1

I.

Carter is a math teacher at the District's Joe T. Robinson High School (Robinson) where she also served as the coach for the cheer and dance teams. Carter's supplemental cheerleading and dance team contract was for an annual salary of $2,670.00 each.

On March 28, 2017, Robinson Principal Mary Carolyn Bailey, who is white, recommended to the District Superintendent Dr. Jerry Guess, also white, that Carter's supplemental contract for her coaching duties not be renewed for the 2017-2018 school year, citing three reasons: (1) lack of participation over the previous two years; (2) inappropriate cheer routines at sporting events; and (3) inappropriate behavior of cheerleaders during out-of-town travel.

On April 18, 2017, Dr. Guess recommended the non-renewal of Carter's supplemental contract in a notice letter to Carter. This letter was based on the recommendation of Bailey and stated that the reason for this action was "conduct unbecoming a professional employee," namely:

Carter requested a hearing on the recommended non-renewal of her supplemental contract before the District School Board, pursuant to the Arkansas Teacher Fair Dismissal Act. A hearing was held on August 8, 2017, wherein the Board accepted Dr. Guess's recommendation to not renew Carter's supplemental contract.2

In Carter's amended complaint her sole claim for race discrimination against the District is that a similarly-situated white cheerleading coach during the 2012-2013 school year, Amber Populis, had allowed the cheer team to perform inappropriate routines of which Carter complained, and that her complaints were not taken seriously.

The initial recommendation to not renew Carter's supplemental contract came from Bailey, who states she could recall no complaints regarding Populis's performance as the cheer coach, as described by Carter, during the 2012-2013 school year. At the time of the alleged misconduct by Populis, Bailey was the interim principal.

After Carter's supplemental contract was not renewed for the cheer and dance teams, she was replaced with Candace Johnson, also an African-American woman. No one replaced Carter as dance coach, as all dance teams in the District were eliminated.

Carter alleges her supplemental contract was not renewed because of her race. Carter's teaching contract remained intact and she currently teaches in the District.

II.

The District moves for summary judgment on grounds that the non-renewal of Carter's cheerleading and dance team supplemental contract had nothing to do with her race, but was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons as outlined in the notice letter she received on April 18, 2017. The District asserts it is thus entitled to summary judgment.

A.

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To support an assertion that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed, a party must cite "to particular parts of materials in the record," or show "that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute," or "that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). "The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). The inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citations omitted). Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted). However, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id.

B.

Race discrimination claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are analyzed under the same standards. Tipler v. Douglas County, Neb., 482 F.3d 1023, 1027 (8th Cir. 2007). To survive a motion for summary judgment on a race discrimination claim, a plaintiff must either present admissible evidence directly indicating unlawful discrimination, or create an inference of unlawful discrimination under the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Macklin v. FMC Transport, Inc., 815 F.3d 425, 427 (8th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Carter has presented no direct evidence of race discrimination,3 her claim is analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Id. Under that framework, Carter is first required to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination by showing (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she met her employer's legitimate expectations, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination (for example, similarly situated employees outside the protected class were treated differently). Id. If Carter establishes her prima facie case, the burden shifts to the District to show a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. If the District does so, the burden shifts back to Carter to establish that the proffered non-discriminatory reason is pretextual. Id., at 427-28. To survive summary judgment, Carter must point to enough admissible evidence to raise genuine doubt as to the legitimacy of the District's motive. DePriest v. Milligan, 823 F.3d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

1.

In her response to the District's motion for summary judgment, Carter argues she has established a prima facie case of discrimination because she was treated differently than Populis, a white similarly situated employee. Carter alleges that during the 2012-2013 school year, Populis allowed the cheer team to perform a vulgar routine in which the girls bent over at the waist and poked their lips out during a song with lyrics about fellatio. Carter alleges these routines were performed at the pep assemblies and football games, and that she attempted to discuss Populis's sponsoring of the cheer team with Bailey but that Bailey was dismissive and even laughed at her complaint and allowed Populis to continue to coach the cheer team. Bailey, however, states she could recall no complaints regarding Populis's performance as the cheer coach, as described by Carter.

Carter's allegation about the inappropriate cheer allowed by Populis does not suffice to defeat summary judgment as there is no evidence in the record of inappropriate cheers involving Populis other than Carter's own allegation. "The non-moving party `may not rely on allegations or denials,' however, but must substantiate h[er] allegations with `sufficient probative evidence [that] would permit a finding in [her] favor on more than mere speculation [or] conjecture." Ball v. City of Lincoln, Neb., 870 F.3d 722, 727 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Mann v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2007)). This, Carter has failed to do.

But even assuming that Carter's allegations are sufficiently supported and that she has presented a prima facie case of discrimination, she has not established pretext. "Pretext may be demonstrated by showing disparate punishment between similarly situated employees, but [Carter] must show that [s]he and the alleged comparator[] `were similarly situated in all relevant respects." Lindeman v. Saint Luke's Hospital of Kansas City, 899 F.3d 603, 606 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ryan v. Capital Contractors, Inc., 679 F.3d 772, 777 (8th Cir. 2012)). "This is `a rigorous standard at the pretext stage.'" Id. (quoting Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1051). "To be similarly situated, a plaintiff must show that [s]he and the more leniently treated employees have `comparable disciplinary histor[ies].'" Id. (quoting Forrest v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 285 F.3d 688, 692 (8th Cir. 2002)). "And the employees also `must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances.'" Id. (quoting EEOC v. Prod. Fabricators, Inc., 763 F.3d 963, 970 (8th Cir. 2014)).

Populis and Carter were not similarly situated. Populis's conduct as described by Carter involved a different cheer routine from the cheer routines of Carter, and Carter does not allege multiple individuals complained of Populis' cheer routine as they did with Carter's. In this respect, Carter acknowledged that Coach Todd Eskola testified at her hearing that he felt like the cheer in question was inappropriate and that he had multiple people come up to him and complain about it. Accordingly, Carter has not demonstrated pretext by showing disparate punishment between similarly situated employees.

2.

Carter also argues that two of the three reasons given for the non-renewal of her supplemental contract were not legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons (she does not address one of the reasons).

i.

Concerning the inappropriate behavior of cheerleaders at a Chicken Express during travel for an out-of-town game, Carter argues this was not a real reason for the non-renewal of her supplemental contract because no school official reviewed a video of the incident (ostensibly, states Carter, because the company would not provide it) and that the District could not prove that she acted irresponsibly while chaperoning the cheer team as no other school officials were present. But Carter acknowledged that the Chicken Express incident "was very tense" and that she "had to calm the girls down," although she states she handled the situation as professionally as anyone could have. Further, Carter agreed that the District received complaints from patrons, although she states she is "sure they tried to call and get a jump on us actually reporting what occurred at that Chicken Express" concerning a white waiter and manager that Carter states treated them poorly. But even though Carter feels that the incident was not serious enough to be considered as one of the reasons for the non-renewal of her supplemental contract, the District determined that it, in conjunction with the other reasons, did. It is not the function of this Court to second guess that determination. Elam v. Regions Financial Corp., 601 F.3d 873, 880-81 (8th Cir. 2010) (federal Courts do not sit as "super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the business judgments made by employers, except to the extent those judgments involve intentional discrimination").

ii.

Concerning the complaints of inappropriate cheer routines, Carter, in her response to the District's motion for summary judgment, does not argue against this reason for the non-renewal of her supplemental contract. Accordingly, any such argument has been waived. See Satcher v. University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff Bd. of Trustees, 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2009) ("failure to oppose a basis for summary judgment constitutes a waiver of that argument"). But even had Carter addressed this reason, she acknowledged that Coach Todd Eskola testified at her hearing that he felt like the cheer in question was inappropriate and that he had multiple people come up to him and complain about it.

iii.

Finally, concerning the lack of participation on the cheer and dance teams at Robinson for the last two years, Carter states this was not a true reason for not renewing her supplemental contract because the District could not verify the supposed decline in the number of students trying out for the cheer and dance teams.4 Carter, however, has not supported her allegation that the lack of participation on the cheer and dance teams was not a true reason for not renewing her supplemental contract with sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in her favor based on more than mere speculation or conjecture. Ball, 870 F.3d at 727.5 But even if the Court discounted the lack of participation in the cheer and dance teams as a reason for the non-renewal of Carter's supplemental contract, the inappropriate behavior of cheerleaders at a Chicken Express during travel for an out-of-town game and the complaints of inappropriate cheer routines are legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the non-renewal of Carter's supplemental contract that she has not shown to be pretextual.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Pulaski County Special school District's motion for summary judgment [doc.#12]. The Court will enter judgment accordingly.6

IT IS SO ORDERED.