THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

DANIEL A. BARKER, Judge.

¶1 James Dunlap ("Father") appeals the family court's division of marital property and orders regarding custody, spousal maintenance, and child support. He contends the court's orders were not supported by the trial evidence. We disagree and therefore affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

¶2 Father and Charlotte Dunlap ("Mother") were married on February 19, 1995 and subsequently had two children: Daughter, born in 1998, and Son, born in 2001. After Daughter disclosed to Mother on November 15, 2007 an instance of Father sexually touching her when she was five or six years old, Mother filed a petition for dissolution. Mother sought spousal maintenance and sole custody of the children subject to supervised visitation by Father. In response, Father objected to Mother's spousal maintenance request and sought sole custody.

¶3 At a hearing on Mother's petition for temporary orders, the family court ordered Mother to arrange counseling for the children. The court further ordered Father to undertake a psycho-sexual evaluation with Steven Gray, Ph.D. and ordered Mother to submit to a psychiatric evaluation. [I 20] The court subsequently appointed D.J. Gaughan, Ph.D. as the custody evaluator. The court also ordered supervised visitation for Father twice weekly for 1.5 hours.

¶4 Trial was held on December 15, 2008. Mother, Father, and Father's brother testified. Among the exhibits admitted into evidence were the written reports of Dr. Gray, Dr. Gaughan, and Dr. Potts, the psychiatrist who evaluated Mother.

¶5 The court issued a decree on March 20, 2009 awarding Mother sole custody subject to Father's supervised visitation under the same terms previously ordered.1 The court also awarded Mother the hair styling business that she operated from the marital residence. In light of Father's interest in James Edward Furniture, the furniture company named after Father that he managed with his brother, the court awarded Mother certain real estate undisputedly valued at $36,000.2 The court further awarded to Mother spousal maintenance in the amount of $900 for thirty-six months.3 Finally, upon attributing to Father monthly income in the amount of $7,500 and $3,000 per month to Mother, the court ordered Father to pay $960.83 monthly in child support. Father subsequently moved to amend or alter judgment. The court substantively denied the motion. Father appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 12-2101(B) (2003).

Discussion

¶6 Father argues that the trial evidence does not support the court's orders regarding custody, visitation, spousal maintenance, child support, and division of property. We review these issues for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Inboden, 223 Ariz. 542, 544, ¶ 7, 225 P.3d 599, 601 (App. 2010) (allocation of property); Leathers v. Leathers, 216 Ariz. 374, 376, ¶ 9, 166 P.3d 929, 931 (App. 2007) (spousal maintenance); Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 520, ¶ 5, 975 P.2d 108, 110 (1999) (child support); Pridgeon v. Superior Court, 134 Ariz. 177, 179, 655 P.2d 1, 3 (1982) (custody). A court abuses its discretion when the record is "devoid of competent evidence" to support its decision. Borg v. Borg, 3 Ariz.App. 274, 277, 413 P.2d 784, 787 (1966). We regard the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to upholding the family court's judgment. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 346, ¶ 5, 972 P.2d 676, 679 (App. 1998).

1. Spousal Maintenance and Child Support

¶7 Father first challenges the court's rulings on spousal maintenance and child support. He contends the court had no evidentiary basis to attribute to Father a monthly income of $7,500.00.

¶8 On this record, we find nothing to suggest that the trial court abused its discretion in computing Father's income. At trial, Mother contested the amount of $3,164.24 that Father reported as his monthly income.4 Instead, she testified that Father earned $7000 to $8000 average monthly income over the course of the marriage. She testified that this amount included personal goods and services the couple obtained through a bartering system used by the furniture manufacturing business that Father and his brother managed.5 Mother's stated amount of Father's income also included the couple's medical insurance, car insurance, her car, Father's truck, credit cards, Home Depot items, and "six years of [home] remodeling," all directly paid for by the furniture business. With respect to this testimony regarding personal items and services paid for by the furniture business, Father's brother testified consistently with Mother.

¶9 Because the family court is better able than this court to assess witness credibility and to weigh conflicting evidence, United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 140 Ariz. 238, 302, 681 P.2d 390, 454 (App. 1983), we cannot say that Mother's testimony was not substantial evidence upon which to attribute income to Father in the amount of $7500.6 Accordingly, the family court did not abuse its discretion in doing so.

2. Custody and Visitation

¶10 Father next argues the family court abused its discretion in awarding Mother sole custody and ordering his visitation be supervised. The parties agree that on August 25, 2010 the family court granted Father unsupervised access to the children. Father's supervised visitation is therefore a moot issue, and in the exercise of our discretion we do not address it. See Arpaio v. Maricopa County Bd. of Supervisors, 225 Ariz. 358, 361, ¶ 7, 238 P.3d 626, 629 (App. 2010) (noting that declining to rule on moot issues is a "discretionary policy of judicial restraint") (quoting Fisher v. Maricopa County Stadium Dist., 185 Ariz. 116, 119, 912 P.2d 1345, 1348 (App. 1995)); Sedona Private Prop. Owners Ass'n v. City of Sedona, 192 Ariz. 126, 127, 961 P.2d 1074, 1075 (App. 1998) ("A case becomes moot when an event occurs which would cause the outcome of the appeal to have no practical effect on the parties."). Consequently, we limit our discussion to the custody issue.

¶11 Father argues the award of sole custody to Mother was not supported by the evidence, which established Father was "determined to have no mental illness or personality disorders." Father also points to evidence of Mother's history of severe mental illness and psychosis and the lack of evidence that Father abused the children. Father also relies on Dr. Gaughan's conclusion that there was inadequate evidence to sustain a finding that Father has a propensity toward sexual misconduct with children.

¶12 Father misconstrues the family court's reasons for awarding Mother sole custody. The court did not do so based on any purported mental illness of Father or evidence that he abused the children. Rather, the court's order was based on "Father's inappropriate parenting decisions" and the court's finding that "Father has made a number of serious errors in judgment regarding the children."

¶13 The court's findings are amply supported by the trial evidence. For example, Dr. Gaughan's report and Mother's testimony revealed the following: Father had chased the Daughter, Son, and a neighbor's child with a running chainsaw (with the chain removed). He would encourage his children to fight each other. Father was "very cruel to animals"; he would attempt to amuse his children by taping the family dog's legs together, and he would cut up small animals and show them to the children.7 Father would allow the children to drink alcohol. Father would show horror movies to the children against their wishes. He was observed "coming home from work and pretending to run down [Daughter] and [Son] with his truck." Two to three years prior to the dissolution proceedings, Father was holding Daughter on his lap and told Mother, "Because I don't get what I need emotionally from you, I get it from [Daughter]." Based on the foregoing, and other noted "sadistic tendencies" exhibited by Father, Dr. Gaughan recommended sole custody for Mother.

¶14 We recognize that Father testified Dr. Gaughan had "been manipulated by [Mother's] stories, taking things out of context, exaggerating them, outright lies." He further stated he should have sole custody because Mother is "mean to [the children]" and has "pulled their hair, hit them, [and] yell[ed] at them." Regarding Mother, the court did find that, although "her mental health appears to be stable at this time[,]" Mother had "very serious . . . mental health issues in 2005."8

¶15 However, the family court, not this court, assesses the credibility of witnesses and the weight to give evidence. See Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 347-48, ¶ 13, 972 P.2d at 680-81; United Cal. Bank, 140 Ariz. at 302, 681 P.2d at 454. In light of the significant evidence of Father's inappropriate parenting behavior, we conclude the family court acted well within its discretion in awarding Mother sole custody.

3. Division of Property

¶16 Finally, Father contends the family court erred in awarding Mother her hair styling business and the $36,000 in real property.

¶17 The court "shall also divide the community, joint tenancy and other property held in common equitably, though not necessarily in kind, without regard to marital misconduct." A.R.S. § 25-318(A)(Supp. 2010). In making property allocations, the court "is not required to make an absolutely equal distribution of the community property as long as it does not appear that the trial court's disposition of the community estate is inequitable or unfair." Nesmith v. Nesmith, 112 Ariz. 248, 252, 540 P.2d 1229, 1233 (1975).

¶18 The court awarded Mother her business because it found the business had no divisible value based on Father's failure to present any valuation evidence. Father disagrees arguing that because Mother "was earning $3,000.00 per month from her business, it must have a value of close to $36,000.00." Accordingly, Father asserts the family court should have granted him "other property interests worth at least $18,000.00." Father, however, offers no authority to support the proposition that income earned from a business is alone indicative of the business's value. And he points to no evidence at trial supporting his conclusion that Mother's business had a value of $36,000. We therefore reject Father's argument.9

¶19 Regarding the award of real property to Mother, the court found Mother was entitled to the award as "an equitable division of community property in light of [Father's] interest in the furniture company . . . ." Father contends the court erred in making this award to Mother because there was no evidence that he had an ownership interest in the furniture business. We disagree.

¶20 Mother testified that Father told her "several times" that he had a fifty percent interest in James Edward Furniture. Although no written document was admitted at trial expressly referring to Father's ownership interest, Mother testified that Father explained a partnership agreement did not exist in writing because of on-going litigation with his former business partners. Father's brother testified that the furniture company's employees "report to their supervisor, and their supervisor would report to me or [Father]." Further, the brother testified that he and Father had life insurance policies naming each other as beneficiaries in the amount of $250,000. The brother stated, "[Father] owns a policy on me . . . because of the impact that whatever would attain to him in running the business for my wife [if I die.]" Father did not dispute that the furniture company was named after him. Although Father maintained he was merely an employee and did not have any "interest" in the company, the family court could properly discount this testimony. See Hayne v. Hayne, 9 Ariz.App. 99, 100, 449 P.2d 633, 634 (1969) ("We allow a fact finder to discount testimony of an interested witness . . . .").

¶21 Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that no evidence supports the court's findings that Father had "some form of interest in James Edwards [sic] Furniture with his brother" and that there was "more than just an employer-employee relationship between [Father] and his brother ...." Accordingly, based on the trial evidence estimating the value of James Edward Furniture at $500,000 to $650,000, we conclude that the court's award of the $36,000 in real property to Mother was not so "inequitable or unfair" to Father as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Nesmith, 112 Ariz. at 252, 540 P.2d at 1233.

Conclusion

¶22 The family court's orders are affirmed. Mother seeks attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324, which requires us to examine both the financial resources and the reasonableness of the parties' respective positions. After doing so, we find that Mother is entitled to fees and costs on appeal subject to her compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.

PETER B. SWANN, Presiding Judge, PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Judge, Concurring.