THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

THOMPSON, Judge.

¶1 Shatisha W. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to Klib W., Cayla W., Cody W., Cyle W., and Asher W.1(collectively the children).2 For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY3

¶2 California Child Protective Services (CPS) removed Klib and Cayla from their parents in 2006 after Father physically abused two-month old Cayla and she suffered four broken ribs. After Mother took steps to assure her children's safety, the children were returned to her care in January 2008. Father was ordered to have only monitored visits with the children. After Father was released from jail, Mother continued a relationship with him and they moved back in together in August 2009.4 Over the next six months, Father repeatedly abused Cayla, including inflicting burns, bruises, and a femur fracture. Cayla sustained a fracture to her left elbow after Father pinned both of her arms behind her back. Mother did not take Cayla in to receive medical treatment and the injury resulted in a deformed upper left arm.

¶3 After the family relocated to Arizona in March 2010, Arizona CPS received a report that Mother had taken Cayla to the emergency room semi-conscious with severe bruising to her head and face. Mother witnessed Father beating Cayla, but she did not seek medical treatment until two days later despite noticing that Cayla was acting abnormally, would not play, and would sometimes fall down.5 The hospital reported burns, black eyes, and bruising in different stages of healing. Initially, Mother reported that Cayla had sustained her injuries from "falling down." She later admitted that Father had a "violent past with the kids but she usually intervene[d] before it [went] too far." The treating physicians determined that Cayla's recent injuries were non-accidental. Mother pled guilty to felony child abuse shortly thereafter and received a probationary disposition requiring that she serve 200 days in jail.

¶4 After the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES) took custody of the children, the juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent. ADES filed a petition to terminate Shatisha's parental rights to the children, and the juvenile court found that reunification services were not warranted and approved ADES's case plan of severance and adoption.6

¶5 At the termination hearing, Mother testified that she did not know how Father inflicted bruises on Cayla "because a lot of stuff happened when [she] was not in the room." Mother further testified that she did not seek medical treatment for Cayla because Father had threatened her and would not allow her to leave. Father abused Mother over a six year period and the children witnessed the abuse to her and Cayla. Mother did not seek counseling for the children or take steps to remove the children from the home. Mother stated that she saw Father hit the other children as well.

¶6 After a four-day contested termination hearing, the juvenile court terminated Mother's parental rights by reason of neglect and abuse under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 8-533(B)(2) (Supp. 2010) and the nature of Mother's felony conviction under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4), and on the basis that termination as to Klib and Cayla was justified on the ground of prior removal under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(11).7 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235 (2007) and 12-120.21 (2003).

DISCUSSION

¶7 To justify termination of parental rights, the juvenile court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, at least one of the statutory grounds set forth in A.R.S. § 8-533. A.R.S. § 8-537(B) (2007); Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12, 995 P.2d 682, 685 (2000). Under any of the § 8-533 grounds, the court must also consider the best interests of the children. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249, ¶ 12, 995 P.2d at 685.

¶8 The juvenile court, "as the trier of fact in a termination proceeding, is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and make appropriate findings." Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002). We therefore accept the juvenile court's findings of fact "unless no reasonable evidence supports those findings." Id. We will affirm a severance order unless it is clearly erroneous. Id.; Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep't Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 2, 982 P.2d 1290, 1291 (App. 1998).

A. Grounds for Termination

¶9 Mother argues on appeal that the evidence does not justify termination because she suffers from battered woman syndrome and therefore was incapable of doing anything about the abuse to her children. She also maintains that she has "started a new life" and has filed for divorce from Father.

¶10 Termination pursuant to § 8-533(B)(2) requires only that "the parent has neglected or wilfully abused a child." "Neglect" is defined as "[t]he inability or unwillingness of a parent . . . to provide [a] child with supervision . . . or medical care if that inability or unwillingness causes unreasonable risk of harm to the child's health or welfare." A.R.S. § 8-201(22) (Supp. 2010). "Abuse" is defined as "the infliction or allowing of physical injury, impairment of bodily function or disfigurement . . . caused by the acts or omissions of an individual having care, custody and control of a child." A.R.S. § 8-201(2). Mother cites no authority suggesting a court also must find an ongoing risk of neglect before terminating a parent's rights, and we are aware of none.

¶11 The record fully supports the juvenile court's findings. The court found that Mother knew or should have known Cayla was being abused, but that she failed to take any preventative action to protect the children. After Mother completed reunification services in California, she agreed to keep the children away from Father except for supervised visitation. She failed to provide adequate supervision from Father and allowed Cayla to undergo many additional beatings without seeking medical treatment. The court noted evidence of at least three prior broken bones in Cayla's body which will require surgery. In addition to this, Cayla had burns on her body, black eyes, and bruises at various stages of healing. Contrary to Mother's arguments on appeal, the juvenile court's comments reflect that it applied the correct standards for determining whether to sever Mother's parental rights and considered all of the relevant and required factors.

¶12 We are not required to find that Mother willfully failed to protect her children, and the statute does not create an exception for those who feel they are unable to protect their children from abuse. Although Mother was in a bad situation herself, we cannot ignore the circumstances that placed these children in a position to be repeatedly abused. Mother testified that Father started to beat her before they were ever married or had any children. Before Cayla was even two months old he had already broken four of her ribs. In spite of this history, Mother continued a relationship with Father after his release from jail, continued to have children with him, and allowed him to be alone with the children. The record more than establishes that Mother's inability or unwillingness to supervise her children created an unreasonable risk of harm to their health and welfare and that her failure to act allowed the children to be repeatedly abused.

¶13 Because only one basis for severance is necessary, and we affirm the termination of Mother's parental rights based on § 8-533(B)(2), we need not discuss the other grounds found by the superior court. See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 3, 53 P.3d at 205.

B. Best Interests

¶14 "[A] determination of the child's best interest must include a finding as to how the child would benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship." Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5, 804 P.2d 730, 734 (1990). Factors that support a finding of benefit from severance include the "immediate availability of an adoptive placement," Audra T., 194 Ariz. at 377, ¶ 5, 982 P.2d at 1291, "whether an existing placement is meeting the needs of the child," id., and whether the child is adoptable. Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 352, 884 P.2d 234, 238 (App. 1994).

¶15 The record demonstrates that the children are adoptable and that their foster placements have expressed an interest in adopting them. The children's case manager testified that they would have permanency and would be safe from experiencing or witnessing any more violence. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's best interests finding.

CONCLUSION

¶16 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court's termination of Mother's parental rights.

MAURICE PORTLEY, Judge, JOHN C. GEMMILL, Judge, concurring.