THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

WINTHROP, Chief Judge.

¶1 Elizabeth Anne Cisz ("Appellant") appeals the trial court's decision to revoke her probation and sentence her to incarceration in the Arizona Department of Corrections ("ADOC"). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶2 On March 16, 2009, pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant was found guilty of misconduct involving weapons (as a prohibited possessor), a class four felony, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 13-3102(A)(4) (Supp. 2010).2 At the time of the crime, Appellant was on standard probation. The trial court suspended sentencing and placed Appellant on three years' intensive probation supervision, requiring inter alia, that as a condition of her probation she "[n]ot possess or control any firearms, ammunition, or prohibited weapons as defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101."3 She was further advised and acknowledged that if she violated any of the conditions of her probation, her probation could be revoked and she could be sentenced to prison.4

¶3 On approximately February 10, 2011, after accessing Appellant's Facebook account, her probation officer became aware for the first time that Appellant had posted a photograph showing her holding what appeared to be a long "pump action type firearm" while standing with a handgun in a holster on her hip.5 Before confronting Appellant about the apparent violation of her probation, the probation officer consulted another probation officer who is "an avid gun collector and hunter" and "very up on firearms." The other officer informed Appellant's probation officer that the long firearm held by Appellant in the photograph "is a Browning Sweet 16 shotgun."6 When questioned whether the "shotgun" might actually be a "pellet firing weapon[]," the other officer explained that, based on the size of the barrel, it was "not a pellet gun." Appellant's probation officer conducted a search on Google and concluded from the various pictures he viewed that the long firearm held by Appellant was "an identical match" to a Browning Sweet 16 shotgun. Because he could only see the handle of the sidearm, the other probation officer could not identify the type of revolver shown in the holster.

¶4 A few days later, Appellant went to see her probation officer for a regular office visit, and the officer inquired about the photo. Appellant admitted posing for the photograph while on probation and posting the photo on her Facebook account on November 16, 2010, but she explained that the photo had been taken for "a magazine shoot" and the weapons in her possession in the photograph "were just pellet guns." The probation officer challenged that assertion based on his previous research, and he informed Appellant that he was taking her into custody and would file a petition to revoke her probation.

¶5 On February 18, 2011, a petition to revoke Appellant's probation was filed. In the petition, Appellant's probation officer alleged as follows:

Appellant denied the allegations of the petition, and the court scheduled a probation violation hearing for March 15, 2011.

¶6 At the probation violation hearing, Appellant's probation officer testified that one of the conditions of Appellant's probation was to not possess or control any firearms, ammunition, or prohibited weapons as defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101, and the petition to revoke had been based on the allegation that Appellant had violated that condition of her probation. The probation officer testified that it was his understanding that a pellet gun, as well as a Browning Sweet 16 shotgun and a revolver, would be prohibited under the terms of Appellant's probation.

¶7 Counsel for Appellant asserted that the weapons with which Appellant posed were actually pellet guns and therefore did not fall within the definition of a "firearm" or "prohibited weapon" as provided in A.R.S. § 13-3101.7 Appellant's counsel conceded, however, that if the definition of a "firearm" provided in A.R.S. § 13-105(19) (2010) applied to the petition to revoke, Appellant would be in violation of her probation even if the weapons were pellet guns. At the close of the hearing, the court took the matter under advisement and ordered counsel for each side to submit a supplemental brief regarding what constituted a weapon prohibited under the terms of Appellant's probation.

¶8 In her brief, Appellant argued that the weapon she held in the photograph was a pellet gun, pellet guns do not expel a projectile by use of an explosion, and thus the weapon did not meet the definition of a firearm or prohibited weapon as provided in A.R.S. § 13-3101. Although she again conceded that under the definition of a firearm in A.R.S. § 13-105, "her defenses to the allegation in the petition would have been severely limited," she further argued that she was not subject to A.R.S. § 13-105, ostensibly because that statute was not cited in the condition of her probation at issue. She also maintained that the revolver in the holster on her hip was "a fake pistol."

¶9 In its brief, the State argued in part that, even if the weapons at issue were pellet guns, a pellet gun qualifies as a firearm, and A.R.S. § 13-3101 must be read in conjunction with A.R.S. § 13-105.

¶10 After considering the briefs filed by the parties, the court found that Appellant had violated the terms of her probation. Although it concluded that the weapons shown in the photo were pellet guns as asserted by Appellant, the court reasoned that A.R.S. § 13-3101 must be read in harmony with A.R.S. § 13-105, and that for Appellant to hold a pellet gun, which this court has found may qualify as a deadly weapon, see State v. Cordova, 198 Ariz. 242, 243-44, ¶ 5, 8 P.3d 1156, 1157-58 (App. 1999), should be prohibited. At the April 4, 2011 disposition hearing, the court granted the State's petition to revoke Appellant's probation and sentenced her to a presumptive term of 2.5 years' imprisonment in ADOC, with credit for 96 days of presentence incarceration.

¶11 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the Arizona Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003), 13-4031 (2010), and 13-4033(A) (2010).

ANALYSIS

¶12 On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her probation. We disagree.

¶13 In general, we review for an abuse of discretion a trial court's determinations with respect to the revocation of an appellant's probation. See State v. Portis, 187 Ariz. 336, 338, 929 P.2d 687, 689 (App. 1996). To revoke an appellant's probation, the State need only establish a probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Moore, 125 Ariz. 305, 306, 609 P.2d 575, 576 (1980) (citation omitted). We will uphold the court's finding of a probation violation unless that finding is arbitrary or unsupported by any theory of the substantial evidence. Id. It is for the trial court to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to assess the credibility of witnesses. State v. Thomas, 196 Ariz. 312, 313, ¶ 3, 996 P.2d 113, 114 (App. 1999).

¶14 In reaching our determination, we review de novo the interpretation of statutory and contract language. See, e.g., Dreamland Villa Cmty. Club, Inc. v. Raimey, 224 Ariz. 42, 46, ¶ 17, 226 P.3d 411, 415 (App. 2010). When interpreting statutory language, we seek first to discern the intent of the legislature. State v. Jernigan, 221 Ariz. 17, 19, ¶ 9, 209 P.3d 153, 155 (App. 2009). The legislature's intent may be determined "by considering the statutes as a whole and giving harmonious effect to all sections." Id. at 20, ¶ 15, 209 P.3d at 156 (citation omitted). "Statutes on the same subject matter are to be construed in harmony together." Id. (citation omitted). When statutory language gives rise to different interpretations, we adopt the interpretation most harmonious with the statutory scheme and legislative purpose. Saenz v. State Fund Workers' Comp. Ins., 189 Ariz. 471, 474, 943 P.2d 831, 834 (App. 1997) (citing State v. Pinto, 179 Ariz. 593, 596, 880 P.2d 1139, 1142 (App. 1994)). In our review, we may "examine the policy behind the statute and the evil it seeks to remedy." Id. (quoting Pinto, 179 Ariz. at 596, 880 P.2d at 1142).

¶15 Additionally, we treat a plea agreement as a contract, and generally apply principles of contract interpretation to that agreement. Coy v. Fields, 200 Ariz. 442, 445, ¶ 9, 27 P.3d 799, 802 (App. 2001) ("Plea agreements are contractual in nature and subject to contract interpretation." (citations omitted)). Further, "[a] valid statute is automatically part of any contract affected by it, even if the statute is not specifically mentioned in the contract." Cypress on Sunland Homeowners Ass'n v. Orlandini, 227 Ariz. 288, 298-99, ¶ 38, 257 P.3d 1168, 1178-79 (App. 2011) (quoting Higginbottom v. State, 203 Ariz. 139, 142, ¶ 11, 51 P.3d 972, 975 (App. 2002)); see also Smith v. Superior Equip. Co., 102 Ariz. 320, 324, 428 P.2d 998, 1002 (1967) ("[I]t is a general rule of law that when the Legislature adopts a statute governing contracts of any nature, that statute ipso facto becomes a part of the contract, and the latter will be construed as though the statute were written into it." (citation omitted)). We will affirm the trial court's ruling if the result is legally correct for any reason. State v. Perez, 141 Ariz. 459, 464, 687 P.2d 1214, 1219 (1984).

¶16 In this case, Appellant (as well as her counsel and the prosecuting attorney) signed a plea agreement, in which she agreed to plead guilty to misconduct involving weapons and the State agreed to stipulate that Appellant would be eligible for probation. Although it did not explicitly include the condition at issue, the plea agreement referenced the terms and conditions of probation, stating that the court could reject the plea if it found any of the terms and conditions of probation inappropriate. Appellant (and the court) then signed the form entitled "Uniform Conditions of Supervised Probation," which included among its terms the condition of probation at issue.8 Accordingly, the terms and conditions of probation were incorporated into Appellant's plea agreement, and as a condition of her probation, Appellant was contractually obligated to "[n]ot possess or control any firearms, ammunition, or prohibited weapons as defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101." The State asserts that Appellant violated her probation by possessing a firearm.

¶17 Under A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(4), a "firearm" is defined as "any loaded or unloaded handgun, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun or other weapon that will expel, is designed to expel or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. Firearm does not include a firearm in permanently inoperable condition." (Emphasis added.) The term "explosive" is also defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101 to mean "any dynamite, nitroglycerine, black powder, or other similar explosive material, including plastic explosives." A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(3). Assuming arguendo that a pellet gun does not expel a projectile by means of an explosive as that term is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(3), if the definition of a firearm is restricted to that provided in A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(4), a pellet gun would not qualify as a firearm.9

¶18 Under A.R.S. § 13-105(19), however, "`[f]irearm' means any loaded or unloaded handgun, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun or other weapon that will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of expanding gases, except that it does not include a firearm in permanently inoperable condition." (Emphasis added.) Thus, under § 13-105(19), a pellet gun may qualify as a firearm.10 See Cordova, 198 Ariz. at 243-44, ¶ 5, 8 P.3d at 1157-58 (relying on § 13-105 to hold that a pellet gun that used CO2 cartridges to propel the pellets was a firearm, and thus a "deadly weapon,"11 for the purposes of an aggravated assault conviction and dangerous nature findings).12

¶19 Appellant argues that, because the condition of her probation at issue references only A.R.S. § 13-3101, she should not be held responsible for a possible violation of that condition based on the definition of a firearm contained in A.R.S. § 13-105. We disagree that the condition of probation at issue limited the definition of a firearm to that provided in A.R.S. § 13-3101. Appellant proposes to read the "as defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101" language of the probation condition as applying to each of the terms in the condition — firearms, ammunition, and prohibited weapons. The problem with her proposed construction of the contractual provision is that the term "ammunition" is not defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101. Consequently, the condition that she "[n]ot possess or control any firearms, ammunition, or prohibited weapons as defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101" must be read as prohibiting her from possessing or controlling any (1) firearms, (2) ammunition, or (3) prohibited weapons as defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101. In other words, the "as defined in A.R.S. § 13-3101" language in the contract is confined to the last term, "prohibited weapons," and cannot logically serve to limit the definition of the terms "firearm" and "ammunition." Consequently, the trial court did not err in applying a reasonable definition, including that found in A.R.S. § 13-105, to the term "firearm" in Appellant's condition of probation, and in seeking to harmonize §§ 13-3101 and 13-105 rather than frustrate the purpose of the applicable statutes and Appellant's contract with the State. The evidence presented at the probation violation hearing supports the trial court's finding that Appellant violated her probation. We therefore find no abuse of the court's discretion in its decision to revoke Appellant's probation and sentence her to incarceration in ADOC.

CONCLUSION

¶20 We affirm the trial court's decision to revoke Appellant's probation and sentence her to incarceration in ADOC.

DIANE M. JOHNSEN, Presiding Judge, PATRICIA A. OROZCO, Judge, concurring.