THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

HALL, Judge.

¶ 1 Jonathan Leigh Sosnowicz (defendant) appeals his convictions and sentences for one count of second degree murder and three counts of aggravated assault. In this memorandum decision, we address the following issue we deem not worthy of publication in our concurrently filed opinion: Whether the trial court erred when it granted the State's motion to preclude defense counsel from asking Maricopa County medical examiner William Stano, M.D., to tell the jury the blood alcohol content (BAC) of the victim (J.P.) at the time of his death. In this decision we set forth only the details of the case necessary to our resolution of the issue presented; a fuller version of the circumstances of the case is provided in the opinion.

¶ 2 Before Dr. Stano testified, the State orally requested that the trial court preclude defense counsel from asking Dr. Stano what J.P.'s BAC was at the time of his death. The State argued that his specific BAC was not relevant, but did not object to admitting evidence that J.P. had alcohol in his system at the time of his death.

¶ 3 In response to the State's argument that J.P.'s BAC was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible,1 see Arizona Rules of Evidence 402, defense counsel contended that it may have been relevant to show if J.P. was intoxicated, if he had difficulty walking or standing, or if it "contributed to the accident in some way." The trial court granted the State's request to withhold J.P.'s BAC from the jury. We review a trial court's ruling regarding the relevance and admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Bigger, 227 Ariz. 196, 208, ¶ 42, 254 P.3d 1142, 1154 (App. 2011).

¶ 4 Dr. Stano testified that J.P.'s consumption of alcohol did not affect how he died. Moreover, defendant failed to demonstrate how disclosing the additional information of J.P.'s BAC was relevant to buttress defendant's claim that his striking J.P. with the Hummer was a non-criminal accident. For example, no evidence was presented that could have led a jury to find that J.P.'s level of intoxication contributed to the accident, which might have been the case had there been testimony that J.P. stumbled or veered into the path of the Hummer. Further, if Dr. Stano had been permitted to reveal J.P.'s BAC without commenting further on what the BAC meant in relation to J.P.'s intoxication and effect on his body, as defense counsel suggested, the jury may have been misled as to its significance. See Ariz. R. Evid. 403. We conclude that the trial court did not err in precluding evidence of J.P.'s BAC.

¶ 5 For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in our opinion, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences.

MICHAEL J. BROWN, Presiding Judge, and PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Judge, concurring.