THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

DOWNIE, Judge.

¶1 Tawana Burton Jackson appeals her convictions for armed robbery, unlawful flight from law enforcement, and aggravated assault, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 13-902, -904, -1203, -1204, 28-622.01, and -624(C). Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), defense counsel has searched the record, found no arguable question of law, and asks that we review the record for fundamental error. See State v. Richardson, 175 Ariz. 336, 339, 857 P.2d 388, 391 (App. 1993). Jackson filed a supplemental brief in propria persona. On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions. State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 546, 552, 633 P.2d 355, 361 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Jackson entered a convenience store on June 7, 2009 ("June 7 robbery"), wearing sunglasses, a blue and white outfit, and a black scarf covering her head. She pointed a black handgun at the clerk and handed her a bank envelope with a note demanding money. Jackson left in a red Pontiac Sunfire.

¶3 The next day, Jackson entered a store on the Salt River Pima Maricopa Indian Reservation, wearing an eye-patch, a wig, and a black jacket with an Arizona Diamondbacks logo on the front ("June 8 robbery"). Jackson approached the customer service desk and gave employee R.P. a black Wells Fargo bank bag with a note stating: "This is not a joke. This is a hold up. Give me your money!" R.P. told Jackson that his supervisor had to open the cash register. Jackson became upset and pulled a black handgun from her waistband. As supervisor D.R. opened the register, Jackson became agitated and pressed the gun against D.R.'s forehead, yelling: "All the f[ ]ing money!" D.R. placed cash into the bank bag, and Jackson ran out the front door.

¶4 On September 5, 2009, Jackson entered a different convenience store, pointed a black handgun at H.U., and demanded money ("September robbery"). After H.U. emptied the cash register into Jackson's bank bag, Jackson ordered her onto the floor. Jackson was wearing sunglasses and a dark green pantsuit, and she drove away in a red Pontiac Sunfire.

¶5 A search of police databases revealed that Jackson matched the robbery suspect's description and also owned a red Pontiac Sunfire. On September 8, 2009, officers observed Jackson drive the Sunfire from her apartment complex. Because the Sunfire's license plate had been reported stolen, officers attempted a traffic stop, but Jackson did not stop. A chase ensued, but officers lost Jackson and went to her apartment to wait for her. Jackson returned a short while later and was arrested. When an officer attempted to question Jackson, she spit on him.

¶6 Officers guarded Jackson's apartment to ensure that no one entered while they awaited a search warrant. Jackson's son, Q.T., arrived and asked if he could retrieve his clothes. A detective escorted him into the apartment. When officers showed Q.T. surveillance photos of the September robbery, Q.T. identified Jackson, explaining that she was wearing a wig.

¶7 Officers later executed a search warrant at Jackson's apartment and discovered wigs, blue and white clothing, a black shawl, a dark green pantsuit, a black CO2 BB gun, nine pairs of sunglasses, and a black Wells Fargo bank bag containing $643. They also saw a black jacket with a Diamondbacks logo on the front. They later learned that the jacket matched surveillance video of the June 8 robbery, and they informed tribal police. Tribal officers obtained their own search warrant and confiscated the jacket.

¶8 Jackson was indicted on three counts of armed robbery (counts 1, 2, and 3); one count of unlawful flight from law enforcement (count 4); and one count of aggravated assault (count 5). Jackson moved to suppress the evidence seized from her apartment. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the court denied her motion. Jackson waived her right to a jury trial and submitted to a bench trial on a stipulated record. The court found Jackson guilty as charged. It sentenced her to concurrent prison terms of 11 years for counts 1, 2, and 3, 1.5 years for count 4, and 1 year for count 5, with 544 days' pre-sentence incarceration credit for counts 1 and 2, and 614 days for counts 3, 4, and 5.

DISCUSSION

¶9 We have read and considered the briefs submitted by Jackson and her counsel and have reviewed the entire record. Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300, 451 P.2d at 881. We find no fundamental error. All of the proceedings were conducted in compliance with the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the sentences imposed were within the statutory ranges. Jackson was present at all critical phases of the proceedings and was represented by counsel. There was a factual and legal basis for the guilty verdicts.

¶10 Jackson's supplemental brief contends:

We will not disturb the trial court's suppression ruling absent an abuse of discretion. State v. May, 210 Ariz. 452, 454, ¶ 4, 112 P.3d 39, 41 (App. 2005) (citation omitted). We consider only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, and we view that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's factual findings; we review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo. Id. (citations omitted); State v. Rosengren, 199 Ariz. 112, 116, ¶ 9, 14 P.3d 303, 307 (App. 2000).

¶11 To the extent Jackson challenges the credibility of the police officers who testified at the suppression hearing (e.g., regarding statements made to and by Q.T.), we find no error. The credibility of a witness is for the trier of fact and not an appellate court. State v. Gallagher, 169 Ariz. 202, 203, 818 P.2d 187, 188 (App. 1991) (citation omitted). Turning to the Fourth Amendment issue, the trial court ruled that officers initially entered Jackson's apartment without a warrant, but concluded:

¶12 Even assuming arguendo that the initial warrantless entries were improper, the record nonetheless supports the trial court's ruling on the suppression motion. See State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 269, 689 P.2d 519, 528 (1984) (pursuant to the independent source doctrine, evidence obtained from a legal warrant need not be excluded because police entered and secured residence prior to obtaining the warrant); see also State v. Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. 46, 58, 906 P.2d 579, 591 (1995) (citations omitted) (should officers make an illegal search, "products of a subsequent search [pursuant to a] warrant may be admitted at trial, provided the warrant was based on information legally obtained").

¶13 The Mesa police department's search warrant affidavit described the following items:1

¶14 Surveillance photos from the June 7 robbery showed Jackson wearing dark sunglasses and a light blue and white outfit and using a bank bag and a handgun. Police reports from that robbery confirmed that Jackson wore dark sunglasses and a Hawaiian-patterned blue and white garment, used a bank bag and a handgun, and drove away in a red Pontiac Sunfire. The court thus had ample evidence from independent sources (i.e., unrelated to warrantless entries into the apartment) to conclude the warrant was "based on information legally obtained." Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. at 58, 906 P.2d at 591 (citation omitted).

¶15 Even if the dress and gun mentioned in the affidavit were disregarded, probable cause still existed for issuance of a search warrant. See id. ("The proper method for determining the validity of the search . . . is to excise the illegally obtained information from the affidavit and then determine whether the remaining information is sufficient to establish probable cause."). The police reports and surveillance photos provided ample support for the request to search Jackson's apartment for a green pantsuit, sunglasses, a blonde wig, and a black bank-style money bag. Based on the record before it, the court properly denied the motion to suppress.

II. Waiver of Jury Trial

¶16 Jackson also argues she was coerced into waiving a jury trial. A jury trial waiver is valid "only if the defendant is aware of the right and manifests an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of such right." State v. Baker, 217 Ariz. 118, 120, ¶ 7, 170 P.3d 727, 729 (App. 2007) (citations omitted). "Prior to accepting a waiver, the trial court is obligated to `address the defendant personally, advise the defendant of the right to a jury trial and ascertain that the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent." Id. at ¶ 8 (citation omitted); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.1(b)(1).

¶17 The trial judge spoke directly to Jackson, clearly explaining her right to a jury trial. The court also advised Jackson of the possible sentences she could receive if convicted. Jackson stated she understood her jury trial right and wanted to waive it. The court found that Jackson made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. The record supports this determination. Nothing in the record suggests Jackson was coerced in any manner into waiving her right to a jury trial.

CONCLUSION

¶18 We affirm Jackson's convictions and sentences. Counsel's obligations pertaining to Jackson's representation in this appeal have ended. Counsel need do nothing more than inform Jackson of the status of the appeal and her future options, unless counsel's review reveals an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85, 684 P.2d 154, 156-57 (1984). On the court's own motion, Jackson shall have 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if she desires, with an in propria persona motion for reconsideration or petition for review.

PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Presiding Judge, LAWRENCE F. WINTHROP, Chief Judge, concurring.