THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

GEMMILL, Judge.

¶1 Defendant Shelton John Williams appeals his conviction for conspiracy to possess marijuana for sale, a class two felony, on grounds of insufficiency of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm his conspiracy conviction and sentence. Williams was also convicted and sentenced on three other offenses, and it appears from his notice of appeal that he has, technically, appealed those convictions and sentences as well.1 He does not, however, challenge these three convictions and sentences on appeal. We therefore affirm all four of Williams's convictions and sentences.

¶2 Williams argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal and that his conspiracy conviction cannot stand, because the evidence at trial failed to show that he had entered into any agreement to possess marijuana for sale. According to Williams, the evidence indicated that, at most, he had been hired to package the more than 500 pounds of marijuana found in the house from which he fled. We review de novo the court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal and the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶15, 250 P.3d 1188, 1191 (2011).

¶3 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the jury's verdict and resolve all conflicts in the evidence against defendant. State v. Girdler, 138 Ariz. 482, 488, 675 P.2d 1301, 1307 (1983). There is "no distinction between the probative value of direct and circumstantial evidence." State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 560, n. 1, 858 P.2d 1152, 1163, n. 1 (1993). A judgment of acquittal is appropriate only "if there is no substantial evidence to warrant a conviction." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a). "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is such proof that `reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Landrigan, 176 Ariz. 1, 4, 859 P.2d 111, 114 (1993) (citation omitted). "When reasonable minds may differ on inferences drawn from the facts, the case must be submitted to the jury, and the trial judge has no discretion to enter a judgment of acquittal." West, 226 Ariz. at 563, ¶18, 250 P.3d at 1192 (quoting State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 603, 944 P.2d 1204, 1217 (1997).) "To set aside a jury verdict for insufficient evidence it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient evidence to support the conclusion reached by the jury." State v. Arredondo, 155 Ariz. 314, 316, 746 P.2d 484, 486 (1987).

¶4 We find the evidence sufficient to demonstrate that Williams entered into the agreement necessary to support the conviction for conspiracy. Under Arizona law, conspiracy requires proof that a defendant 1) with intent to promote or aid the commission of an offense; 2) made an agreement with one or more persons that one of them or another person will engage in conduct constituting the offense; and 3) one of the persons committed an overt act in furtherance of an object of the conspiracy. Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 13-1003(A) (2010).2 Criminal conspiracy rarely can be proved by direct evidence; the agreement may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, specifically the overt conduct of the parties. State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 336, 710 P.2d 440, 446 (1985).

¶5 The evidence in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to conviction and resolving all conflicts against defendant, indicated that despite repeated police commands to stop, Williams ran from a stash house containing more than 500 pounds of marijuana when police made a forced entry on a search warrant. As he was jumping one of the neighbor's fences, a police officer observed him wearing yellow gloves, similar to those found in the house and typically worn by persons packaging marijuana for transport to protect against materials used to mask its odor. When they arrested Williams, police found on him a bank card, a Florida driver's license in another name, and a FedEx card.

¶6 Police had followed a van, which they suspected from a wiretap contained a load of marijuana from Mexico. They observed the van backed up to a door at the rear of the stash house. Police arrested the driver of the van shortly after it left the stash house, and found $150,660 in a trash bag directly behind the driver's seat. The van smelled as if it had contained a large quantity of marijuana. On the driver, police found a napkin containing numbers that police interpreted as weights of the individual bales of marijuana totaling about 300 pounds that the driver had sold to Williams and his codefendants for $150,000.

¶7 The officers obtained a warrant to search the suspected stash house where the van was seen leaving. The stash house contained masking agents, packaging materials, bags commonly used to transport marijuana, two heavy duty scales, two pneumatic compressors, packing peanuts, a handgun, and twenty-three bales of marijuana weighing more than 500 pounds and valued at $250,000, one of which was in the process of being wrapped for packaging. Police also found some marijuana already packaged for shipment, and FedEx shipping labels prepared in a company name used by one of Williams' co-defendants.

¶8 A detective testified that suppliers ordinarily only allow those "very trusted by the organizations involved," typically those "intimately involved" and with "some stake in it" into the stash house. He testified that he did not believe it was possible "for [Williams] to be in a house and not participating in that enterprise given what the evidence presented in this case shows."

¶9 We conclude that a reasonable jury could find this evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams had entered into an agreement with his codefendants and others to purchase marijuana, transport it for sale, and offer it for sale or sell it to others.

¶10 We accordingly affirm William's conviction and sentence for conspiracy. We also affirm his convictions and sentences on the additional offenses of illegally conducting an enterprise, possession of marijuana for sale in an amount over the statutory threshold, and possession of drug paraphernalia.

PATRICIA A. OROZCO, Presiding Judge, PHILIP HALL, Judge, concurring.