THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

TIMMER, Presiding Judge.

¶1 Stephanie J. ("Mother") appeals the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to twelve-year-old J.S. Mother argues the court erred because sufficient evidence did not support its finding that three statutory grounds listed in Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 8-533(B) (West 2012)1 exist to justify severance and severance is in J.S.'s best interests. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

BACKGROUND2

¶2 Mother is the biological parent of J.S., who was born February 19, 2000. She has abused drugs, particularly methamphetamine, since she was fourteen years old.

¶3 On July 20, 2010, Mother was arrested and incarcerated in Arizona for driving under the influence ("DUI"). Shortly thereafter, on August 10, Mother was transferred to Clark County Jail in Nevada pending charges of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. As a result, on August 11, the Arizona Department of Economic Security ("ADES") filed a dependency petition alleging J.S. dependent based on Mother's incarceration and chronic substance abuse. The juvenile court adjudicated J.S. dependent as to Mother and placed J.S. in the custody of a family friend.3

¶4 Over the course of the following year, ADES provided Mother with reunification services. On August 9, 2011, after Mother had minimally participated in some services, but after she had entered an intensive outpatient substance-abuse treatment program in Winslow, Arizona (the "Winslow Program"), ADES moved to sever Mother's parental rights. Because Mother had made progress in the Winslow Program, ADES moved to continue the severance hearing for ninety days to give it more time to evaluate Mother's progress. J.S.'s attorney opposed the motion, and the juvenile court denied it. After a four-day termination hearing in December, the court found that ADES had proven by clear and convincing evidence the grounds of chronic substance abuse, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), out-of-home placement for nine months or longer, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a), out-of-home placement for fifteen months or longer, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), and that severance was in J.S.'s best interests, A.R.S. § 8-533(B). Consequently, the court severed Mother's parental rights on January 18, 2012. Mother timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶5 The juvenile court may terminate the parent-child relationship only upon finding that clear and convincing evidence demonstrates at least one statutory ground for severance and that a preponderance of the evidence shows severance is in the child's best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22, 110 P.3d 1013, 1018 (2005). We will affirm unless the court abused its discretion by making "factual findings [that] are clearly erroneous, that is, unless there is no reasonable evidence to support them." Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 2, 982 P.2d 1290, 1291 (App. 1998). "[T]he juvenile court will be deemed to have made every finding necessary to support the judgment." Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-8287, 171 Ariz. 104, 111, 828 P.2d 1245, 1252 (App. 1991) (citations omitted). With these principles in mind, we consider Mother's arguments.

I. Statutory grounds for severance

¶6 Mother argues the juvenile court erred because the evidence did not support findings that three statutory grounds listed in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) exist to justify severance. If the evidence supports any one of the statutory grounds, we need not address contentions relevant to the other grounds. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 251, ¶ 27, 995 P.2d 682, 687 (2000); Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002). Thus, we only discuss the ground of out-of-home placement for fifteen months or longer, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), because resolution of the challenge to the existence of that ground is dispositive of this appeal.

¶7 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), the court was authorized to terminate Mother's parental rights if (1) J.S. had been in an out-of-home placement for fifteen months or longer, (2) Mother had been unable to remedy the circumstances causing J.S. to be in that placement, (3) a substantial likelihood existed Mother would not be able to properly care for J.S. in the near future, and (4) ADES had made diligent efforts to provide reunification services. Mother does not contest that sufficient evidence supports factor (1), but she challenges the court's findings on the remaining factors.

A. Ability to remedy circumstances

¶8 The juvenile court found that Mother had a chronic substance-abuse problem yet failed to participate in most of the services offered by ADES, including inpatient drug treatment, "continue[d] to be homeless, with no legal means of income or stable home," and "[could not] provide for [J.S.'s] basic needs including shelter, food, and clothing." The court further noted at the severance hearing that visits between Mother and J.S. had never progressed from supervised to unsupervised.

¶9 Mother argues the evidence is insufficient to establish she was unable to remedy the circumstances that caused J.S.'s out-of-home placement because Mother could have provided shelter for J.S. at the sober-living residence where she had lived since commencing treatment at the Winslow Program. She relies on testimony from Child Protective Services ("CPS") acting supervisor Melinda Foy, who stated the sober-living residence permitted children to live with a parent there and that CPS allows such placements. We are not persuaded to overturn the court's findings on the basis of this testimony.

¶10 First, Foy also testified that Mother could only reside at the sober-living residence temporarily, and she would have to secure permanent housing. But the evidence showed Mother's prospects for securing housing in the near future was uncertain, at best. Foy testified that immediately prior to J.S.'s removal, Mother did not have a permanent home but instead moved from friend to friend with J.S. in tow. After removal, and contrary to the case plan, Mother failed to secure any employment or housing until moving into the sober-living residence. Mother admitted at trial she lacked any income and acknowledged an outstanding warrant for her arrest existed due to her failure to pay a DUI fine.

¶11 Second, Foy also testified that in light of the longevity of Mother's separation from J.S., the instability of their lives before removal,4 and Mother's relatively short time in a rehabilitation program, Foy would expect a very slow and lengthy transition to return J.S. to Mother. Consequently, Foy stated CPS "would not be prepared to just move [J.S.] back in with [Mother]" at the sober-living residence.

¶12 In sum, Foy's testimony did not contradict the court's finding that Mother had been unable to secure stable housing or place herself in a position to provide shelter for J.S. Consequently, and because the court made other findings addressing Mother's inability to remedy the circumstances that caused the out-of-home placement, we reject Mother's challenge to the court's ruling on this factor.

B. Acquiring ability to care for J.S. in near future

¶13 Mother argues insufficient evidence exists she would not be able to exercise proper and effective parental care and control of J.S. in the near future because the finding is based entirely on conclusory testimony by Foy and CPS caseworker Caleb Chappelear, and even ADES believed Mother could parent J.S. in the near future as evidenced by its motion to continue the severance trial. We disagree.

¶14 Foy, who holds a master's degree in forensic psychology and has worked for CPS and its Michigan counterpart for a combined eight years, testified without objection a substantial likelihood exists Mother would not be capable of exercising parental care and control in the near future. Her testimony was not conclusory. When asked to give reasons for her opinion, Foy testified as follows:

Elaborating on Mother's need for parenting classes to gain insight into the effects of substance abuse on children and to develop empathetic skills, Foy related that Mother had previously smoked methamphetamine with her children other than J.S., and she had kicked then-sixteen-year-old K.S. and K.S.'s infant out from their living situation to fend for themselves without any resources, including food and baby supplies.

¶15 Chappelear also testified a substantial likelihood exists Mother would not be capable of exercising parental care and control in the near future. Elsewhere in his testimony, after relating his training and stating that his duties include formulating an opinion regarding whether a person is unable to parent due to chronic substance abuse, Chappelear opined, without objection, that Mother "would have great difficulty continuing to parent [J.S.] in the future due to her prolonged substance abuse." He also echoed Foy's testimony about Mother's lack of parenting skills by stating Mother had displayed a "lack of interest" during her supervised visits with J.S., electing to spend time on her cell phone rather than interacting with her son.

¶16 The testimony from Foy and Chappelear, together with evidence Mother had attended only one parenting class before entering the Winslow Program, had minimally participated in reunification services, see infra ¶ 19, had only been sober for fifty-one days in a controlled environment prior to trial,6 and had no income, supports the juvenile court's finding that a substantial likelihood exists Mother would not be capable of exercising parental care and control in the near future. Although ADES asked for a ninety-day continuance of the severance trial to further evaluate Mother's progress, ADES's motion is not evidence, and ADES never wavered from its position that the court should sever Mother's parental rights.

C. Reunification services

¶17 Mother next argues the juvenile court erred by finding that ADES provided Mother with sufficient reunification services. Specifically, Mother faults ADES for providing her referrals to local rehabilitation service providers when her prognosis for recovery while near her friends and acquaintances was poor.

¶18 Prior to severance under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), ADES must "demonstrate that it has made a reasonable effort to preserve the family." Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 33, 971 P.2d 1046, 1053 (App. 1999). "Although CPS need not provide `every conceivable service,' it must provide a parent with the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to improve the parent's ability to care for the child." Id. at ¶ 37 (citing Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353, 884 P.2d 234, 239 (App. 1994)). ADES is required to undertake efforts "with a reasonable prospect of success," but is not required to engage in efforts that would be "futile." Id. at ¶ 34.

¶19 The record demonstrates ADES made ample attempts to provide Mother with appropriate reunification services. ADES provided Mother with parenting classes, substance-abuse treatment, mental-health assessment, individual counseling, drug testing, supervised visitation, and parent-aide services. On four separate occasions, ADES referred Mother to substance-abuse treatment providers, and on all four occasions Mother was discharged from the program for lack of participation. Before her entry into the Winslow Program, she only attended one parenting class and tested for drugs just twice.

¶20 We reject Mother's contention ADES's referrals were doomed to fail because they did not remove her from Bullhead City "where she was living and using." She relies on Fred Elsen's testimony that Mother had reported realizing she could not remain sober if she remained in the Bullhead City area among her peers because they "triggered" her abusive habits. Elsen then opined Mother would not have gotten sober had she remained in Bullhead City. But we are not aware of any authority requiring ADES to automatically remove a substance-abusing parent from his or her geographic environment to provide services with a reasonable prospect of success; Mother does not cite any. And Mother does not point to any evidence she ever informed ADES of needing to leave the Bullhead City area to successfully participate in a recovery program. According to Chappelear, Mother's only excuse for not participating in the inpatient treatment referrals was "she didn't feel that she needed to go to something like that." Absent some indication Mother would not succeed in the referred rehabilitation services because of their location, we cannot fault ADES for failing to refer services located outside Bullhead City.

¶21 Additionally, other evidence casts doubt on Mother's claim she did not participate in referred services because she could not have succeeded while remaining in the Bullhead City area. First, although Mother lived in Bullhead City for eight months in 2007, she had only returned to the area in June 2009, which was approximately one year before ADES removed J.S. and commenced offering services to Mother. Accordingly, her ties to that community were not of long duration. Second, Mother failed to participate in four referred inpatient substance-abuse programs, which, by definition, would have isolated her from her routine of seeing friends who purportedly triggered her abuse of drugs. Mother's contention would be stronger had she participated in these programs and then requested ongoing services outside Bullhead City if she believed she would return to her habits upon discharge. Third, if Mother believed she had to leave the area to successfully participate in programs, no reason appears why she waited to do so. Mother testified she waited eleven months to enter the Winslow Program because she lacked insurance to pay for it until she obtained AHCCCS at the end of June 2011. The court could have rejected this explanation, however, as other evidence showed she had AHCCCS coverage and knew it by at least October 2010 and she only needed to reapply to maintain coverage.

¶22 For all these reasons, the juvenile court did not err by finding that ADES provided Mother with appropriate reunification services.

II. Best interests

¶23 Mother finally argues the juvenile court erred by finding it was in J.S.'s best interests to terminate the parent-child relationship. In considering J.S.'s best interests, the court was required to determine how J.S. would benefit from the severance or be harmed by the continuation of his relationship with Mother. Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5, 804 P.2d 730, 734 (1990).

¶24 The juvenile court concluded that severance would benefit J.S. "because it would free the child for adoption and provide the child with stability in a safe, drug-free home with parents who are actively involved in his life." Sufficient evidence supports this ruling. According to Chappelear, J.S. always seems happy when visited at his foster family's home. J.S.'s foster parents want to adopt him, and J.S. has expressed his desire for the adoption. His foster father is a teacher at J.S.'s school and his mother is the school secretary. J.S. has educational delays and "they both are very involved in his education and making sure that whoever his special ed teachers are are giving him the services that he needs." J.S. would have three siblings upon adoption, and adoption would give him a permanent and drug-free home. Furthermore, J.S. had lived in two separate placements for fifteen months and expressed a desire for stability in his life. Mother could not provide this stability as, at the time of trial, she had no income, no job, was living in a sober-living residence without paying rent, and had a warrant for her arrest.

¶25 In light of the above-described evidence, the juvenile court did not err by finding that severance of Mother's parental rights to J.S. was in J.S.'s best interests.

CONCLUSION

¶26 For the forgoing reasons, we affirm.7

Patricia K. Norris, Judge, and Donn Kessler, Judge, concurring.