THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

THOMPSON, Judge.

¶1 Defendant Jaren Troy David Lamb appeals his sentences for two counts of aggravated DUI committed on March 25, 2010. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶2 On September 23, 2010, the state charged defendant with one count of aggravated DUI — impaired, and one count of aggravated DUI — .08 or more, both class 4 felonies. The state disclosed a list of nine prior felony convictions it intended to use at trial for crimes committed by defendant on September 22, 2000 (one offense), October 7, 2000 (three offenses), and December 16, 2001 (five offenses). The state requested a jury determination of defendant's conviction of one prior felony offense committed within ten years preceding the current offenses, citing the five felonies committed on December 16, 2001. The state further alleged that defendant had "prior and repetitive convictions" pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 13-703 (2010), citing the felony committed on September 22, 2000 and the three felonies committed on October 7, 2000.

¶3 After a jury trial which he did not attend, defendant was convicted as charged. The trial court then conducted a bench trial on defendant's historical priors and concluded that defendant had two prior felonies for enhancement purposes and a third prior felony for aggravation purposes. After considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the court sentenced defendant to concurrent ten-year presumptive sentences with credit for 77 days of pre-sentence incarceration. Defendant timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Constitution Article VI, Section 9, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003), 13-4031 (2010), and -4033(A) (2010).

Sentence Enhancement

¶4 Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a category three repetitive offender. The trial court found that defendant had two historical prior felony convictions for the purposes of sentence enhancement — one committed on September 22, 2000, and another committed on October 7, 2000. Defendant did not object at trial to the use of these two priors for enhancement purposes; we therefore review this issue for fundamental error. See State v. Rasul, 216 Ariz. 491, 496, ¶ 20, 167 P.3d 1286, 1291 (2007).

¶5 We find no error, fundamental or otherwise. A.R.S. § 13-703(C) provides, in relevant part, that "a person shall be sentenced as a category three repetitive offender if the person. . . stands convicted of a felony and has two or more historical prior felony convictions." Here, defendant was convicted of two felonies, and had two historical prior felony convictions committed on September 22, 2000 and October 7, 2000. Defendant argues that the trial court should have sentenced him as a category two repetitive offender under A.R.S. § 13-703(B)(1) because the September 22, 2000 and October 7, 2000 felonies were consolidated for plea proceedings, citing State v. Ofstedahl, 208 Ariz. 406, 407, ¶ 4, 93 P.3d 1122, 1123 (App. 2004). Ofstedahl does not support defendant's argument. In Ofstedahl, we held that the term "historical prior conviction" meant that the conviction on a prior offense must precede the conviction on a defendant's present offense, explaining that the legislature had eliminated the use of Hannah1 priors for sentence enhancement purposes in 1993. 208 Ariz. at 407-08, ¶ 4-5, 93 P.3d at 1123-24. The Ofstedahl scenario, where some of a defendant's convictions were used to enhance other convictions entered at the same time, is not present here. Accordingly, we find no error.

Presumptive Sentences

¶6 Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to presumptive terms of incarceration. He argues that the court used an improper aggravator and failed to weigh the mitigating and aggravating factors.

¶7 In sentencing defendant, the trial court stated:

When defendant objected to the court's finding that defendant had an "extensive criminal history" on the basis that it fell under the catch-all provision of A.R.S. § 13-701(D), the trial court clarified that it was using the remaining historical prior felony conviction not used to enhance defendant's sentence as an aggravator:

We find no abuse of discretion with regard to the aggravator. See A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(11) (2010) (prior felony conviction within ten years preceding the date of current offense is an aggravating factor). Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to weigh the mitigating and aggravating circumstances. It is well-established that the trial court need not state factors supporting a presumptive sentence, but "[i]n balancing aggravating and mitigating factors, the trial court is not required to make its decision based upon the mere numbers of aggravating or mitigating circumstances." State v. Willcoxson, 156 Ariz. 343, 347, 751 P.2d 1385, 1389 (App. 1987). The trial court in this case clearly considered the individual circumstances of defendant before sentencing him to presumptive terms.

¶8 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences.

MAURICE PORTLEY, Presiding Judge, ANDREW W. GOULD, Judge, concurring.