THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

VÁSQUEZ, Presiding Judge.

¶ 1 After a jury trial, appellant Nicholas Narcho was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence of intoxicants and aggravated driving with an alcohol concentration of .08 or more, both while his driver license was suspended, cancelled, or revoked. The trial court found he had three historical prior felony convictions and sentenced him to enhanced, partially mitigated, concurrent prison terms of eight years. On appeal, Narcho argues the court abused its discretion "by failing to consider all the mitigating factors presented at sentencing." For the following reason, we affirm Narcho's convictions and sentences.1

¶ 2 Before sentencing, Narcho asserted numerous mitigating circumstances and asked the trial court to impose the shortest prison term available under A.R.S. § 13-703(J). The court found Narcho's remorse and his commitment to engage in treatment to be mitigating circumstances that were "sufficiently substantial" to justify a partially mitigated, "minimum" term. A.R.S. §§ 13-701(F), 13-703(J). But Narcho argues the other mitigating circumstances he had alleged "were uncontested" and "[t]here was no reason [for the court] to reject the other six factors" he had proposed.2

¶ 3 "A trial court has broad discretion to determine the appropriate penalty to impose upon conviction." State v. Cazares, 205 Ariz. 425, ¶ 6, 72 P.3d 355, 357 (App. 2003). Accordingly, "we will not disturb a sentence that," like Narcho's, "is within statutory limits . . . unless it clearly appears that the court abused its discretion." Id. "[A] reviewing court may find abuse of discretion when the sentencing decision is arbitrary or capricious, or when the court fails to conduct an adequate investigation into the facts relevant to sentencing." State v. Fillmore, 187 Ariz. 174, 184, 927 P.2d 1303, 1313 (App. 1996).

¶ 4 But, as we explained in Cazares, "a sentencing court is not required to find that mitigating circumstances exist merely because mitigating evidence is presented; the court is only required to give the evidence due consideration." 205 Ariz. 425, ¶ 8, 72 P.3d at 357; see also State v. Fatty, 150 Ariz. 587, 592, 724 P.2d 1256, 1261 (App. 1986). Moreover, "we presume the court considered any evidence relevant to sentencing that was before it." Cazares, 205 Ariz. 425, ¶ 7, 72 P.3d at 357.

¶ 5 Here, Narcho presented evidence before sentencing that he believed to be relevant in mitigation. On appeal, he offers nothing to rebut the presumption that the trial court fully considered that evidence before imposing sentence, and it appears the court did so. We find no merit to Narcho's implicit and unsupported suggestion that, because the evidence he presented was "uncontested," the court was required to find such evidence constituted mitigating circumstances warranting a lesser sentence. See id. ¶ 8.

¶ 6 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Narcho to enhanced, partially mitigated prison terms, as authorized by statute. See A.R.S. § 13-703(J). Accordingly, Narcho's convictions and sentences are affirmed.

PHILIP G. ESPINOSA, Judge, VIRGINIA C. KELLY, Judge, concurring.