THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ECKERSTROM, Presiding Judge.

¶1 Jessica E., mother of Aliviah M., born in September 2006, appeals from the juvenile court's June 2012 order terminating her rights to the child based on length of time in court-ordered care, see A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c); the fact that within eighteen months of having been returned to Jessica's custody in a previous dependency proceeding, Aliviah was again removed and placed in court-ordered care, see § 8-533(B)(11); and chronic substance abuse, see § 8-533(B)(3). Jessica contends there was insufficient evidence to terminate her parental rights pursuant to § 8-533(B)(8)(c). She also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding that termination of her rights was in Aliviah's best interests. We affirm for the reasons stated below.

¶2 To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must find that clear and convincing evidence establishes the existence of at least one of the statutory grounds for termination that are set forth in § 8-533(B). Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, ¶ 12, 995 P.2d 682, 685 (2000). On appeal "we will accept the juvenile court's findings of fact unless no reasonable evidence supports those findings, and we will affirm a severance order unless it is clearly erroneous." Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 4, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002). We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences permitted by that evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the order. Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, ¶ 2, 181 P.3d 1126, 1128 (App. 2008).

¶3 The record establishes that Child Protective Services (CPS) first became involved with Jessica, Aliviah, and the child's father in September 2007, after a report of domestic violence between the parents. Although the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES) provided Jessica with intensive in-home services, in September 2008, four months after Jessica completed those services, she drove her car while under the influence of alcohol, with Aliviah riding as a passenger, and drove over the median in a parking lot. Jessica became combative with a police officer as she was being arrested. She pled no contest to charges of endangerment, driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), and aggravated assault of a peace officer in connection with that incident, and was required to serve a 120-day jail term as a condition of the three years' probation imposed.

¶4 ADES filed a dependency petition on September 16, 2008, based on the DUI incident and Jessica's history of drug use. Aliviah was adjudicated dependent in November 2008 after Jessica pled no contest to the allegations. ADES provided the family with a variety of services and returned Aliviah to Jessica's physical custody in December 2009, dismissing the dependency proceeding in April 2010. But on May 28, 2010, Jessica's probation officer visited Jessica's home unannounced and found Aliviah and Jessica's two-year-old sister with Jessica, who was crying and intoxicated. ADES took custody of Aliviah and filed a new dependency petition on June 3, 2010. Aliviah was adjudicated dependent in July after Jessica admitted allegations in an amended dependency petition.

¶5 ADES again provided Jessica with a plethora of services designed to assist her in addressing her serious substance abuse issues and attaining the case-plan goal of reunification. Many of the services focused on her persistent substance abuse, although she was provided with services addressing mental-health and parenting issues as well, including a psychological evaluation and individual counseling. In February 2011, Jessica enrolled in residential drug treatment, and, because she seemed to be doing well, the juvenile court gave her additional time to remedy the circumstances that had caused the court to conclude Aliviah could not safely be returned to her. At the May 2011 permanency hearing the court found Jessica in compliance with the case plan and ordered ADES to continue to provide her with services.

¶6 Jessica had tested positive for methamphetamine in October, November, and December 2010, as well as in January and February 2011. She often skipped urinalysis testing or submitted to urinalysis testing but produced diluted results. She was, at times, noncompliant with various services, including Family Drug Court (FDC), from which she ultimately was terminated as unsuccessful. At a dependency review hearing in November 2011, the juvenile court found Jessica was not in compliance with her case plan and granted ADES leave to file a motion to terminate Jessica's parental rights.

¶7 ADES filed the motion followed by an amended motion, alleging three grounds for terminating Jessica's parental rights: substance abuse, length of time in care, and prior removal. In June 2012, after a hearing was conducted over three days in April 2012, the juvenile court granted ADES's motion, terminating Jessica's parental rights to Aliviah on all three grounds. This appeal followed.

¶8 Jessica contends on appeal there was insufficient evidence to terminate her parental rights to Aliviah pursuant to § 8-533(B)(8)(c) in light of the efforts she had made to address her substance abuse and other issues. She relies on that portion of In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 576, 869 P.2d 1224, 1229 (App. 1994), in which this court stated that parents who make "appreciable, good faith efforts to comply with remedial programs outlined by ADES will not be found to have substantially neglected to remedy the circumstances that caused out-of-home placement, even if they cannot completely overcome their difficulties."1 Jessica points to evidence demonstrating her efforts to comply with the case plan, suggesting the juvenile court "did not take into account all the positive things she had done to remedy her situation." Jessica also maintains her efforts were thwarted by factors beyond her control, such as the termination of her health care coverage under the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (AHCCCS), which meant she was unable to get the psychiatric services or medication she needed for depression and anxiety. Additionally, she claims her caseworker was unable to get her any housing subsidies, which made it virtually impossible for her to secure and maintain stable housing. Jessica insists she "remedied most of the reasons" Aliviah had been removed from the home and that there is a "substantial likelihood that she will be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future."

¶9 As ADES correctly points out, Jessica only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the termination of her rights pursuant to § 8-533(B)(8)(c). But when the juvenile court terminates a parent's rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm the order if there is sufficient evidence supporting at least one ground. Jesus M., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 3, 53 P.3d at 205. By not challenging the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the two other statutory grounds for terminating her rights—chronic substance abuse, § 8-533(B)(3), and previous removal, § 8-533(B)(11)—Jessica has effectively conceded there was sufficient evidence supporting the findings related to those grounds. Cf. DeElena v. S. Pac. Co., 121 Ariz. 563, 572, 592 P.2d 759, 768 (1979) (issues not argued in brief deemed abandoned on appeal). For this reason alone, we may find there existed two statutory bases for terminating Jessica's parental rights.

¶10 In any event, in its thorough, five-page minute entry order the juvenile court stated it had considered all of the evidence before it and had assessed the credibility of the witnesses, and entered detailed factual findings which were the bases for its conclusion that ADES had established all three grounds for terminating Jessica's parental rights alleged in its motion. The factual findings are amply supported by the record. Consequently, we adopt the court's ruling here, finding no purpose would be served by restating the court's ruling in its entirety. See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 16, 53 P.3d at 207-08, citing State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274, 866 P.2d 1358, 1360 (App. 1993).

¶11 Jessica also challenges the juvenile court's finding that termination of her parental rights was in Aliviah's best interests. The requisite best-interests finding must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. § 8-533(B); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, ¶ 22, 110 P.3d 1013, 1018 (2005). To sustain its burden of establishing termination is in a child's best interests, ADES must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child would benefit from the termination of the parents' rights or be harmed if the parental relationships were permitted to continue. Lawrence R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 585, ¶¶ 7-8, 177 P.3d 327, 329 (App. 2008). Among the factors relevant to a court's best-interests finding is that an adoptive plan exists for the child or the child is adoptable. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, ¶ 19, 83 P.3d 43, 50 (App. 2004). The court may also consider whether the child's needs are being met by the current placement. In re Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-8490, 179 Ariz. 102, 107, 876 P.2d 1137, 1142 (1994).

¶12 Here, the juvenile court found ADES had sustained its burden of proving "by a preponderance of the evidence" that termination of Aliviah's parents' rights was in her best interests "because she is in need of permanency. She is considered to be adoptable. Her current placement is willing to adopt [her]." The court further found that a relative of Aliviah's also was interested in adopting her. In challenging the court's best-interests finding, Jessica contends there was evidence that Aliviah misses her mother, adding, "Nobody doubted that her parenting skills were good, that she and Aliviah were bonded."

¶13 The evidence Jessica relies on, however, does not negate the juvenile court's findings or its conclusion that termination of Jessica's parental rights was in Aliviah's best interests. Moreover, the court was well aware of that evidence, and it was for that court, not this court, to weigh all of the evidence and determine whether, on balance, Aliviah would benefit if her parents' rights were terminated or would suffer a detriment if the relationship were to remain. See Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 4, 100 P.3d 943, 945 (App. 2004) (as trier of fact, juvenile court "is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts").

¶14 We will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Lashonda M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 210 Ariz. 77, ¶ 13, 107 P.3d 923, 927 (App. 2005). The record contains reasonable evidence establishing Aliviah's foster placement was meeting her needs and was willing to adopt her. ADES also was exploring the possibility of having Aliviah's maternal aunt adopt her. Additionally, given the evidence about Jessica's persistent problems with substance abuse and the effect those problems and her mental health issues had over an extended period of time on her ability to parent Aliviah properly, we cannot say the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding termination was in Aliviah's best interests.

¶15 For the reasons stated, we affirm the juvenile court's order terminating Jessica's parental rights to Aliviah.

JOSEPH W. HOWARD, Chief Judge, J. WILLIAM BRAMMER, JR., Judge*, concurring.