THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Not for Publication Rule 28, Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure

ESPINOSA, Judge.

¶1 In this appeal from the juvenile court's order adjudicating him delinquent for threatening or intimidating his school's assistant principal, Dakota R. contends the state presented insufficient evidence to sustain the court's adjudication. We disagree and, therefore, affirm.

¶2 In October 2011, the assistant principal of Coronado School, Michelle Goodman, received information from a crossing guard that a parent had reported students "were hearing that Dakota was saying that he was going to bring a gun to school." Goodman had disciplined Dakota shortly before receiving the report, suspending him from school. Goodman investigated the report, and spoke to two students who had heard Dakota's statements, ultimately reporting the incident to the Pima County Sheriff's Department.

¶3 The first student, M.T., to whom Dakota had spoken directly, testified at the adjudication hearing that he had been "angry and upset" and, although she did not recall his words exactly, he had said "something to do with Miss Goodman and blowing up the school and a gun." The second student, A.T., who had overheard Dakota's statements, testified he had said "he was gonna blow up the school and that he didn't like the principal at the school." And he testified Dakota had cursed, using the "F-word." A detective from the Pima County Sheriff's Department, who had investigated when Goodman reported the incident to the Department, also testified that M.T. told him Dakota had said "he wished that he could come to the—bring a gun to school and/or blow up the school."

¶4 After the hearing, the juvenile court found the state had not proven its first charge against Dakota—interference with or disruption of an educational institution. But it adjudicated Dakota delinquent on a second charge—threatening or intimidating Goodman. The court placed Dakota on a four-month term of probation and ordered him to perform sixteen hours of community service. This appeal followed.

¶5 Dakota argues the adjudication of delinquency should be reversed because the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had made "a true threat, in violation of A.R.S. §[ ]13-1202(A)(1)." "To determine whether sufficient evidence existed to support adjudicating" Dakota delinquent, "we must consider admissible evidence in the light most favorable to supporting the verdict." In re Julio L., 197 Ariz. 1, ¶ 6, 3 P.3d 383, 384-85 (2000). We do not reweigh the evidence presented and "will only reverse on the grounds of insufficient evidence if there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the judgment or if the judgment is contrary to any substantial evidence." In re John M., 201 Ariz. 424, ¶ 7, 36 P.3d 772, 774 (App. 2001).

¶6 A person commits threatening or intimidating pursuant to § 13-1202(A)(1) "if the person threatens or intimidates by word or conduct . . . [t]o cause physical injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another." Although the state need not demonstrate the person acted with wrongful intent, had the ability to carry out the threat, or intended to do so, the state must show the person communicated a "true threat." In re Kyle M., 200 Ariz. 447, ¶¶ 14-15, 23, 27 P.3d 804, 807, 808-09 (App. 2001). A statement is a true threat if, in light of the context and circumstances, a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted "as a serious expression of an intent to inflict bodily harm." Id. ¶ 23. This "objective test does not require a subjective analysis of the belief of the particular person to whom the threat is made." In re Ryan A., 202 Ariz. 19, ¶ 11, 39 P.3d 543, 546 (App. 2002). Likewise, "`[t]he speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.'" Citizen Publ'g Co. v. Miller, 210 Ariz. 513, ¶ 28, 115 P.3d 107, 114 (2005) (discussing "true threat" doctrine in context of whether state can place certain speech outside First Amendment protection through tort law), quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003). Rather, the prohibition against "`true threats protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engenders, in addition to protecting people from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.'" Id., quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (alteration in original).

¶7 Viewing Dakota's statements here in the context in which they were made and considering their content, we cannot say there was an absence of evidence to support the juvenile court's implicit conclusion that he had made a true threat. See id. ¶¶ 30-33 (court considers statements' content and context to determine if true threat). M.T. testified she had not believed what Dakota was saying, but her subjective belief was not required. See Ryan A., 202 Ariz. 19, ¶ 11, 39 P.3d at 546. And, based on the fact that a parent ultimately reported the statements to a school employee, the juvenile court could infer that someone who had heard about Dakota's statements believed them sufficiently serious to report them.

¶8 Furthermore, despite M.T.'s claimed skepticism about Dakota's statements, both she and A.T. testified Dakota had seemed angry when he made the statements. And there was evidence that Goodman had disciplined Dakota, giving him reason for genuine anger and a basis for an objective belief that he had made a true threat against her. Likewise, nothing about the content of the statements, as reported in the testimony at trial, suggested they were intended as a joke. Thus, we cannot agree with Dakota's argument that the juvenile court should have concluded that his statements were merely "made in jest or during idle talk." Kyle M., 200 Ariz. 447, ¶ 18, 27 P.3d at 808. Nor can we consider these statements to be in the nature of "political hyperbole." Id. In sum, we cannot say there was a "complete absence of probative facts" from which the court could conclude Dakota had made a true threat. John M., 201 Ariz. 424, ¶ 7, 36 P.3d at 774.

¶9 The juvenile court's adjudication and disposition order are affirmed.

GARYE L. VÁSQUEZ, Presiding Judge, VIRGINIA C. KELLY, Judge, concurring.