THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Not for Publication Rule 28, Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure

PHILIP G. ESPINOSA, Judge.

¶1 James and Mark Reed appeal from a superior court judgment affirming a decision by the Arizona Game and Fish Commission revoking their hunting licenses, suspending their privilege to hunt or fish for five years, and imposing a civil penalty of $1,500 jointly against them, as well as the superior court's denial of their "Motion to Vacate and for Rehearing." The Reeds argue the Commission incorrectly construed various portions of the statutes and regulations applicable to license revocation and its findings of fact and conclusions of law were insufficient to sustain the revocation of their licenses. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Background

¶2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the administrative decision. See Richard E. Lambert, Ltd. v. City of Tucson Dep't of Procurement, 223 Ariz. 184, ¶ 2, 221 P.3d 375, 377 (App. 2009). In February 2010, while Mark and his father James were hunting javelina in the Buenos Aires National Wildlife Refuge in Southern Arizona, Mark shot and killed a mountain lion.1 Immediately afterward, other hunters approached and reportedly encouraged him to tag and remove the lion so as "not to let the game meat go to waste." Although both Mark and James possessed valid hunting licenses and javelina tags, only James had a mountain lion tag, so Mark put James's tag on the carcass before loading it into Mark's truck and driving away.

¶3 Meanwhile, another hunter reported the kill to the Game and Fish Department's poaching hotline, and the Reeds were stopped at a U.S. Border Patrol immigration checkpoint near Amado, Arizona. When Game and Fish Department officers arrived and questioned them about the incident, both men initially said that James had killed the mountain lion; however, when they were separated and questioned again, both admitted Mark had in fact made the kill and James had permitted Mark to use his mountain lion tag.

¶4 Mark was cited for taking wildlife without a permit or tag, possessing unlawfully taken wildlife, using the big-game tag of another, and taking wildlife in a closed area. James was cited for knowingly allowing another to use his big-game tag. In the Pima County Justice Court, Mark pleaded no contest to possessing unlawfully taken wildlife and using another's tag, and the remaining charges against him were dismissed. James pleaded no contest to the single charge against him. Subsequently, after a hearing, the Commission revoked the Reeds' hunting licenses for a period of five years, ordered them to complete a hunter education course before reapplying for a license, and imposed a $1,500 assessment against them jointly. The Commission denied their request for rehearing, and the superior court affirmed the administrative decision. We have jurisdiction over their appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-913.

Discussion

¶5 In reviewing an administrative decision, the superior court decides whether the action taken was illegal, arbitrary, or capricious or involved an abuse of discretion. Brown v. Ariz. Dep't of Real Estate, 181 Ariz. 320, 323, 890 P.2d 615, 618 (App. 1995). We in turn determine whether that court's judgment is supported by the record, a question of law we review de novo. Id. We begin with the Reeds' general argument that the Commission lacked statutory or regulatory authority to revoke their hunting licenses under the circumstances of this case. Section 17-340, A.R.S., authorizes the Commission to revoke or suspend a person's hunting license for up to five years if he or she has been convicted of certain hunting offenses. These offenses include unlawfully taking or possessing wildlife and knowingly allowing another to use the person's big-game tag. § 17-340(A)(1), (5). To effectuate this legislative directive, the Commission has promulgated certain regulations, including Ariz. Admin. Code R12-4-605, which directs the Commission to hold a hearing before revoking a license for certain hunting violations.

¶6 R12-4-605(B) requires the Commission to hold a hearing when it intends to "revoke, suspend, or deny any hunting[,] fishing, or trapping license if the Department recommends revocation, suspension, or denial of the license for an individual [who has been] convicted of" certain enumerated offenses. These offenses include, among others,

The Reeds contend that neither § 17-340 nor R12-4-605 authorized the Commission to revoke their hunting licenses in this case. Although they acknowledge that § 17-340 clearly grants the Commission authority to revoke hunting licenses, they suggest that the Commission has limited its power to exercise that authority by promulgating R12-4-605, which, they argue, sets forth a narrower standard governing revocation of hunting licenses.

¶7 An administrative agency must follow the rules it has promulgated. See Cochise Cnty. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 170 Ariz. 443, 445, 825 P.2d 968, 970 (App. 1991). While we are free to draw our own legal conclusions, an agency's interpretation of statutes and its own regulations is entitled to judicial deference. Capitol Castings, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 171 Ariz. 57, 60, 828 P.2d 781, 784 (App. 1992). The Commission maintains that R12-4-605 does not limit its power to revoke licenses under § 17-340 but merely enumerates the violations for which the Commission is required to hold a hearing before imposing a license sanction. Although the title of R12-4-605, "Standards for Revocation, Suspension, or Denial of a License," provides some support for the Reeds' argument that the regulation sets forth the specific conditions under which the Commission may revoke a license, other considerations belie this theory.

¶8 First, the title of R12-4-605 is not part of the regulation. See State v. Hollenback, 212 Ariz. 12, ¶ 5, 126 P.3d 159, 162 (App. 2005) (statutory heading not part of law and may only aid in resolving ambiguity in statute if one exists); Stapert v. Ariz. Bd. of Psychologist Exam'rs, 210 Ariz. 177, ¶ 7, 108 P.3d 956, 958 (App. 2005) ("The rules for interpreting statutes apply equally to administrative regulations."). And nothing in the body of R12-4-605 suggests the Commission intended to limit the authority granted to it in § 17-340; rather, R12-4-605 sets forth the circumstances under which the Commission must hold a hearing before revoking a license. Furthermore, even if R12-4-605 did limit the authority granted to the Commission by § 17-340, it would not provide the Reeds with a ground for reinstatement of their licenses because "an administrative rule that diminishes rights in an enabling statute is not valid." Freelance Interpreting Servs., Inc. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 212 Ariz. 457, ¶ 26, 133 P.3d 1163, 1167 (App. 2006). But, in any event, we are constrained to avoid such an interpretation. See Marlar v. State, 136 Ariz. 404, 411, 666 P.2d 504, 511 (App. 1983) (administrative regulation interpreted to "further the statutory policy contained in its enabling legislation"; courts avoid interpretation that would render any clause, sentence, or word void, contradictory, or insignificant). Accordingly, we agree with the superior court that R12-4-605 does not limit the Commission's authority to revoke a license pursuant to § 17-340.

¶9 We further agree that § 17-340 authorized the revocation at issue here. As noted above, § 17-340(A)(1) provides for the revocation of a hunting license if the licensee is convicted of unlawful possession of wildlife. One of the offenses of which Mark was convicted was possession of wildlife without a valid tag in violation of A.R.S. § 17-309(A)(17). Thus, his conviction of this possession offense provided a ground for the revocation of his license. See § 17-340(A)(1). With respect to James, § 17-340(A)(5) provides for the revocation of a hunting license if the licensee is convicted of knowingly allowing another person to use the licensee's big-game tag. James was convicted of allowing Mark to use his tag, see § 17-309(A)(1); Ariz. Admin. Code R12-4-302(D); thus, the revocation of his license also was specifically authorized by § 17-340.

¶10 The Reeds additionally argue that the Commission's findings of fact and conclusions of law were "insufficient to permit sound judicial review" and that the revocation of their licenses should be set aside on this ground. The Commission responds that its findings were sufficient to support the license revocation because they referred to the Reeds' convictions in justice court, which was all that was necessary to support the revocation under § 17-340(A).

¶11 Section 41-1063, A.R.S., requires that any final decision of an administrative agency "shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated." Such findings need only contain enough detail for a reviewing court to discern how the agency arrived at its conclusion. Shelby Sch. v. Ariz. State Bd. of Educ., 192 Ariz. 156, ¶ 21, 962 P.2d 230, 237 (App. 1998). As discussed earlier, § 17-340 authorizes revocation of a hunting license upon a showing that the licensee has been convicted of an offense described in that section. Here, the Commission's findings of fact included the Reeds' respective convictions for offenses listed in § 17-340, and its conclusions of law cited that section as the basis for revocation. Thus, in contrast to Shelby School, in which this court concluded the administrative agency's findings were insufficient because the agency had "cite[d] to the entire record as the basis for its decision," 192 Ariz. 156, ¶ 23, 962 P.2d at 237, the Commission here specifically cited the Reeds' convictions and § 17-340, which provides for license revocation based on such convictions. We therefore see no error in the superior court's conclusion that the findings of fact and conclusions of law, though brief, were "explicit enough to allow the court to intelligently review the agency's decision and to decide whether there is a reasonable basis for the decision." Shelby Sch., 192 Ariz. 156, ¶ 21, 962 P.2d at 237.

Disposition

¶12 For the foregoing reasons, the superior court's judgment and order denying rehearing are affirmed.

GARYE L. VÁSQUEZ, Presiding Judge, VIRGINIA C. KELLY, Judge, concurring.