THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz.R.Sup.Ct. 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.24

(Not for Publication — Ariz.R.P.Juv.Ct. 103(G); ARCAP 28)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

HOWE, Judge.

¶1 Dominique M. ("Mother") appeals termination of her parental rights to her biological children N.M. and J.M. ("the children") based on out-of-home placement for a cumulative period of fifteen months or more and that severance is not in the best interests of the children. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This case arises from Mother's three year struggle to reunite with her children. At N.M.'s birth in 2004, Mother tested positive for marijuana. Approximately six weeks later, Child Protective Services ("CPS") referred Mother to Terros Families FIRST and DES Daycare after N.M. was found with facial bruises, a congenital eye hemorrhage, and a scratched cheek. After Mother claimed that two-year-old J.M., caused the injuries, CPS closed the case as "no evidence of abuse," although physicians described Mother's explanation as "possible, but not likely."

¶3 On May 26, 2007, CPS reported that Mother had left the children with a friend's thirteen-year-old daughter at the friend's house, which was filled with pet feces, piles of garbage, and dirty dishes. Mother's youngest child at the time, T.M., died from unknown causes during the incident. From 2007 to 2009, B.M., Mother's close friend, cared for the children. Mother maintained contact with the children during this time, and resumed parenting in January 2009.

¶4 On June 14, 2009, CPS removed the children from Mother's care, placing them in B.M.'s temporary custody, after Mother was arrested for striking six-year-old J.M. in the face with a belt buckle and throwing him into a wall. Later examination revealed a half-inch bruise around J.M.'s left eye, a cut on his lower lip, and deep bruising on his right buttocks, chest, and back of the neck. After Mother pled guilty to two counts of child abuse, the trial court placed her on supervised probation for fifteen years, and prohibited her from consuming alcohol.

¶5 As a result of the incident, Arizona Department of Economic Security ("ADES") filed a dependency petition alleging that Mother was unable to parent because of physical abuse, neglect, and mental illness. At the dependency hearing, where Mother did not contest the allegations, the juvenile court found the children dependent as to Mother and approved a family reunification plan. The juvenile court offered Mother services in Terros, parent-aide services, Magellan self-referral, anger management counseling, and psychological evaluation. Additionally, CPS reported that Mother had to demonstrate appropriate parenting skills, remain sober, gain stable employment, and manage her behavioral health concerns to achieve reunification with her children. CPS offered Mother substance abuse therapy, urinalysis testing, and therapeutic visits with the children.

¶6 Mother had difficulty complying with the reunification services. Between October 2011 and April 2012, Mother worked at a snack bar, where she repeatedly failed to appear, arrived late for work, or left the bar unattended. Mother's job specialist reported that she was unmotivated to work, and she remained unemployed after she left the snack bar.

¶7 Mother also had difficulty remaining sober between 2010 and 2012. On some of the tests, Mother would test negative for all substances; on other tests, she would test positive for marijuana, alcohol, opiates, or methamphetamine.

¶8 A psychologist evaluated Mother in April 2011, and stated that she would consider any children placed in Mother's care at risk, and she recommended that, before reunification, Mother must remain sober for six months and demonstrate additional behavioral changes to relay confidence in her ability to parent.

¶9 Between September and October of 2012, the juvenile court held a contested termination adjudication hearing. Mother's psychologist testified that Mother's participation in the services was unsuccessful and Mother continued to have difficulty controlling her anger around children. Additionally, case manager J.H. testified that Mother appeared to make behavioral changes for a time, but was unable to sustain these changes.

¶10 Case manager K.B. testified that termination would give the children permanence so that they could move forward with a family that could meet their needs and provide a safe environment. She testified that B.M. would adopt the children, that she would be approved to adopt them, and that the children wanted to live with her. She also stated that the children had settled into their new placement and their behavioral issues had stabilized.

¶11 In addition, case manager K.B. testified that termination of Mother's parental rights would allow the children to stop worrying about CPS and give them time to focus on themselves. She testified that Mother aggravated the children's frustration and anger in the process by telling them, "You guys are coming home. You're coming home."

¶12 At the conclusion of trial, the juvenile court terminated Mother's parental rights. The court concluded that ADES made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services, the children were in out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of fifteen months or longer, Mother was not capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future, and ADES had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of the parental rights was in the children's best interests.

¶13 Mother timely appeals. This Court has jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 8-235 and 12-120.21 (West 2013).1

DISCUSSION

¶14 Mother argues that the trial court erred in finding that (1) she was incapable of parenting her children in the near future, and (2) severance was in the children's best interest. We find no error and affirm.2 We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile court's order. Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 2, 181 P.3d 1126, 1128 (App. 2008). We do not reweigh the evidence because the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, "is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts." Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 4, 100 P.3d 943, 945 (App. 2004). We accept the juvenile court's factual findings if reasonable evidence supports them, and we affirm a severance order unless it is clearly erroneous. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002).

¶15 To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that a ground for termination set forth in A.R.S. § 8-533 exists, and by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the children's best interest. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 280, 288, ¶¶ 1, 41, 110 P.3d 1013, 1014, 1022 (2005). To satisfy the requirements of § 8-533(B)(8)(c), the juvenile court must find that (1) ADES made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services, (2) the child has been in out-of-home placement for a cumulative period of fifteen months or longer pursuant to court order, (3) the parent has failed to remedy the circumstances that caused the child to be in out-of-home placement, and (4) a substantial likelihood exists that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c).

I. Ability to Parent in the Near Future

¶16 Mother's first argument is that ADES did not provide clear and convincing evidence to support a finding that Mother was unable to parent in the near future. We find that reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that Mother was incapable of providing parental care to the children in the near future.

¶17 Mother argues that she had made significant progress under the reunification plan. While we commend her participation in the services, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that she failed to exhibit the sustained progress necessary to effectively parent the children. Mother's psychologist testified that the services were not successful and Mother continued to have anger and violence issues around the children. Additionally, case manager J.H. testified that Mother was unable to sustain her behavioral changes. Testimony also showed that Mother had not found stable employment since her job at the snack bar.

¶18 Mother next argues that she could correct her substance abuse within her psychologist's six month recommendation and that would exhibit the ability to parent in the near future. This Court will consider the impact of substance abuse in the case of child's out-of-home care by looking at

Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 378, ¶ 25, 231 P.3d 377, 382 (App. 2010) (quoting In re N.F. & C.H., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa App. 1998)). The psychologist's opinion does not set the definition of the near future under the statute. Nevertheless, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that Mother could not maintain sobriety for those six months. Mother has had a long history of substance abuse during the children's lives. Mother tested positive for marijuana at N.M.'s birth, and she continued her substance abuse even while going through the reunification process. She has failed to show that she can consistently remain sober, and the juvenile court could find reasonable evidence to conclude that Mother would be unable to rise above her substance abuse in another six months. Accordingly, we find the court did not err in terminating Mother's parental rights under § 8-533(B)(8)(c).

II. Best Interests of the Children

¶19 Mother's final argument is that severance is not in the children's best interests. "A finding that the best interests of the child will be served by removal from a custodial relationship may be established by either showing an affirmative benefit to the child by removal or a detriment to the child by continuing in the relationship." Jennifer B. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 189 Ariz. 553, 557, 944 P.2d 68, 72 (App. 1997).

¶20 During trial, case manager K.B. testified that termination would give the children permanence so they could move forward with a family that could meet their needs and provide a safe environment. She also testified how the children were thriving in their placement and termination would allow the children to stop worrying about CPS and give them time to settle in and focus on themselves. The case manager further testified that Mother was aggravating the children's frustration and anger in the process by telling them, "You guys are coming home. You're coming home."

¶21 Mother contends that termination was not in the children's best interest because CPS was unable to find them an adoptive home after a year of searching and the evidence suggests that the children may not be adoptable due to their behavioral issues. On the contrary, case manager K.B. testified that the placement stabilized the children's behavioral issues. Furthermore, she testified that B.M. would adopt the children, that B.M. would be approved to adopt them, and that the children want to live with her.

¶22 We conclude that reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that severance of the relationship is in the children's best interests.

CONCLUSION

¶23 For these reasons, we affirm the juvenile court's termination order.

PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Presiding Judge, ANDREW W. GOULD, Judge, concurring.