THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

Not for Publication Rule 28, Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure

MEMORANDUM DECISION

KELLY, Judge.

¶1 Jenny R. appeals from the juvenile court's October 2012 order terminating her parental rights to her four-year-old twins Suzanna and Isaiah T.-R. Jenny argues the evidence was insufficient to establish her inability to parent due to a history of chronic drug abuse that was likely to continue for a prolonged indeterminate period, her failure to remedy circumstances causing the children to remain in out-of-home care, or a substantial likelihood that she would be unable to parent effectively in the near future. She also argues the evidence was insufficient to establish termination was in the children's best interests. We affirm.

¶2 A juvenile court may terminate a parent's rights if it finds clear and convincing evidence of one of the statutory grounds for severance and a preponderance of evidence that termination of the parent's rights is in the children's best interests. A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B), 8-537(B); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, ¶ 41, 110 P.3d 1013, 1022 (2005). "[W]e view the evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to sustaining the court's decision, and we will affirm a termination order that is supported by reasonable evidence." Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, ¶ 18, 219 P.3d 296, 303 (App. 2009) (internal citation omitted). That is, we will not reverse a termination order for insufficient evidence unless, as a matter of law, no reasonable fact-finder could have found the evidence satisfied the applicable burden of proof. Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, ¶ 10, 210 P.3d 1263, 1266 (App. 2009).

¶3 In May 2011, after Jenny sold methamphetamine to an undercover police officer, police conducted a drug raid at the home of Maria R., Jenny's mother, where Jenny and the twins were living. Jenny fled the scene, leaving Isaiah and Suzanna behind, and Maria was arrested. Child Protective Services (CPS), a division of the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES), took Isaiah and Suzanna into protective custody, and ADES filed a dependency petition alleging Isaiah and Suzanna were dependent children. Jenny's whereabouts remained unknown for several months, and she was served with the dependency petition by publication; the juvenile court adjudicated the twins dependent as to her on August 16, 2011. Jenny first appeared in court at the dependency disposition hearing on August 31, 2011, and an attorney was appointed for her. The court provided her with the "Notice to Parent in a Dependency Action," and ordered her to participate in case plan tasks.

¶4 By May 2012, Jenny had been unsuccessfully discharged from residential drug treatment on three separate occasions; had relapsed on spice, a synthetic form of marijuana, and alcohol; and had failed to comply with a number of her case plan tasks. The juvenile court changed the case plan goal to severance and adoption and directed ADES to file a motion to terminate Jenny's parental rights.

¶5 In its motion, ADES alleged termination was warranted on the statutory grounds of abuse, see § 8-533(B)(2); neglect, see id.; history of chronic substance abuse, see § 8-533(B)(3); substantial neglect or willful refusal to remedy the circumstances causing the children to remain in out-of-home care for nine months or longer, see § 8-533(B)(8)(a); and failure to remedy those circumstances, along with a substantial likelihood of an inability to parent effectively in the near future, see § 8-533(B)(8)(c). After a two-day adjudication hearing, the juvenile court concluded ADES had failed to establish the ground of abuse, but had proven all other grounds alleged by clear and convincing evidence. The court also found termination was in the children's best interests.

¶6 On appeal, Jenny does not dispute specific facts found by the juvenile court in its under-advisement ruling, but argues the court erred in finding those facts sufficient to support termination for chronic drug abuse under § 8-533(B)(3). For example, Jenny maintains the court "chose to ignore the progress" she made in addressing her drug addiction, citing evidence that from "March 16, [2012,] until the end of the trial [on September 11, 2012]," she "only failed . . . twice" to call in, as required for random drug testing, and "tested positive [for illegal substances] only two times," with her most recent positive urinalysis occurring on May 15. She argues "her inability to complete rehabilitation does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that she has was presently abusing drugs or alcohol at the time of trial." Her only argument with respect to the court's finding of time-in-care grounds for termination is a related one; she maintains "it was not [her] burden to prove she had resolved the same drug abuse allegations that were the circumstances that caused the children to be in care. Rather, it was the State's burden to prove she [had] not."

¶7 In Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, ¶ 14, 231 P.3d 377, 380 (App. 2010), we addressed a similar challenge to termination of a father's parental rights on the ground of chronic substance use. In that case, the father had an extensive drug history, including positive drug tests in the two years preceding the severance. 224 Ariz. 373, ¶¶ 16-17, 231 P.3d at 381. By the time of the termination adjudication, he had established four months of sobriety but had not completed any substance abuse treatment. Id. ¶¶ 24, 28. In upholding the juvenile court's termination order we explained "drug abuse need not be constant to be considered chronic," id. ¶ 16, and stated,

Id. ¶ 29. The same reasoning applies here. In asking that we find error, Jenny is essentially asking that we reweigh the evidence on appeal, which we will not do. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 14, 100 P.3d 943, 947 (App. 2004).

¶8 We need not consider the juvenile court's findings of other grounds for termination. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 3, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002) (appellate court need not consider challenge on alternate grounds for severance if evidence supports any one ground). Indeed, although Jenny argues the court erred in finding termination warranted on chronic substance abuse grounds pursuant to § 8-533(B)(3), she does not meaningfully address the court's finding that termination was warranted on a time-in-care ground pursuant to § 8-533(B)(8), and does not address at all the court's finding that termination also was warranted on the ground of neglect. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, ¶ 13, 995 P.2d 682, 685 (2000) (appellate court need not address unchallenged finding). We comment only to correct Jenny's apparent misconception that these alternative findings of neglect and circumstances preventing her from parenting effectively were based solely on "drug abuse allegations." In its under-advisement ruling, the court wrote, "At the time of the trial, [Jenny] had been drug free for six weeks, but her participation in services was inconsistent. [Jenny] is again living with [Maria], unemployed and unable to provide an appropriate home for the children." The court's ruling sets forth its well-reasoned analysis of the statutory grounds for termination, with findings fully supported by the record. We see no need to restate that analysis here. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 16, 53 P.3d 203, 207-08 (App. 2002), citing State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274, 866 P.2d 1358, 1360 (App. 1993).

¶9 Jenny also argues the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that termination is in the children's best interests. She notes the state had not yet identified an adoptive home for the children and contends "the sole basis" of the court's ruling on best interests was the CPS case manager's opinion that an adoptive home for the children "certainly could" be found and that severance and adoption were in their best interests. To the extent Jenny argues this testimony was inadmissible because the case manager had not been qualified as an expert witness on adoption, we agree with ADES that she has waived any such challenge on appeal by failing to raise it below. See Rhue v. Dawson, 173 Ariz. 220, 230, 841 P.2d 215, 225 (App. 1992) ("An objection to the admission of evidence raised for the first time on appeal is deemed to be waived."). We also agree with ADES that the case manager's lay opinion about the twins' adoptability, based on her own observations of the children and her seven years of experience with CPS, was admissible under Rule 701, Ariz. R. Evid., without reference to expert qualifications required by Rule 702, Ariz. R. Evid., for opinions based on "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge."

¶10 To establish termination is in the twins' best interests, ADES was required to show they "would derive an affirmative benefit from termination or incur a detriment by continuing in the relationship." Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 6, 100 P.3d at 946, 947. Expert testimony is not required to establish best-interests; rather, "[t]he best interest requirement may be met if, for example, [ADES] proves that a current adoption plan exists for the child or even that the child is adoptable." Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, ¶ 19, 83 P.3d 43, 50 (App. 2004) (internal citation omitted); see also In re Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 352, 884 P.2d 234, 238 (App. 1994) (existence of adoptive home not required for finding severance in minor's best interest). The juvenile court also may properly consider evidence that a present placement is meeting the child's needs in finding termination in his or her best interests. See In re Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-8490, 179 Ariz. 102, 107, 876 P.2d 1137, 1142 (1994). Moreover, a court is not required to ignore, in considering best interests, that "[i]n most cases, the presence of a statutory ground will have a negative effect on the children." In re Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-6831, 155 Ariz. 556, 559, 748 P.2d 785, 788 (App. 1988) (best interests separate from consideration of statutory grounds and may constitute basis to deny termination).

¶11 Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court's best interests finding. Evidence that the twins' needs had been met while in ADES's custody and would likely be placed in an adoptive home reflects a benefit from severance of Jenny's parental rights. Although the twins had required services to address "some severe speech issues" when CPS first took them into protective custody, by the time of the adjudication hearing, neither of them had special needs that might have impeded their adoption; instead, the case manager described them as "very articulate . . . using full sentences, and very bright," and "certainly" adoptable. The benefit of freeing the children for adoption and the prospect of a stable, drug-free home is particularly apparent in light of the juvenile court's observations about Jenny's "long term substance abuse and inability to remain drug-free while in residential treatment," her continued lack of employment, and her inability "to provide an appropriate home for the children."

¶12 For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court's October 2012 order terminating Jenny's parental rights.

GARYE L. VÁSQUEZ, Presiding Judge, PHILIP G. ESPINOSA, Judge, concurring.