THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

(Not for Publication — Rule 111, Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

WINTHROP, Chief Judge.

¶1 Tiana Monique Coleman ("Appellant") appeals her convictions and placement on probation for resisting arrest and aggravated assault. Appellant's counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), stating that he has searched the record on appeal and found no arguable question of law that is not frivolous. Appellant's counsel therefore requests that we review the record for fundamental error. See State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30, 2 P.3d 89, 96 (App. 1999) (stating that this court reviews the entire record for reversible error). Although this court granted Appellant the opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona, she has not done so.

¶2 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the Arizona Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, and Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (West 2012),1 13-4031, and 13-4033(A). Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

¶3 On January 27, 2011, a grand jury issued an indictment, charging Appellant with Count I, assault, a class two misdemeanor; Count II, resisting arrest, a class six felony; and Count III, aggravated assault, a class four felony, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-1203, 13-2508, and 13-1204. Before trial, the State alleged one aggravating circumstance, claiming that in committing her offenses, Appellant caused physical, emotional, or financial harm to the victim. Appellant filed a motion to sever Count I (assault), which the trial court granted before trial. Subsequently, the court dismissed Count I without prejudice.

¶4 At trial, the State presented the following evidence: On January 13, 2011, officers from the Phoenix Police Department responded to an emergency traffic call in Phoenix, Arizona. The investigation led officers in search of a female suspect at a nearby apartment. The occupants of that apartment indicated they would only allow female officers to enter. Two female officers, Officers Garza and Bruce-Jones, entered the apartment and announced their presence. During their search of the apartment, the officers located Appellant in the kitchen, apparently attempting to hide between a refrigerator and a cabinet.

¶5 Officer Garza asked Appellant why she was hiding, and Appellant became very defensive and subsequently stated she would only speak to Officer Bruce-Jones. After obtaining an index card containing a name and date of birth given by Appellant, Officer Garza left the kitchen and handed the card to an officer outside the apartment for a records check. Officer Garza returned to the hallway, but she remained out of Appellant's sight while observing Officer Bruce-Jones converse with Appellant. Another officer informed Officer Garza via police radio that probable cause existed to arrest Appellant in connection with the emergency call. Officer Garza informed Officer Bruce-Jones that they could arrest Appellant and reentered the kitchen to assist in the arrest.

¶6 In attempting to execute the arrest, each officer took one of Appellant's arms and attempted to restrain her, while Appellant began to tighten up and start yelling. Both officers ordered Appellant to stop resisting their efforts. Appellant, however, broke free of Officer Bruce-Jones' grip on her right arm and punched Officer Bruce-Jones just above the left eye. A "scuffle" ensued between the two officers and Appellant, creating enough noise to attract the attention of other officers, who entered the apartment to assist in effectuating the arrest of Appellant.

¶7 At trial, Officer Bruce-Jones testified she could "feel the swelling" and see a "shadow" over her eye after being struck by Appellant. She further testified she sustained swelling over her left eye, eye socket, and eyebrow area, for which she sought medical treatment. Defense counsel sought to impeach Officer Bruce-Jones' credibility by questioning her about an investigation conducted by the Professional Standards Bureau regarding a series of e-mails sent by Officer Bruce-Jones to a former friend. Officer Bruce-Jones denied intending to harass the former friend with the e-mails, and instead claimed the e-mails were sent to help the friend seek help for mental health problems.

¶8 Appellant testified at trial she did not hide from the police when they entered the apartment. However, she felt "claustrophobic" while Officer Garza and Officer Bruce-Jones questioned her in the kitchen. When the officers attempted to place her in handcuffs, Appellant braced herself. She claimed she did so in order to avoid being placed on the floor because that would have put pressure on her stomach area, and she had stomach issues stemming from her gallbladder being removed. Appellant further asserted she did not injure Officer Bruce-Jones or know how Officer Bruce-Jones sustained her injury.

¶9 The jury found Appellant guilty of resisting arrest and aggravated assault. The jury further found, however, that the State had not proven the alleged aggravating circumstance that Appellant had caused physical harm to Officer Bruce-Jones. The trial court suspended sentencing and ordered that Appellant be placed on current terms of three years' probation for each count. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

¶10 We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and find none. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300, 451 P.2d at 881; Clark, 196 Ariz. at 537, ¶ 30, 2 P.3d at 96. The evidence presented at trial was substantial and supports the verdicts, and the sentencing proceedings followed the statutory requirements. Appellant was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings and was given the opportunity to speak at sentencing. The proceedings were conducted in compliance with her constitutional and statutory rights and the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

¶11 After filing of this decision, defense counsel's obligations pertaining to Appellant's representation in this appeal have ended. Counsel need do no more than inform Appellant of the status of the appeal and of her future options, unless counsel's review reveals an issue appropriate for petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85, 684 P.2d 154, 156-57 (1984). Appellant has thirty days from the date of this decision to proceed, if she desires, with a pro per motion for reconsideration or petition for review.

III. CONCLUSION

¶12 Appellant's convictions and placement on probation are affirmed.

MAURICE PORTLEY, Judge, PETER B. SWANN, Judge, concurring.