THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

(Not for Publication — 103(G) Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct.; Rule 28 ARCAP)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PATRICIA A. OROZCO, Judge.

¶1 Linda D. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court's order terminating her parent-child relationship with A.S.2 For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother is the biological parent of A.S., who was born in December 2008. In February 2011, Mother was hospitalized after she sustained injuries when she fell in the shower while she was intoxicated. When Mother was admitted to the hospital, her blood alcohol content (BAC) was .500. By consuming alcohol, Mother had also violated one of the terms of her probation for an April 2010 extreme aggravated driving under the influence (DUI) conviction.3 Mother had been arrested for driving with a BAC of.300 with A.S. in the car.

¶3 After Mother's hospitalization, the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES) took temporary custody of A.S. and filed a dependency petition pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 8-201(13) (Supp. 2012)4 because of abuse or neglect. The petition alleged A.S. was dependent as to Mother because Mother exposed A.S. to domestic violence and abused alcohol. The juvenile court agreed and found A.S. dependent as to Mother.

¶4 ADES offered Mother various services, including random urinalysis testing, parent aide services, substance abuse assessment and treatment, individual counseling, and domestic violence counseling. Mother completed a substance abuse program required for her probation and a parent aide program; however, Mother failed to complete any of the substance abuse or domestic violence programs offered by ADES. Additionally, although Mother was required to complete 128 urinalysis tests between February 23, 2011 and June 21, 2012, she only tested forty-nine times.

¶5 On January 30, 2012, ADES filed a motion to terminate Mother's parental rights to A.S. on the grounds of chronic substance abuse pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533.B.3 (Supp. 2012) and out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of nine months or more pursuant to § 8-533.B.8(a).

¶6 The juvenile court held a contested severance hearing in June 2012. On September 28, 2012, the court found that ADES had proven by clear and convincing evidence the two grounds alleged in its severance motion. The court also determined that severance was in A.S.'s best interest and ordered the termination of Mother's parental rights.

¶7 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235.A (2007), 12-120.21.A.1 (2003), and -2101.A.1 (Supp. 2012).

DISCUSSION

¶8 In order to terminate the parent-child relationship, the juvenile court must find that at least one of the statutory grounds listed in A.R.S. § 8-533.B exists and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12, 995 P.2d 682, 685 (2000).

Statutory Ground

¶9 Mother contends the trial court erred in finding there was clear and convincing evidence that she was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities because of alcoholism and that the condition would continue for a prolonged period of time. Mother does not challenge the juvenile court's finding that termination was appropriate under A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8(a) based on out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of nine months or more; therefore, Mother has waived this issue, and we affirm the juvenile court's order terminating Mother's parental rights on that ground. See Schabel v. Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 97, 186 Ariz. 161, 167, 920 P.2d 41, 47 (App. 1996) (issues not raised in an appellate brief are waived).

¶10 Because we affirm the termination of Mother's parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8(a), we need not address Mother's contention that the juvenile court erred in finding she is unable to discharge her parental responsibilities due to alcohol abuse. See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251, ¶ 27, 995 P.2d at 687 ("Because we affirm the trial court's order granting severance on [one basis], we need not consider whether the trial court's findings justified severance on the other grounds announced by the court.").

Best Interest

¶11 Mother also argues that the trial court erred in finding that termination was in A.S.'s best interest. Whether termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest is a factual question for the juvenile court to determine. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 13, 53 P.3d 203, 207 (App. 2002). "We will not disturb the juvenile court's order severing parental rights unless its factual findings are clearly erroneous, that is, unless there is no reasonable evidence to support them." Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 2, 982 P.2d 1290, 1291 (App. 1998).

¶12 Termination of parental rights requires the juvenile court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interest of the child. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41, 110 P.3d 1013, 1022 (2005). ADES can establish that termination is in the child's best interest by presenting credible evidence that demonstrates that the child would derive an affirmative benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 6, 100 P.3d 943, 945 (App. 2004). The best interest requirement can be met if ADES proves that a current adoptive plan exists for the child or even that the child is adoptable. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 19, 83 P.3d 43, 50 (App. 2004). Whether the existing placement is meeting the needs of the child is also considered. Audra T., 194 Ariz. at 377, ¶ 5, 982 P.2d at 1291.

¶13 The juvenile court found that ADES had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship was in A.S.'s best interest. Specifically, it found that severance would benefit A.S. because she was adoptable and her current placement was meeting all of her needs. The court also found that not terminating Mother's parental rights would leave A.S. with no reliable caregiver because Mother was in denial about her substance abuse, refused to fully participate in treatment services, and had failed to put A.S.'s interests ahead of her own.

¶14 The testimony of the ADES case manager supports the juvenile court's findings. She opined that severance was in A.S.'s best interest because A.S. deserved to be in a safe home where all of her needs could be met consistently. The case manager also testified that A.S. was adoptable and was currently placed with a relative who wanted to adopt her. We therefore conclude that sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that termination of Mother's parental rights was in A.S.'s best interest.

CONCLUSION

¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court's order terminating Mother's parent-child relationship with A.S.

PETER B. SWANN, Judge and ROBERT C. HOUSER, Judge Pro Tempore*, concurring.