NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

DECISION ORDER

KESSLER, Judge.

¶1 City of Phoenix ("Phoenix") and Mary Freund ("Freund") (collectively "Petitioners") seek special action relief from a superior court order denying their motion for summary judgment. Given the unique circumstances of this case, we accept jurisdiction and grant relief. For the following reasons, we reverse the superior court's order denying Petitioners' motion for summary judgment and remand this matter to the superior court to enter judgment for Petitioners.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This case is related to a contested child custody proceeding between Kimberly Lewis ("Lewis") and Real Party in Interest William Andrew Rehkow ("Rehkow"). After Lewis complained to the Phoenix Police Department that Rehkow was harassing and stalking her, Phoenix Police Detective Freund, was assigned as case agent in 2004.

¶3 In 2006, both Rehkow and Lewis sought protective orders from the family court. The family court found that Rehkow had been harassing Lewis, including filing unwarranted legal pleadings, misrepresenting facts to the court, sending threatening letters to Lewis's brother, and filing unwarranted complaints against the court-appointed psychologist and against Lewis's attorneys. Although the court found that, unlike Lewis's claims, Rehkow's claims of harassment were not substantiated, it granted both parties relief. As part of that relief, the court ordered that neither party shall "disseminate or discuss . . . any of the matters presented to the Court . . . with any third parties including media of any kind or clients or co-workers of either party. The Court determines that such commentary . . . represents an indirect attempt to intimidate or harass."1

¶4 Freund began a formal criminal investigation into Rehkow in December 2006, and throughout the spring of 2007, Freund learned and reported that: a private investigator named Scotti was investigating a case involving Freund Rehkow hired a private investigator a website registered to Scotti was displaying information from the sealed family court case including the child's name the website was updated with information from the family court case Scotti denied putting the information on the website and stated that anyone may put information on this website the domain provider for the website confirmed this website could not be accessed by anyone other than the registered owner; and after the website was blocked in March 2007, a new website opened in April 2007. Thereafter, the website was updated with information about a subpoena issued for Scotti and then again with more information about the sealed case. In mid-May 2007, the website was updated to include photographs of documents from Rehkow's bar complaint against Lewis's attorney which included testimony from the sealed family court case. Freund's report also reflects that the state bar records clerk confirmed that Scotti was the only person to request and view the documents in 2007 during which time he was seen photographing the documents and had also represented to the clerk that he was a private investigator for Rehkow.2

¶5 Freund also reported that Rehkow sent numerous letters to Lewis's attorney throughout January and February 2007 demanding documents already provided, accusing counsel of hiding information and refusing to cooperate, threatening to contact the state bar, accusing counsel of lying to the state bar, accusing counsel of ex parte communication with the judge, accusing counsel's paralegal of ignoring his requests, and making disparaging remarks about the paralegal. At least one letter to Lewis's attorney was copied to the family coordinator, but Rehkow also sent letters directly to the family coordinator during the same time, in part attempting to have the coordinator force Lewis's attorney to respond to Rehkow. Freund also reported that Rehkow left messages for Lewis's attorney's paralegal threatening to include the paralegal in the bar complaint against counsel.

¶6 On May 16, 2007, Freund concluded that Rehkow hired Scotti and that Scotti had been directly and indirectly involved in stalking and harassing Lewis. She also concluded that the two worked together to display and discuss sealed court records on the website.

¶7 Freund's report documents that throughout the investigation, Lewis complained to Freund about feeling personally endangered and concerned for the safety of her child and the people at her dance studio. She also reported to Freund that the website was hurting her family and business and explained that her son discovered the website, became upset and left her home, and Lewis received a call at work from a woman who read the website and wanted to know if the information was true. Likewise, the report indicates that Lewis's attorney told Freund on several occasions that she thought Rehkow's letters and complaints to her and her staff were meant to harass Lewis by increasing the cost of her attorneys' fees and by trying to intimidate counsel so she would not represent Lewis.

¶8 Freund also reported that Lewis and her attorney advised Freund that a psychologist ("S.G.") told Lewis's attorney that Rehkow had written letters to S.G. and left messages for S.G. about Lewis, and that Rehkow was psychotic and would likely kill Lewis. When Freund later spoke to S.G., she confirmed those conclusions. Freund believed S.G. was a psychologist or a doctor, but learned after the indictment that was not true.

¶9 On May 29, 2007, Freund executed an affidavit in support of a warrant to search Rehkow, his home, and his car on suspicion of stalking and aggravated harassment for events occurring during the time period of December 28, 2006 and May 24, 2007. She included the same facts from her police report as described above. Before searching Rehkow however, the police searched Scotti's house. The search of Scotti's house revealed that: Scotti was in possession of Lewis's personal and business documents, some of which appeared to have been retrieved from the trash; ledgers from Lewis's business; a letter from Scotti to Rehkow about the website; emails between Rehkow and Scotti regarding wire-tapping Lewis's home and cell phone and discussions to take Lewis's trash; a map from Rehkow's home to Lewis's home; articles about Lewis and her husband, credit card receipts belonging to Lewis; and information regarding the superior court judge assigned to the custody matter and Freund, including home addresses and maps, as well as trash collection schedules. The search of Rehkow's house revealed he was in possession of Lewis's business documents from after the couple's divorce that appeared to have been retrieved from the trash because they were stained, and Lewis's personal checks and home documents.

¶10 In June 2007, the grand jury indicted Rehkow for two counts of class 3 felony stalking, one of which was a domestic violence offense, and one count of aggravated harassment, a class 6 felony and domestic violence offense. In 2008, the superior court remanded the indictment to the grand jury because the police detective who testified before the grand jury stated that a psychologist named S.G. told the police that Rehkow was psychotic, delusional, and likely to kill Lewis, but, in fact, S.G. was not a psychologist. In addition, the court found that the grand jury was erroneously told that Rehkow had been prohibited by the court from hiring a private investigator. In arguing against the remand, the State contended that even without the erroneous statements regarding S.G., there was sufficient evidence to support the indictment because of a pattern of harassment by Rehkow over years. After remand, however, the State did not to seek another indictment and, upon Rehkow's motion, the criminal case was dismissed without prejudice.

¶11 Meanwhile, in November 2007 the family court determined that Rehkow's actions in disseminating case information so it could be placed on a website harassed Lewis in violation of the December 2006 injunction against harassment. Thus, the family court found Rehkow in contempt.

¶12 In 2009, Rehkow brought a multi-count complaint against Lewis, Lewis's attorney in the family court proceedings, Phoenix, and Freund.3 Rehkow claimed that Freund and Lewis conspired to set him up for the criminal charges to help Lewis in the custody case.

¶13 Petitioners moved for summary judgment on both counts arguing that there was probable cause for Rehkow's arrest based on what Freund knew before the arrest. They also argued that Rehkow's malicious prosecution claim was barred because there was no termination of the criminal case that was favorable to Rehkow. In response, Rehkow argued: (1) according to his expert probable cause to search Rehkow for stalking and aggravated harassment did not exist; (2) the family court held that material given to Scotti did not violate its orders and the only other evidence of a violation of the court order was an inadmissible result of the search warrant; and (3) a jury could determine that the dismissal of the charges against him without prejudice was favorable to him.

¶14 The superior court granted the motion for summary judgment as to Rehkow's defamation claim against Lewis's attorney, but denied the motion in all other respects. The court found the existence of numerous material fact disputes, including the relationship between Freund and Lewis, the nature of the conversations between Freund, Lewis, and her attorney about S.G., and the nature and motivation behind Freund and Lewis's attorney's communications and cooperation. The court also found a disputed fact about whether there was probable cause for the search warrant and/or Rehkow's arrest.

¶15 Similarly, on reconsideration, the court held there were material fact disputes about: (1) whether the criminal case was favorably terminated because, although dismissed without prejudice, the charges had not been refiled; and (2) whether there was probable cause to issue the search warrant, and to arrest and indict Rehkow. As part of the latter holding, the court concluded there were fact issues regarding whether there was reasonable suspicion that Rehkow had committed a crime, whether Freund knew facts warranting an ordinarily prudent person to believe a crime had been committed, and whether Freund acted as an ordinarily prudent person in the events leading up to the search, arrest, and indictment.

¶16 Petitioners then filed this special action, arguing the superior court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment. We issued a stay of any further proceedings as to Petitioners while deciding the issue presented in this petition.

JURISDICTION

¶17 We generally do not accept special action jurisdiction from the denial of a motion for summary judgment, Ft. Lowell-NSS, Ltd. P'ship v. Kelly, 166 Ariz. 96, 99-100, 800 P.2d 962, 965-66 (1990), except when the question presented is a pure issue of law and under no rule of law can the superior court's ruling be justified. Harris Trust Bank of Ariz. v. Superior Court, 188 Ariz. 159, 162, 933 P.2d 1227, 1230 (App. 1996) (citations omitted). Acceptance of special action jurisdiction in such limited circumstances avoids the expense of time and money at trial and promotes judicial economy and efficient use of the parties' and the court's resources. Grosvenor Holdings, L.C. v. Figueroa, 222 Ariz. 588, 593, ¶ 8, 218 P.3d 1045, 1050 (App. 2009). Accepting jurisdiction also advances the interests of judicial economy and benefits both parties by precluding a trial and possible verdict which would ultimately be reversed. Harris Trust, 188 Ariz. at 162, 165, 933 P.2d at 1230, 1233 (vacating order striking statute of limitations defense and remanding). Thus, in Nataros v. Superior Court, the Arizona Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction of a special action from the denial of a motion to dismiss a counterclaim alleging malicious prosecution. 113 Ariz. 498, 499-500, 557 P.2d 1055, 1056-57 (1976). The court accepted jurisdiction and granted relief because the counterclaim was premature, and allowing such a counterclaim would violate the favorable termination rule for malicious prosecution and could lead to inconsistent judgments. Id. at 500, 557 P.2d at 1057. The court also noted it would accept jurisdiction because the denial of the motion was nonappealable and the error was patent. Id. at 499, 557 P.2d at 1056.

¶18 As discussed below, the issues presented here are pure questions of law. Because we conclude that requiring Petitioners to go to trial cannot be justified, they should not be required to litigate the claims against them and then either pursue or defend an appeal when the claims should have been summarily disposed. Dismissal benefits all the parties because it simplifies the remaining litigation and avoids a needless appeal.

¶19 Holding that probable cause can be resolved on summary judgment under these circumstances does not conflict with Gonzales v. City of Phoenix, 203 Ariz. 152, 155-56, ¶¶ 14-15, 52 P.3d 184, 187-88 (2002). In Gonzales, this Court vacated a judgment based on a jury verdict for the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution suit. 203 Ariz. at 155, ¶¶ 11-12, 52 P.3d at 187. The supreme court disagreed, holding that although generally a court decides as a matter of law whether the facts establish probable cause in the defense of a malicious prosecution claim, the superior court may submit the issue to the jury through hypothetical questions when conflicting probable cause evidence is presented. Id. at ¶ 14. The court found a genuine dispute regarding the probable cause evidence because of conflicting versions of exchanges between detectives, the criminal defendant, and the defendant's employees. Id. at ¶ 15. In contrast, this petition is based solely on undisputed facts, and as such, there is no need to present a jury with hypothetical questions.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶20 We review summary judgment de novo, including whether there are disputed facts precluding summary judgment and whether a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Unique Equip. Co., v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc., 197 Ariz. 50, 52, ¶ 5, 3 P.3d 970, 972 (App. 1999). We construe the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion Midland Risk Mgmt. Co. v. Watford, 179 Ariz. 168, 170, 876 P.2d 1203, 1205 (App. 1994).4

I. Petitioners were entitled to summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim because Rehkow's criminal proceeding was not favorably terminated.

¶21 Petitioners moved for summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim in part because there was no favorable termination of the criminal proceedings against Rehkow. Rehkow argues that favorable termination, for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, is a fact question for the jury. We agree that Petitioners were entitled to summary judgment.

¶22 After the superior court remanded the charges to the grand jury, the State did not seek another indictment. Initially, however, in opposing the remand the State pointed out that the motion was limited to evidence about statements from S.G. that were misleading or false, and that even without those statements there was sufficient evidence before the grand jury to indict Rehkow for stalking. Thus, Petitioners argue that the decision to not bring a new indictment was merely procedural and not favorable to Rehkow. Rehkow cites Overson v. Lynch, 83 Ariz. 158, 317 P.2d 948 (1957), to argue that quashing an indictment is a favorable termination.

¶23 Favorable termination of a criminal proceeding is an element of a claim for malicious prosecution. Overson, 83 Ariz. at 161, 317 P.2d at 949. Rehkow had the burden to present sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment—that is, evidence sufficient for a jury to find that the termination was favorable. Lane v. Terry H. Pillinger, P.C., 189 Ariz. 152, 157, 939 P.2d 430, 435 (App. 1997). There is no per se rule whether a voluntary dismissal of the underlying complaint is a favorable termination for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim. Frey v. Stoneman, 150 Ariz. 106, 110-11, 722 P.2d 274, 278-79 (1986). Rather, a court must evaluate the particular circumstances and merits of the case to determine whether termination was actually favorable. Id. at 111, 722 P.2d at 279. There might be reasons other than lack of merit for a withdrawal. Id. Thus, although determining favorable termination is generally an issue for the court, a jury question arises if there are disputed facts about the reasons for the termination. Id.

¶24 In Lane, after the plaintiff dismissed his underlying civil action, the defendants sued for wrongful bringing of a civil action. 189 Ariz. at 153-54, 939 P.2d at 431-32. The plaintifff8e7now the defendant in the malicious prosecution actionf8e7filed an affidavit explaining why he dismissed his civil action. Id. at 155, 939 P.2d at 433. Because his affidavit did not address the merits of the case, id. at 155 n.5, 939 P.2d at 433 n.5, the malicious prosecution plaintiffs asserted that his reason for the voluntary dismissal was ambiguous. Id. at 155, 939 P.2d at 433. Relying in part on Frey, we held that the superior court properly granted summary judgment for lack of a favorable termination. Id. at 156-57, 939 P.2d at 434-35. We explained that, absent sufficient evidence to show that a jury might have believed the favorable termination claim, the issue of favorable termination is one of law for the court. Id. Importantly, we held there must be evidence that the original plaintiff dismissed his claim as meritless rather than for procedural reasons. Id. at 155-57, 939 P.2d at 433-35.5

¶25 In contrast, in Frey the court reversed a dismissal of a malicious prosecution complaint based on a prior voluntary dismissal of a medical malpractice action. 150 Ariz. at 111-12, 722 P.2d at 279-80.6 The plaintiff in the underlying action voluntarily dismissed his case in response to a summary judgment motion and demand for a decision on the merits. Id. at 108, 722 P.2d at 276. Thereafter, the defendants in the underlying action sued for wrongful bringing of a civil action. Id. at 108-09, 722 P.2d at 276-77. The supreme court reversed the dismissal of the malicious prosecution complaint, determining that there were many issues of material fact and conflicting allegations that "must be resolved by the jury." Id. at 111-12, 722 P.2d at 279-80.

¶26 Rehkow, however, does not present disputed material facts regarding the State's reason for not seeking another indictment. He does not present evidence to establish his argument that the State believed the evidence was insufficient to convict or thought Rehkow was innocent, much less to establish ambiguity or the need for jury resolution of disputed material facts.

¶27 Instead, Rehkow argues that we may infer that the State abandoned the charges because they were based on the false evidence from S.G., Freund's involvement with Lewis which would severely contradict her credibility, and the length of timef8e7four yearsf8e7that has passed without a new indictment.7 According to Rehkow, we should presume that the criminal prosecution was abandoned because the State's case was meritless.8

¶28 We disagree. The only evidence in the record reflects that the superior court remanded the indictment because of the S.G. evidence, and because the jury was misinformed that Rehkow had been prohibited by court order from hiring a private investigator because that was false. Nonetheless, the State maintained that there was sufficient evidence before the grand jury to indict Rehkow for stalking. Rehkow's bare assertion that a jury might conclude the State abandoned another indictment because the claims were meritless is just speculation.

¶29 Moreover, inconsistent verdicts could result if the State ultimately decided to prosecute Rehkow after trial on his malicious prosecution claim. In other words, there is a risk that Rehkow could be found guilty of aggravated harassment or stalking after Freund is found guilty of malicious prosecution. See Nataros, 113 Ariz. at 500, 557 P.2d at 1057 (holding that as a matter of public policy, dismissal of a counterclaim alleging malicious prosecution was required in part because of the risk of inconsistent verdicts if the jury found for the plaintiff on one or more of its claims and also for the counterclaimant on malicious prosecution).

¶30 Because Rehkow presented no evidence that the criminal prosecution was favorably terminated, nor presented disputed material facts such that a reasonable jury could have believed termination was favorable to Rehkow, Petitioners were entitled to summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim. Accordingly, we accept jurisdiction and vacate that portion of the order denying Petitioners' motion for summary judgment.

II. There was no factual dispute regarding probable cause to preclude summary judgment on either claim.

¶31 Petitioners claim that there was probable cause to arrest Rehkow for aggravated harassment and stalking based on the undisputed facts Freund knew at the time. Thus, they argue that the superior court should have granted summary judgment on both the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 false arrest claim and the malicious prosecution claim. Petitioners argue that, despite any disputed facts, Freund still had sufficient evidence to support probable cause for Rehkow's arrest.

¶32 Rehkow argues, first, that there is evidence that Freund and Lewis conspired to secure the protective order in the family court case in order to then bring the charges to assist Lewis in her custody battle. He maintains that without the improper S.G. evidence the stalking and aggravated harassment charges were unsupported because there was no evidence that Rehkow was violent or that Lewis experienced reasonable fear. Rehkow maintains that the only evidence of probable cause was violation of the family court injunction against harassment. Rehkow admits that evidence establishes that, on one occasion, Rehkow shared information regarding the sealed family court case, which was displayed on the website, but maintains that this does not satisfy the elements of aggravated harassment because one incident is not enough to support such a charge. Rehkow maintains there is no evidence of the underlying criminal harassment even if there is evidence that he violated the injunction because there is no evidence that the alleged harassment was directed at Lewis. Rehkow maintains that the website did not pertain to Lewis, but rather to the family court judge and was therefore protected speech.9 He also claims petitioners did not assert that harassment occurred due to threatening letters and phone calls until this petition for special action.

¶33 To survive summary judgment on a § 1983 false arrest claim, Rehkow must establish a dispute of material fact as to whether there was probable cause to arrest him for any of the charges. See Lacy v. County of Maricopa, 631 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1193-94 (D. Ariz. 2008). This is because the lack of probable cause is a necessary element in a false arrest claim. Id. Whether probable cause existed is generally an issue of law for the court to determine. Slade v. City of Phoenix, 112 Ariz. 298, 301, 541 P.2d 550, 553 (1975). The only exception is if there is sufficient ambiguity to create a jury question regarding probable cause. Gonzales, 203 Ariz. at 155, ¶ 14, 52 P.3d at 187.

¶34 "Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the plaintiff had committed or was committing an offense." Lacy, 631 F. Supp. 2d at 1194 (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). A false arrest focuses not on the probable cause to support each charge, but rather on the validity of the arrest. Id. In other words, if there was probable cause for any charge, then a false arrest claim fails as a matter of law. Id. This is the same standard that applies to probable cause determinations for malicious prosecution claims. Slade, 112 Ariz. at 301, 541 P.2d at 553 (affirming dismissal of malicious prosecution and false arrest claims after opening statements, holding that probable cause is a complete defense to malicious prosecution, and defining probable cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinarily prudent person to believe the accused is guilty of an offense).

¶35 To resolve the probable cause issue, we do not consider the subjective beliefs or ulterior purposes of the police officer asking for the arrest. Rather, as long as there is an objective basis to support probable cause, the police officer's subjective beliefs and ulterior purposes are irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes. In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810-13 (1996), plaintiffs appealed their convictions contending in part that, although the traffic stop was supported by probable cause, it resulted in false arrest because the stop was a mere pretext to search for drugs in the vehicle. Plaintiffs argued that the court must determine if the police conduct was reasonablef8e7that is, police made the stop for the reason given. Id. at 810. The Court explained why subjective beliefs and ulterior motives are irrelevant in light of objective evidence of reasonable conduct:

Id. at 813 (emphasis added) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The holding in Whren is not limited to pretexts in vehicle searches, but applies also to alleged pretexts in searches incident to arrest. United States v. Hudson, 100 F.3d 1409, 1413-16 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that search of residence and arrest of defendant under a state warrant did not violate Fourth Amendment under Whren even though federal agents obtained warrants from the state on other charges because they knew the United States Attorney would not issue warrant against or prosecute defendant).

¶36 Because Freund's alleged ulterior motivations are irrelevant to the false arrest issue, so too is much of Rehkow's argument about Freund's relationship with Lewis and her purported involvement in conspiring to get an injunction from the family court to assist Lewis in the custody dispute. These facts are not material, nor relevant to the probable cause analysis. Thus, the superior court's consideration of Freund's relationship with Lewis and whether she acted as a reasonable police officer for purposes of denying summary judgment was erroneous.

¶37 Additionally, the events surrounding S.G.'s opinion about Rehkow's dangerousness are immaterial with respect to the probable cause determination. As Freund explained, she was told by Lewis and Lewis's attorney that S.G. was a psychologist who opined that Rehkow was dangerous. Freund included this statement in her police report without checking with S.G., and later learned that S.G. was not a psychologist. However, these facts do not affect the probable cause determination for purposes of analyzing a malicious prosecution claim. Slade, 112 Ariz. at 301, 541 P.2d at 553 (holding that fact that officer did not check with an independent witness to corroborate complaint by citizen against defendant and report was written giving impression that witness was contacted does not affect determination of probable cause).

¶38 The only operative question is whether Freund had an objective basis to reasonably trust the information received and to believe Rehkow had committed a crime for which an arrest was warranted. Lacy, 631 F. Supp. 2d at 1194. For purposes of summary judgment, that question depends on the existence of disputed material facts.

A. Aggravated harassment

¶39 Here, as discussed at ¶¶ 4-7 supra, it is undisputed that Freund knew before arresting Rehkow that Rehkow gave Scotti information about the sealed family court case, at least some of which was displayed on the websites at various times. Freund was also aware that there was a valid injunction against harassment prohibiting the very actions she believed Rehkow was committing with Scotti's assistance. Also, Lewis had complained to Freund about feeling personally endangered and concerned for the safety of her child and the people at her dance studio, that the website was hurting her family and business, that she got a call at work from a woman trying to verify the truth of the contents on the website, and that after discovering the website her son became upset and left her home. Further, Lewis's attorney told Freund on several occasions that she thought Rehkow's letters and complaints to her and her staff demanding documents that he already had, accusing counsel of hiding information and lying to the state bar, and threatening bar complaints against counsel and her paralegal, were actually meant to harass Lewis by increasing the cost of attorneys' fees and by trying to intimidate counsel so she would not represent Lewis.

¶40 Harassment "means conduct that is directed at a specific person and that would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed and the conduct in fact seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the person." Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 13-2921(E) (2010). A person is guilty of harassment if, with intent to harass or with knowledge that he is harassing another, he anonymously or otherwise contacts, communicates or causes a communication with another person in a manner that harasses, or repeatedly commits acts that harass, or surveils another person. A.R.S. § 13-2921(A)(1), (3), (4). Harassment is aggravated if the person commits harassment and a court has issued an order of protection or an injunction against harassment against the person and in favor of the victim, and the order is served and is still valid. A.R.S. § 13-2921.01(A)(1) (2010).

¶41 Contrary to Rehkow's assertion that there was evidence of only one incident, which is insufficient to commit harassment, Freund could reasonably believe that Rehkow's acts of disseminating sealed family court case information to be placed on a website, enabling the website to be updated with additional sealed information as it became available, and repeatedly contacting the family coordinator and Lewis's attorney and staff through letters and phone calls about Lewis constituted aggravated harassment.

¶42 We also disagree with Rehkow's contention that the record supports a determination that website harassment was not "directed" at Lewis, but rather the family court judge, and, thus, there was no probable cause to arrest him for harassment. The statute requires harassment to be directed a specific person. A.R.S. § 13-2921(E). Section 2921 however, does not require that a harasser direct a third party to specifically convey the message to the victim, but rather prohibits causing communication with another, which is directed at the victim, in a manner that harasses. Based on the facts here, repeatedly contacting Lewis's attorney and the family coordinator about Lewis's case, and updating the website with additional sealed court information from Lewis's case as it became available is sufficient evidence to support Freund's objective belief that Rehkow's actions were directed at Lewis in a manner that harassed or constituted repeated acts of harassment.10

¶43 Moreover, Freund knew Rehkow hired Scotti as a private investigator, and once Scotti's home was searched Freund obtained more evidence to support her belief that Rehkow committed aggravated harassment. The evidence included that Scotti was in possession of: Lewis's personal and business documents and business ledgers; a letter from Scotti to Rehkow about the website; emails between Rehkow and Scotti regarding wire tapping Lewis's home and cell phone, and discussions to take Lewis's trash; a map from Rehkow's home to Lewis's home; articles about Lewis and her husband; credit card receipts belonging to Lewis; and information regarding the family court judge and Freund, including home addresses and maps, as well as trash collection schedules. Thus, there was also an objective basis to believe that Rehkow "[s]uveil[ed] or cause[d] another person to surveil a person for no legitamate purpose," A.R.S. § 13-2921(A)(4), to support probable cause to arrest him for harassment.

B. Stalking

¶44 There was also objective and reasonable evidence to support probable cause to arrest Rehkow for stalking. The crime of stalking is committed if a person intentionally or knowingly engages in a "course of conduct" that is directed toward another person and that would cause a reasonable person to fear for her safety. A.R.S. § 13-2923(A)(1) (Supp. 2013). Course of conduct includes directing express or implied verbal, written, or other threats to a specific person on two or more occasions. A.R.S. § 13-2923(C)(1)(a)(i).

¶45 Rehkow maintains that because evidence of disparaging remarks to third persons and threatening letters and calls to Lewis's attorney have never been produced, there was no basis for Rehkow's arrest for stalking. However, even assuming that such evidence has not been produced, that does not diminish the fact that Freund's search warrant affidavit and investigative police report documented such instances that provided her with an objectively reasonable basis to arrest Rehkow for stalking.

¶46 Also, contrary to Rehkow's assertion that there was no evidence of Lewis's reasonable fear, it is undisputed that Lewis reported to Freund that she was fearful for her safety. Such fear need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to support probable cause for an arrest. Similarly, Rehkow contends that there was no evidence that the threats related to physical harm or to personal safety, and that there was no evidence that Rehkow was violent. However, the statute only requires that a reasonable person would fear for her safety and that the person in fact fears for her safety. A.R.S. § 13-2923(A)(1). It does not require fear for physical safety nor evidence of violence.

¶47 Rehkow's various letters and calls to Lewis's attorney and her paralegal threatening bar complaints, causing the website to be updated with additional sealed court information, making calls to the family coordinator, and evidence about intercepting Lewis's trash and wiretapping her home, is sufficient to establish probable cause for a course of conduct that was directed at Lewis, that could cause a reasonable person to fear for her safety, and that caused Lewis to fear for her safety.

CONCLUSION

¶48 There are no disputed facts regarding Freund's objective bases supporting probable cause to arrest Rehkow that preclude summary judgment. For the reasons stated above, we accept jurisdiction of the petition for special action and grant relief to Petitioners. We vacate the superior court's order denying their motion for summary judgment and motion for reconsideration and direct the court to enter judgment for Petitioners.