NOT FOR PUBLICATION

THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ESPINOSA, Judge.

¶1 Petitioner Michael Liska seeks review of the trial court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. "We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief absent a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶ 4, 166 P.3d 945, 948 (App. 2007). Liska has not sustained his burden of establishing such abuse here.

¶2 After a jury trial in 1982, Liska was convicted of one count of sexual exploitation of a minor and three counts of sexual conduct with a minor. He was sentenced to aggravated prison terms totaling fifty-six years' imprisonment. We affirmed the convictions and sentences on appeal. State v. Liska, No. 2 CA-CR 3005-2 (memorandum decision filed Nov. 14, 1984). Liska then sought and was denied post-conviction relief three times; we denied review or relief in each proceeding. See State v. Liska, No. 2 CA-CR 97-0359-PR, ¶¶ 1, 15 (memorandum decision filed June 25, 1998).

¶3 In March 2013, Liska initiated a fourth proceeding for post-conviction relief, arguing the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Missouri v. Frye, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012), constituted a significant change in the law entitling him to relief. The trial court disagreed, concluding Lafler and Frye did not change the standard for effective representation at plea proceedings, did not represent a significant change in the law, and that Liska was precluded from raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶4 On review, Liska maintains the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his petition, argues the court wrongfully concluded his claim was precluded, and again contends he was entitled to relief based on Lafler and Frye. Liska filed what we construe as a combined notice of and petition for post-conviction relief in this proceeding in March 2013. Rule 32.4(a) provides that a timely notice of post-conviction relief is one filed within ninety days of the entry of judgment and sentence or thirty days after the mandate in the direct appeal. Thus, Liska's notice was untimely.

¶5 "Any notice not timely filed may only raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h)." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). Thus, separate from any rule of preclusion that applies in this successive proceeding, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2, Rule 32.4 prohibits Liska from raising any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to Rule 32.1(a). Any such claim can only be raised in an untimely notice if it is a claim of a significant change in the law under Rule 32.1(g). Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a).

¶6 In this case, Liska continues to claim, pursuant to Rule 32.1(g), that Lafler and Frye constitute a significant change in the law.1 In his petition for post-conviction relief, Liska provided little by way of argument as to whether these decisions were a significant change in the law, asserting merely that they "caused [him] to become aware of a heretofore unknown and unrecognized issue of ineffective assistance of counsel at the pre-trial/plea bargain stage of proceedings." In his reply to the state's response to his petition he expanded to some degree on his argument, asserting Lafler and Frye had "altered the long established standards of Strickland by the addition of a new constitutional entitlement." On review, Liska similarly discusses how Lafler and Frye extended the Strickland standards.

¶7 "Rule 32 does not define `a significant change in the law.' But plainly a `change in the law' requires some transformative event, a `clear break from the past.'" State v. Shrum, 220 Ariz. 115, ¶ 15, 203 P.3d 1175, 1178 (2009), quoting State v. Slemmer, 170 Ariz. 174, 182, 823 P.2d 41, 49 (1991). Examples of such changes include "when an appellate court overrules previously binding case law" or "[a] statutory or constitutional amendment representing a definite break from prior law." Id. ¶¶ 16, 17.

¶8 We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in determining Liska had not established that Frye and Lafler represented such a break. Indeed, it has long been the law in Arizona that a defendant is entitled to effective representation in the plea context. See State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, ¶¶ 9, 14, 10 P.3d 1193, 1198, 1200 (App. 2000). And, even before Donald was decided, a defendant could have relied on other authority in asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985); State v. Bowers, 192 Ariz. 419, 966 P.2d 1023 (App. 1998). Because Liska failed to establish he was entitled to relief based on a significant change in the law, and because he has presented no other claim raisable pursuant to an untimely notice of post-conviction relief, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing his petition.

¶9 Accordingly, although we grant the petition for review, relief is denied.