NOT FOR PUBLICATION

THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ESPINOSA, Judge.

¶1 Petitioner Michael Deskins seeks review of the trial court's order denying his petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We will not disturb the court's ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶ 4, 166 P.3d 945, 948 (App. 2007). Deskins has not sustained his burden of establishing such abuse here.

¶2 After a jury trial in 1988, Deskins was convicted of attempted sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen years of age, sexual exploitation of a minor, furnishing obscene or harmful items to minors, child molestation, and five counts of sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen years of age. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences, including five terms of life imprisonment, as well as various other terms totaling fifty-five years' imprisonment.

¶3 Deskins's appeal apparently was initiated in the Arizona Supreme Court, but thereafter was transferred to the court of appeals. This court vacated the trial court's imposition of lifetime parole on seven of the nine counts, but otherwise affirmed the convictions and sentences. State v. Deskins, No. 2 CA-CR 89-0630 (memorandum decision filed Jan. 31, 1990). Deskins subsequently sought and was denied post-conviction relief in at least two proceedings. In the second proceeding, initiated in 2004, this court denied relief on review. State v. Deskins, No. 2 CA-CR 2005-0242-PR (memorandum decision filed Apr. 27, 2006).

¶4 In June 2013, Deskins filed another petition for post-conviction relief, claiming he was denied his right to appeal because the Arizona Supreme Court improperly transferred his appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals after the passage of amended A.R.S. § 12-120.21. Section 12-120.21 was amended in 1989 to remove "crimes for which a sentence of . . . life imprisonment" had been imposed from the subsection allowing direct appeal to the supreme court without decision by this court. 1989 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 58, § 1. Pursuant to that change, as noted above, Deskins's case apparently was transferred to this court. Because his crime was committed before the effective date of that statute, Deskins maintains this court lacked jurisdiction over his appeal, and he was therefore denied his right to an appeal. He asserted that his claim was one of sufficient constitutional magnitude that it could not have been waived without his knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. The trial court concluded the claim was precluded, and denied relief. Deskins filed a motion for rehearing, which the trial court also denied, concluding Deskins's claim did not "implicate a constitutional right such that the claim is of significant constitutional magnitude" and it was therefore precluded.

¶5 On review, Deskins again asserts he was denied his right to appeal because this court lacked jurisdiction over his appeal and claims the trial court abused its discretion in finding preclusion. We need not, however, address that ruling. This proceeding for post-conviction relief was not only successive, but untimely. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). "Any notice not timely filed may only raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h)." Id. And, although the current timeliness rules were adopted after Deskins's crimes, the "order promulgating the 1992 amendments made them `applicable to all post-conviction relief petitions filed on and after September 30, 1992, except that the time limits of 90 and 30 days imposed by Rule 32.4 shall be inapplicable to a defendant sentenced prior to September 30, 1992, who is filing his first petition for post-conviction relief.'" Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 135, 962 P.2d 205, 209 (1998), quoting 171 Ariz. XLIV (1992). As noted above, this is not Deskins's first petition.

¶6 The claim Deskins raises is one pursuant to Rule 32.1(a)—that he was unconstitutionally denied his right to an appeal.1 See Ariz. Const. art. II, § 24. Thus, Deskins has not established that his claim is one that may be raised in an untimely proceeding for post-conviction relief. Indeed, although the trial court attempted to address his claim as one of a significant change in the law, which may be raised in an untimely proceeding under Rule 32.1(g), in his motion for rehearing, Deskins specifically denied that he was asserting such a claim. He likewise rejects such a characterization on review.

¶7 Therefore, although the petition for review is accepted, relief is denied.