NOT FOR PUBLICATION

THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES, See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ESPINOSA, Judge.

¶1 Petitioner Kent Holcomb seeks review of the trial court's summary dismissal of his untimely, successive notice of and petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We grant review and, for the following reasons, we deny relief.

¶2 Holcomb was convicted after a jury trial of kidnapping, sexual abuse, five counts of sexual assault, and one count of attempted sexual assault. He was sentenced to aggravated, consecutive prison terms totaling ninety-six years. This court affirmed his convictions and sentences and denied relief on review of his first Rule 32 proceeding. State v. Holcomb, Nos. 2 CA-CR 1992-0338, 2 CA-CR 95-0444-PR (consolidated) (memorandum decision filed Jul. 11, 1996, as corrected Aug. 8, 1996). He filed a second notice of and petition for post-conviction relief on May 15, 2013, in which he alleged consecutive sentences were illegally imposed because the state had "neither charge[d] nor notice[d] him" under former A.R.S. § 13-708, which he characterizes as a "penalty statute" that authorized his consecutive sentences.1 He also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.

¶3 The trial court summarily dismissed Holcomb's notice and petition, finding his claims precluded "because they were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal or in [his] previous petition." This petition for review followed. On review, Holcomb urges us to apply federal case law apparently related to petitions for federal habeas corpus relief, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2254, to conclude the trial court abused its discretion in finding his claims precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2(a). Citing Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 46 P.3d 1067 (2002), Holcomb also appears to argue the trial court abused its discretion to the extent it found his claims precluded by waiver under Rule 32.2(a)(3), asserting the claims are of "sufficient constitutional magnitude" to require his personal waiver.

¶4 We review a trial court's summary denial of post-conviction relief for an abuse of discretion. State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, ¶ 17, 146 P.3d 63, 67 (2006). We find none here. Federal habeas law regarding circumstances that might excuse a prisoner's procedural default in state court has no relevance to a state court's determination that a Rule 32 petitioner is precluded, under applicable state law, from raising a claim in an untimely, successive petition. Cf. Martinez v. Ryan, ___, U.S. ___, ___, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012); State v. Escareno-Meraz, 232 Ariz. 586, ¶¶ 5-6, 307 P.3d 1013, 1014 (App. 2013) (Supreme Court's decision affording "equitable" cause for relief from state court procedural default of federal habeas claim did not alter established Arizona law of claims allowable under Rule 32). And the narrow exception to preclusion suggested in Stewart v. Smith applies only to those "relatively few rights" "that can only be waived by a defendant personally," such as the rights to counsel or trial by jury. State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶ 28, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App. 2007). Holcomb's claim sounds in his general due process right to fair sentencing, not "`an inherently personal right of fundamental importance that . . . must be personally and expressly waived.'" State v. Espinosa, 200 Ariz. 503, ¶ 8, 29 P.3d 278, 280 (App. 2001), quoting State v. Smith, 197 Ariz. 333 ¶ 13, 4 P.3d 388, 393 (App. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Soliz, 223 Ariz. 116, ¶¶ 1, 18, 219 P.3d 1045, 1046, 1049 (2009).

¶5 Accordingly, Holcomb has not persuaded us that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his claims, grounded in Rule 32.1(a), as waived or otherwise precluded pursuant to Rule 32.2(a).

¶6 Moreover, although not cited by the trial court, Holcomb's claims, filed nearly seventeen years after this court's decision in his first Rule 32 proceeding, are also precluded as untimely under Rule 32.4(a), which provides, "Any notice not timely filed may only raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h)," regardless of whether claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(a), (b), or (c) have been waived in previous proceedings. Thus, the court's ruling was correct for the additional reason that Holcomb's claims were precluded as untimely under Rule 32.4(a). See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c) ("[A]ny court on review of the record may determine and hold that an issue is precluded. . . ."); State v. Lopez, No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0506-PR, 2014 WL 1592969 (Ariz. Ct. App. April 21, 2014) (issue of personal waiver in Stewart v. Smith irrelevant to time-barred claim). With this addition, we adopt the court's ruling, which clearly identified Holcomb's claims and resolved them correctly based on thorough, well-reasoned analysis. See State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274, 866 P.2d 1358, 1360 (App. 1993) (when trial court has correctly ruled on issues "in a fashion that will allow any court in the future to understand the resolution[, n]o useful purpose would be served by this court rehashing" that analysis).

¶7 For the foregoing reasons, review is granted, but relief is denied.