NOT FOR PUBLICATION

THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ESPINOSA, Judge.

¶1 Victor Lizardi appeals from his convictions and sentences for first-degree murder and armed robbery. He argues insufficient evidence supports his convictions and the trial court erred in entering a criminal restitution order (CRO) at sentencing. We vacate the CRO but otherwise affirm Lizardi's convictions and sentences.

¶2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding Lizardi's convictions. State v. Pena, 233 Ariz. 112, ¶ 2, 309 P.3d 936, 938 (App. 2013). Lizardi was a passenger in a vehicle driven by M. when he saw P.'s parked car. After instructing M. to turn around and stop, Lizardi approached P.'s car on foot to see if there was anything he could steal. Lizardi was armed with a handgun. P. then approached and confronted Lizardi. Lizardi returned to M.'s car and she drove away, but P. followed in his car, yelling for them to pull over. M. eventually did so, and Lizardi and P. both got out of their respective vehicles as P. taunted Lizardi and accused him of trying to steal from him.

¶3 P. retrieved his car keys from his vehicle and dangled them in front of Lizardi, saying: "[H]ey homie, you want to take my car[?]" Lizardi then drew his pistol and shot P. six times, killing him. Lizardi took the keys and drove away in P.'s car after he and M. found and took some money from the car.

¶4 Lizardi was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder and armed robbery. The jury unanimously found, via a special interrogatory, that Lizardi was guilty of first-degree murder both on a premeditation theory and a felony-murder theory. The trial court sentenced Lizardi to a prison term of natural life for murder and a 10.5-year presumptive prison term for armed robbery. This appeal followed.1

¶5 Lizardi asserts on appeal there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for premeditated murder, felony murder, and armed robbery. He argues there was no evidence of premeditation and evidence only supported a finding that he had shot P. "in the heat of passion in response to his nonstop taunting and belittling." He further argues he could not be found guilty of felony murder because he did not commit armed robbery and thus did not shoot P. in the course of committing that crime. He reasons there was no evidence he had shot P. in an effort to obtain property and the shooting and taking of the car were "two separate events."

¶6 In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, "the controlling question is solely whether the record contains `substantial evidence to warrant a conviction.'" State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 14, 250 P.3d 1188, 1191 (2011), quoting Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a). Substantial evidence exists if, "`after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. ¶ 16, quoting State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 66, 796 P.2d 866, 868 (1990). If "`reasonable minds may differ on inferences drawn from the facts,'" the evidence is substantial and the conviction must be upheld. Id. ¶ 18, quoting State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 603, 944 P.2d 1204, 1217 (1997). We determine de novo whether sufficient evidence supports every element of the offense. Id. ¶¶ 15-16.

¶7 Relevant here, a person commits armed robbery if he or she "in the course of taking any property of another from his person or immediate presence and against his will, . . . threatens or uses force against any person with intent either to coerce surrender of property or to prevent resistance to such person taking or retaining property," and that person is "armed with a deadly weapon" or "[u]ses or threatens to use a deadly weapon." A.R.S. §§ 13-1902(A), 13-1904(A). A person commits first-degree murder if he or she commits armed robbery and, "in the course of and in furtherance of the offense or immediate flight from the offense, the person or another person causes the death of any person." A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(2).

¶8 The evidence amply supports the jury's conclusion that Lizardi is guilty of armed robbery and first-degree murder. Although Lizardi is correct that, had he "conceived of [the theft] and executed [it] after" murdering P., there would have been no armed robbery, State v. Lopez, 158 Ariz. 258, 264, 762 P.2d 545, 551 (1988), the evidence does not require that conclusion. Particularly in light of Lizardi's initial intent to steal from P., the jury could conclude he shot P.—at least in part—to take his keys and vehicle. Indeed, P. had mockingly invited Lizardi to do so. Lizardi's reliance on Lopez therefore is misplaced. In that case, the court emphasized the complete lack of evidence that the defendant and his brother had any interest in stealing the victim's property before killing him. The evidence suggested instead that they had taken "the car and the billfold for the purpose of removing themselves from the scene, to attempt to prevent or delay identification of the body, and to destroy evidence." Id. at 264, 762 P.2d at 551.

¶9 Moreover, Lizardi cites no authority for his suggestion that there had to be some evidence he had threatened P. before shooting him to establish that he had committed armed robbery. And his earlier "withdrawal" when P. first appeared does not negate the inference that Lizardi intended to take P.'s property when the opportunity later presented itself.

¶10 As our supreme court has explained, "[b]ecause felony murder is an alternate theory of first degree murder," we "need not consider a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of felony murder when the jury also returns a separate verdict of guilt for premeditated murder." State v. Martinez, 218 Ariz. 421, ¶ 22, 189 P.3d 348, 354 (2008). Likewise, we do not address whether there was sufficient evidence of premeditation to support a conviction of first-degree murder under § 13-1105(A)(1).

¶11 In its sentencing minute entry, the trial court imposed attorney fees and an administration fee against Lizardi and stated that both were "reduced to a [CRO], with no interest, penalties or collection fees to accrue while the defendant is in the Department of Corrections." We agree with Lizardi and the state that A.R.S. § 13-805 does not permit a trial court to enter a CRO at sentencing for fees and assessments, but only for restitution to a victim. State v. Cota, 234 Ariz. 180, ¶ 15, 319 P.3d 242, 246 (App. 2014). Thus, the entry of such a CRO "`constitutes an illegal sentence, which is necessarily fundamental, reversible error.'" State v. Lopez, 231 Ariz. 561, ¶ 2, 298 P.3d 909, 910 (App. 2013), quoting State v. Lewandowski, 220 Ariz. 531, ¶ 15, 207 P.3d 784, 789 (App. 2009).

¶12 For the reasons stated, we vacate the CRO but otherwise affirm Lizardi's convictions and sentences.