NOT FOR PUBLICATION

THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

HOWARD, Judge.

¶1 Appellant William Davis was convicted by a jury of first-degree failure to appear in connection with a felony. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss in which he argued the justice court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to order him to appear in superior court. Because we conclude the justice court had jurisdiction to issue such an order, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 Davis initially appeared before a Cochise County justice court in connection with various felony charges in June 2012. The justice of the peace advised Davis of the charges against him, advised him of his rights, appointed counsel, and ordered him to appear in Cochise County superior court "for an Early Resolution Court [ERC] hearing" on June 13, 2012. Davis failed to appear at the hearing on that date and subsequently was charged and convicted as noted above. He was sentenced to a presumptive, enhanced prison term of seven years. We have jurisdiction over Davis's appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 13-4033(A)(1).

Discussion

¶3 On appeal, Davis argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the failure to appear charge. He contends the justice court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order him to appear at the ERC hearing. He appears to reason that the order therefore was an impermissible basis for the failure to appear charge.

¶4 We review de novo the "interpretation and interplay of statutes relating to the justice courts' jurisdiction." State ex rel. Brannan v. Williams, 217 Ariz. 207, ¶ 4, 171 P.3d 1248, 1250-51 (App. 2007). When interpreting statutes, we strive to "give effect to the legislature's intent" and consider the statute's language "`the best and most reliable index of a statute's meaning.'" State v. Hinden, 224 Ariz. 508, ¶ 9, 233 P.3d 621, 623 (App. 2010), quoting State v. Williams, 175 Ariz. 98, 100, 854 P.2d 131, 133 (1993). "[I]f the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, we look no further." Id.

¶5 Preliminarily, we note Davis had argued below that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over the offense because the justice court lacked jurisdiction to order him to appear at the ERC hearing. But the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction over his felony prosecution pursuant to article VI, § 14(4) of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-123(A). He does not make the same argument here nor does he clearly state what effect the justice court's alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction would have on the superior court's proceedings. Therefore, we interpret Davis's argument here to be a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. But whether the issue is viewed as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction or sufficiency of the evidence, the analysis and result are the same. See State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 15, 250 P.3d 1188, 1191 (2011) (sufficiency of evidence claims reviewed de novo); see also State v. Zinsmeyer, 222 Ariz. 612, ¶ 27, 218 P.3d 1069, 1080 (App. 2009) (conviction based on insufficient evidence fundamental error), overruled on other grounds by State v. Bonfiglio, 231 Ariz. 371, 295 P.3d 948 (2013).

¶6 Davis argues that ordering a defendant to appear before ERC "is not a function of Justice Court's jurisdictional breadth." If the court entering an order lacks jurisdiction "`over the subject matter, . . . over the person involved, or . . . to render the particular judgment or order entered,'" the order is void, and can be vacated at any time. State v. Bryant, 219 Ariz. 514, ¶¶ 13-14, 200 P.3d 1011, 1014-15 (App. 2008), quoting State v. Cramer, 192 Ariz. 150, ¶ 16, 962 P.2d 224, 227 (App. 1998).

¶7 "Justice courts derive their jurisdiction solely from the constitution and statutes of this state." Brannan, 217 Ariz. 207, ¶ 6, 171 P.3d at 1251; Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 32(B); A.R.S. § 22-301(A)(2); see State v. Dziggel, 16 Ariz.App. 289, 290-91, 492 P.2d 1227, 1228-29 (1972). Section 22-301(A)(2) expressly grants a justice court jurisdiction over felonies "but only for the purpose of . . . conducting proceedings through preliminary examinations and holding the defendant to answer to the superior court." The justice court's order requiring Davis to appear for an ERC hearing occurred before the preliminary hearing and before he was held to answer in superior court. Therefore, ordering Davis to appear for the ERC hearing was within the justice court's jurisdiction pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of § 22-301(A)(2). See Hinden, 224 Ariz. 508, ¶ 9, 233 P.3d at 623. Davis does not attempt to explain why the justice court's actions here were outside the scope of § 22-301(A)(2) and instead relies on his bare assertion that the justice court's actions were impermissible under the statute. Accordingly, we reject Davis's argument that ordering him to appear for an ERC hearing was outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the justice court.

¶8 Although Davis cites Espinoza v. Martin, 182 Ariz. 145, 894 P.2d 688 (1995), he does not explain that decision's relevance to this case, and we find none. In that case, a group of Maricopa County superior court judges created a policy under which they would not accept any plea agreements which contained a stipulated sentence. Id. at 146, 894 P.2d at 689. On review, the supreme court first determined that this policy violated Rule 17.4, Ariz. R. Crim. P., because it limited a trial court's discretion to decide whether to accept or reject a defendant's plea agreement. Id. at 148, 894 P.2d at 691. The court next determined that because the policy was, in essence, a "procedural rule," it also violated Rule 36, Ariz. R. Crim. P., which prohibits lower courts from adopting rules which are inconsistent with the rules of criminal procedure and also invalidates all rules—like the policy in question—not approved by the supreme court in writing. Id. at 149, 894 P.2d at 692.

¶9 Davis contends "Cochise County's Early Resolution Court, wherein the Justice Court orders defendants to attend an Early Resolution Hearing is similarly situated as the reasoning in Espino[z]a." Davis does not, however, explain which procedural rules the justice court violated that would invoke Espinoza's reasoning. Davis also has failed to explain who, if not the justice court under these circumstances, has jurisdictional authority to order the defendant to appear at an ERC hearing in superior court. Davis's reliance on Espinoza, without further explanation or argument, consequently fails.

¶10 Davis was charged with failure to appear in the first degree. A person commits that crime "if, having been required by law to appear in connection with any felony, such person knowingly fails to appear as required, regardless of the disposition of the charge requiring the appearance." A.R.S. § 13-2507(A). Because Davis had notice and was required by law to appear at the ERC, he was guilty of first-degree failure to appear. See State v. Wiley, 199 Ariz. 242, ¶ 6, 16 P.3d 803, 805 (App. 2001) ("[Section] 13-2507 proscribes failing to appear in court in connection with a felony regardless of whether the duty to appear originates in a statute, rule of procedure, court order, or combination thereof."). The state thus presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that Davis failed to appear as required in connection with a felony. See State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 66, 796 P.2d 866, 868 (1990).

Disposition

¶11 For the foregoing reasons, Davis's conviction and sentence are affirmed.