NOT FOR PUBLICATION

THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES, See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

HOWARD, Judge.

¶1 Following a jury trial, Keanu Castaneda was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury to disregard certain testimony and his motion for a judgment of acquittal and that Arizona's felony-murder statute violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 "We view the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to upholding the verdicts." State v. Tamplin, 195 Ariz. 246, ¶ 2, 986 P.2d 914, 914 (App. 1999). Jamonte and Michael Olague, brothers of Castaneda's girlfriend, planned to steal marijuana from C.S. during a meeting arranged to purchase marijuana from him. Aware of this plan, and equipped with a loaded gun tucked into his waistband, Castaneda accompanied Jamonte into a home where they both met with C.S. During the meeting, Castaneda pulled out the gun, and he and Jamonte threatened C.S. A struggle over the marijuana ensued, during which Castaneda shot and killed C.S.

¶3 Castaneda was indicted on and convicted of the three charges described above. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms on all three counts, the longest of which was a life sentence with the possibility of release after serving twenty-five years. We have jurisdiction over his appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 13-4033(A)(1).

Denial of Jury Instruction

¶4 Castaneda argues the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury that it must disregard his out-of-court statement to police that he knew about the plan to rob C.S. because no independent, corroborating circumstances indicated the statement's trustworthiness and thereby its admission into evidence violated both the hearsay rule and the corpus delicti rule. "We review a court's denial of a requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion." State v. Musgrove, 223 Ariz. 164, ¶ 5, 221 P.3d 43, 46 (App. 2009). A court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to give a requested instruction that "is based on an incorrect legal assumption." State v. Morse, 127 Ariz. 25, 29, 617 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1980).

¶5 The trial court properly refused the requested instruction because the admission of Castaneda's statement to police did not violate the hearsay rule.1 See id. Castaneda argued below, as he does on appeal, that the statement was hearsay and did not meet the requirements of the statement-against-interest exception detailed in Rule 804(b)(3), Ariz. R. Evid., because it lacked corroborating evidence. But Castaneda's statement to police was an admission by a party-opponent and, therefore, not hearsay. See Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) (statement offered against opposing party and made by party in individual capacity not hearsay); State v. Cruz, 218 Ariz. 149, ¶ 51, 181 P.3d 196, 208 (2008) (defendant's out-of-court, inculpating statement to police officer is party admission under Rule 801(d)(2)). Thus, the statement was admissible regardless of whether it met the requirements for the statement-against-interest exception, and the jury was not required to disregard it. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the requested instruction.2 See Morse, 127 Ariz. at 29, 617 P.2d at 1145; Musgrove, 223 Ariz. 164, ¶ 5, 221 P.3d at 46.

¶6 Castaneda also argues the statement was inadmissible because it lacked corroborating circumstances and thereby violated the corpus delicti rule. Under that rule, "[a] defendant may not be convicted of a crime based on an uncorroborated confession without independent proof of the corpus delicti, or the `body of the crime.'" State v. Morgan, 204 Ariz. 166, ¶ 15, 61 P.3d 460, 464 (App. 2002). "The state `must establish the corpus delicti by showing proof of a crime and that someone is responsible for that crime.'" Id., quoting State v. Jones, 198 Ariz. 18, ¶ 12, 6 P.3d 323, 327 (App. 2000).

¶7 But Castaneda did not raise this issue below and therefore has forfeited review for all but fundamental, prejudicial error. See State v. Lopez, 217 Ariz. 433, ¶ 4, 175 P.3d 682, 683-84 (App. 2008). He does not argue fundamental error on appeal and thereby has waived review of the corpus delicti issue entirely. See State v. Moreno-Medrano, 218 Ariz. 349, ¶ 17, 185 P.3d 135, 140 (App. 2008).

¶8 Nevertheless, Castaneda contends that, by raising the hearsay issue below, he also raised corpus delicti because "[t]he corpus delicti rule . . . is effectively incorporated into" Rule 804(b)(3), the statement-against-interest hearsay exception. He cites no legal authority and makes no argument to support this proposition. Consequently, he has waived any claim that raising the issue of the statement-against-interest hearsay exception is equivalent to raising the issue of corpus delicti. See State v. Tarkington, 218 Ariz. 369, n.1, 187 P.3d 94, 95 n.1 (App. 2008) (argument waived if not adequately developed); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.13(c)(1)(vi) ("argument . . . shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on").

Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶9 Castaneda also argues the trial court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 20, Ariz. R. Crim. P., because "[n]otwithstanding [his] statement to police, which should not have been considered by the jury, there was no evidence [he] went with Jamonte to rob [C.S.]." Thus, he argues, the evidence was insufficient to show he had committed the predicate offense of armed robbery that supported the felony-murder charge. He admits, however, that he shot C.S. and that he accompanied Jamonte to assist Jamonte in purchasing marijuana from C.S.

¶10 We review a trial court's denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo. State v. Gray, 231 Ariz. 374, ¶ 2, 295 P.3d 951, 952 (App. 2013). A court may not grant a judgment of acquittal unless "`there is no substantial evidence to warrant a conviction.'" Id., quoting Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a). "`Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is such proof that reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id., quoting State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 67, 796 P.2d 866, 869 (1990).

¶11 The record contains more than sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that Castaneda committed the predicate offense of armed robbery. As discussed above, he admitted to the police that he had known that the Olagues planned to rob C.S., and this statement was admitted properly into evidence. He also admitted he had accompanied Jamonte to the site of the drug deal with a loaded gun and had shot C.S. during the transaction. And testimony by a bystander confirmed that Castaneda had pulled the gun on C.S. and that Jamonte and Castaneda had threatened to kill C.S. if he did not give them the marijuana.

¶12 Thus, reasonable jurors could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Castaneda, armed with a deadly weapon, had assisted Jamonte in taking the marijuana from C.S. under the threat of force. See A.R.S. §§ 13-301(2), (3), 13-303(A)(2), 13-1902, 13-1904(A)(1). The trial court did not err in refusing to grant Castaneda's motion for a judgment of acquittal. See Gray, 231 Ariz. 374, ¶ 2, 295 P.3d at 952.

¶13 Moreover, even if the state had not presented sufficient evidence during its case-in-chief, Castaneda cured any deficiency in the state's evidence through his own testimony at trial. He testified that he had heard about "a rip off" and that the Olagues were "going to jack" someone. He also admitted the Olagues had planned to commit the robbery in a restaurant parking lot and he had accompanied them to that parking lot before C.S. had called Jamonte to change the location of the drug deal. He further admitted that, with his gun drawn and without having paid for the marijuana, he had tried to wrestle the marijuana away from C.S. and had shot C.S. during this struggle. Thus, Castaneda's own testimony established that he had shot C.S. while robbing him at gunpoint and provided sufficient evidence to convict him on a theory of felony murder. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1105(A)(2), 13-1904(A)(1). He thereby waived any possible error in the denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal. See State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 308, 896 P.2d 830, 848 (1995); State v. Bustamante, 103 Ariz. 551, 553, 447 P.2d 243, 245 (1968).

Constitutionality of Felony-Murder Statute

¶14 Last, Castaneda argues Arizona's felony-murder statute violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He did not challenge adequately the constitutionality of the statute below, however, and does not argue fundamental error on appeal.3 Consequently, he has waived review of the issue entirely. See Moreno-Medrano, 218 Ariz. 349, ¶ 17, 185 P.3d at 140; Lopez, 217 Ariz. 433, ¶ 4, 175 P.3d at 683-84.

¶15 Nevertheless, Castaneda contends in his reply brief that he did not need to raise the issue below or argue fundamental error on appeal because raising the constitutionality of the statute before the trial court "would have been futile" given that our supreme court already has held the felony-murder statute to be constitutional. See State v. McLoughlin, 139 Ariz. 481, 485-86, 679 P.2d 504, 508-09 (1984); State v. Brown, 233 Ariz. 153, ¶ 27, 310 P.3d 29, 38 (App. 2013). And he asks this court "to provide additional insight into the matter" before he takes his appeal to our supreme court. But, as he concedes, "we have no authority to overrule or disregard the decisions of our supreme court." Brown, 233 Ariz. 153, ¶ 27, 310 P.3d at 38. Thus, even if he had not waived this issue, we would be bound to reaffirm that the felony-murder statute is constitutional. See id.

Disposition

¶16 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Castaneda's convictions and sentences.