NOT FOR PUBLICATION

THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

KELLY, Presiding Judge.

¶1 Bradley Schwartz seeks review of the trial court's order denying his petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We will not disturb that ruling unless the court clearly abused its discretion. State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶ 4, 166 P.3d 945, 948 (App. 2007). Schwartz has not met his burden of demonstrating such abuse here.

¶2 Schwartz was convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release for twenty-five years. His conviction stemmed from the murder of Schwartz's former business associate by another individual, who stabbed the victim to death and stole his vehicle. Schwartz had extensive contact with the killer the night of the murder, and paid him $10,000 in cash shortly thereafter. Schwartz previously had spoken at length about wanting to harm the victim, and the circumstances surrounding the victim's death were consistent with comments Schwartz had made to several other individuals. We affirmed Schwartz's conviction and sentence on appeal. State v. Schwartz, No. 2 CA-CR 2006-0213 (memorandum decision filed Mar. 31, 2008).

¶3 Schwartz sought post-conviction relief,1 claiming State v. Machado, 226 Ariz. 281, 246 P.3d 632 (2011), constituted a significant change in the law relevant to admission of evidence of third-party culpability, and that there was newly-discovered evidence purportedly supporting his theory that the victim's wife was involved in the murder. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief and dismissed Schwartz's petition. This petition for review followed.

¶4 On review, Schwartz repeats his claims that there has been a significant change in the law and there is newly discovered evidence. He also asserts the trial court erred in rejecting his request for documents from a civil suit between the victim's wife and Pima County.

¶5 Schwartz contends, as he did below, that Machado constitutes a significant change in the law entitling him to relief pursuant to Rule 32.1(g). In Machado, our supreme court clarified that Rule 404(b) does not apply to the admission of evidence of third-party culpability. 226 Ariz. 281, ¶ 16, 246 P.3d at 635. But, even assuming that holding constitutes a significant change in the law, relief is warranted only if Schwartz demonstrates the change, if applicable to his case, "would probably overturn [his] conviction or sentence." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g). Schwartz ignores the trial court's conclusion that Machado would not change the result in his case. Indeed, he does not attempt to identify on review any evidence of third-party culpability that was precluded on Rule 404(b) grounds.

¶6 Schwartz also repeats his claim of newly discovered evidence. Specifically, he claims the following information supported a claim that the victim's wife was involved in the murder: (1) information contained on the victim's computer that he "was communicating with another female" before his death, (2) information concerning financial benefits to the victim's wife as a result of his death, and (3) evidence showing the victim's wife's DNA2 had been found on the victim's keys and in his vehicle. To obtain relief, Schwartz must demonstrate that: (1) the evidence is, in fact, newly discovered; (2) he exercised due diligence in discovering and presenting the evidence; (3) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence is material to the issue involved; and (5) the evidence, "if introduced, would probably change the verdict if a new trial were ordered." State v. Serna, 167 Ariz. 373, 374, 807 P.2d 1109, 1110 (1991) (emphasis omitted).

¶7 Even assuming Schwartz had satisfied the first four requirements, he has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability the evidence would have changed the verdict or sentence. Third-party culpability evidence must "tend to create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt," and its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or delay. State v. Gibson, 202 Ariz. 321, ¶¶ 13, 16, 44 P.3d 1001, 1003, 1004 (2002) (emphasis omitted); see also State v. Prion, 203 Ariz. 157, ¶¶ 22, 24, 52 P.3d 189, 193 (2002); Ariz. R. Evid. 401, 403.

¶8 Even viewed in conjunction with the victim's wife's behavior when deputies arrived at their home to inform her of her husband's death,3 which Schwartz has characterized as "bizarre," the additional evidence Schwartz presents does not create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Although the evidence obliquely supports Schwartz's claim the victim's wife may have had a motive to murder her husband, it does not meaningfully connect her to the killer or the crime.4 See State v. Tucker, 205 Ariz. 157, ¶¶ 31-33, 68 P.3d 110, 116-17 (2003) (evidence of third-party's motive inadmissible absent evidence of opportunity).

¶9 Last, as we understand his argument, Schwartz asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion seeking disclosure of additional information apparently contained on the victim's computer. He argues that his due process rights must trump application of the Victim's Bill of Rights, and that the victim's wife has waived any privilege. But Schwartz does not meaningfully develop any argument that the information is relevant to his post-conviction claims. Nor does he provide citations to the record or to an appendix that would permit us to evaluate the nature of the evidence Schwartz seeks, what objections were made, and whether he raised the due process argument below. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(iv). Accordingly, we do not address this issue further. Cf. State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 298, 896 P.2d 830, 838 (1995) (inadequate argument on review waives issue).

¶10 Although we grant review, we deny relief.