NOT FOR PUBLICATION

THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

VÁSQUEZ, Presiding Judge.

¶1 Petitioner David Ibarra seeks review of the trial court's order denying his petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. "We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief absent a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶ 4, 166 P.3d 945, 948 (App. 2007). Ibarra has not sustained his burden of establishing such abuse here.

¶2 After a jury trial, Ibarra was convicted of aggravated assault, assault, and criminal damage, all designated as domestic violence offenses. The trial court sentenced Ibarra to a slightly aggravated eleven-year prison term, followed by concurrent two-year terms of probation. This court affirmed Ibarra's convictions for aggravated assault and criminal damage, but vacated and remanded his conviction and probationary term for assault.1 State v. Ibarra, No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0296 (memorandum decision filed Apr. 8, 2015). Ibarra then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The court summarily denied relief.

¶3 On review, Ibarra maintains, as he did below, that: 1) trial counsel was ineffective by failing to seek a curative instruction or moving to strike the victim's testimony regarding a prior incident of domestic violence between the parties and by referring to that incident during closing argument; 2) trial counsel should have moved to preclude or strike photographs related to the same incident;2 and, 3) trial counsel failed to object to a duplicitous charge for aggravated assault pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1204(B) (count one), thus permitting the jury to possibly reach a non-unanimous verdict, and appellate counsel failed to raise this issue on appeal. See § 13-1204(B) (person commits aggravated assault by "intentionally or knowingly imped[ing] the normal breathing or circulation of blood of another person by applying pressure to the throat or neck or by obstructing the nose and mouth" in context of domestic violence assault). Ibarra also asserts that, at the very least, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

¶4 The trial court properly identified the claims Ibarra had raised and resolved them correctly "in a fashion that will allow any court in the future to understand the resolution." State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274, 866 P.2d 1358, 1360 (App. 1993). We therefore need not repeat the court's decision in full, but rather adopt that portion of it which applies to the issues Ibarra has raised on review. See id.

¶5 Additionally, to the extent Ibarra points out that "[t]rial [c]ounsel did not provide an affidavit in response to Ibarra's Petition," purportedly leading the trial court to "speculat[e]" about trial counsel's "thoughts and reasoning," we note that it was Ibarra's responsibility as the petitioner to provide such an affidavit.3 See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5. Ibarra submitted no affidavit or other evidence suggesting counsel's decisions had not been based on a reasonable trial strategy. And, Ibarra cites no authority, nor are we aware of any, suggesting a trial court may not rely on its own experience in assessing whether counsel's trial decisions were reasonable, as the court did here. Cf. State v. Wood, 180 Ariz. 53, 61, 881 P.2d 1158, 1166 (1994) ("Because [claims of ineffective assistance of counsel] are fact-intensive and often involve matters of trial tactics and strategy, trial courts are far better-situated to address these issues.").

¶6 Finally, Ibarra argues the trial court improperly relied on State v. Delgado, 232 Ariz. 182, ¶ 24, 303 P.3d 76, 83 (App. 2013), a case in which we concluded § 13-1204(B), the statute at issue here, creates a single offense that can be committed in more than one form, requiring proof of only the particular harm set forth in the statute. Ibarra maintains Delgado is inapplicable because we addressed only the issue of a duplicitous indictment in that case, while he "is claiming that the evidence presented at trial rendered the charge [rather than the indictment] duplicitous."4

¶7 We find Ibarra's argument unpersuasive for several reasons. First, despite stating on review that he is challenging only a duplicitous charge, and not a duplicitous indictment, in his Rule 32 petition Ibarra expressly asserted that "[t]he indictment and the charges for . . . count[] one . . . were duplicitous." Second, Ibarra has not persuaded us that Delgado is meaningfully distinguishable from his case. Id. ¶¶ 1, 18. Third, Ibarra has not supported his argument that the jury instructions and verdict form in his case "further compounded the duplicitous charge" for his conviction under § 13-1204(B), issues we specifically addressed and resolved in Delgado, our resolution of which supports the trial court's dismissal of Ibarra's claim below. See id. ¶¶ 20-24.

¶8 Therefore, we grant review but deny relief.