NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

JONES, Judge.

¶1 Imran Jamali appeals the trial court's order dismissing his complaint against Emma Hyatt. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In April 2014, Jamali filed a complaint against Hyatt seeking damages for defamation, false reporting to law enforcement, invasion of privacy, harassment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional harm, and conspiracy. Jamali alleged all eight causes of action arose from encounters with Hyatt occurring in 2010.2 He asserts he was arrested after Hyatt falsely reported to police he was stalking and harassing her, which led to a "baseless, fraudulent and frivolous criminal felony `case.'" As a result, Jamali allegedly suffered imprisonment, loss of reputation, loss of friends, loss of other relationships, anxiety, emotional pain, public humiliation, and financial insecurity.

¶3 After filing the complaint, Jamali discovered Hyatt was residing in England and requested an extension of time to effect service of process upon Hyatt using "alternate" or "substitute" means. The trial court granted the extension and ordered Jamali to comply with Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 4.2 in choosing a means of service.

¶4 In June 2014, Hyatt moved to dismiss for insufficient service of process pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5). In response, the trial court gave Jamali a second extension to serve the complaint, until October 31, 2014. Asserting difficulty in serving Hyatt, Jamali again requested the court allow him to serve Hyatt through "alternate or substitute service." In September 2014, the court ordered Jamali to serve Hyatt pursuant to Rule 4.2(i)(1) and extended the service deadline for a third time to December 1, 2014.

¶5 On November 20, 2014, a document was filed with the trial court clerk certifying Hyatt was served on November 11, 2014 in conformity with international law. Jamali apparently was not notified that the certificate of service had been filed and, on November 26, 2014, requested another extension, advising he had begun the process for foreign service and believed "service should take place shortly." Hyatt objected to Jamali's request and filed a motion to dismiss asserting she was not properly or timely served in accordance with the court's previous order. Without addressing the November 2014 certificate of service, the trial court denied Jamali's request and granted Hyatt's motion to dismiss in an unsigned minute entry order.

¶6 In January 2015, Jamali filed a "motion to re-open" the case, a declaration supporting service of Hyatt, and an application and affidavit for default against Hyatt. Within those pleadings, Jamali claimed service was effective and timely but that he was never notified Hyatt had been served, nor that the certificate of service had been filed. In her response, Hyatt ignored the November 2014 certificate of service and again denied having been properly and timely served.

¶7 Before the trial court addressed those requests, Hyatt filed a second motion to dismiss "as a precautionary matter . . . [i]n order to prevent any claim by [Jamali] that [Hyatt] has defaulted concerning this matter." Therein, Hyatt argued applicable statutes of limitations barred Jamali's tort claims and Jamali lacked standing or authority to enforce the other claims that were based upon criminal statutes. Jamali did not respond.

¶8 In February 2015, the trial court deemed Jamali's motion one for reconsideration of the dismissal and denied it. Jamali filed a second motion to reconsider, which the court again denied. The court then granted Hyatt's second motion to dismiss and entered a final order dismissing the case with prejudice. Jamali timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)(1),3 and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Dismissal of the Complaint

¶9 Jamali argues the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint. We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo.4 See Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 355-56, ¶¶ 7-8 (2012). Dismissal is appropriate on this ground "only if `as a matter of law plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.'" Id. at 356, ¶ 8 (quoting Fid. Sec. Life Ins. v. State Dep't of Ins., 191 Ariz. 222, 224, ¶ 4 (1998)). We will affirm the trial court if it is correct "for any reason apparent in the record." Forszt v. Rodriguez, 212 Ariz. 263, 265, ¶ 9 (App. 2006) (citing Washburn v. Pima Cnty., 206 Ariz. 571, 575, ¶ 7 (App. 2003)).

A. The Applicable Statutes of Limitations Bar Jamali's Tort Claims.

¶10 In his complaint, Jamali alleges the conduct giving rise to his damages occurred in 2010. He filed his complaint in April 2014, over three years later.

¶11 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-541(1), claims for "malicious prosecution . . . or for injuries done to the character or reputation of another by libel or slander" are barred if not "commenced and prosecuted within one year after the cause of action accrues." Section 12-542(1) provides "injuries done to the person of another" are barred if not "commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward." Because claims for abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional harm, and invasion of privacy involve personal injury, they are governed by the two-year limitations period. See Hatch v. Reliance Ins., 758 F.2d 409, 414-15 (9th Cir. 1985) (abuse of process); Hansen v. Stoll, 130 Ariz. 454, 460 (App. 1981) (intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy).

¶12 It is clear from the face of the complaint that Jamali's tort claims are barred by the one- and two-year statutes of limitations set forth in A.R.S. §§ 12-541(1) and -542(1) because they were not "commenced and prosecuted" until more than three years after the causes of action accrued. The trial court did not err in dismissing these claims.

B. Jamali Does Not Have Standing or Authority to Allege Claims Pursuant to Criminal Statutes.

¶13 Jamali's claims for conspiracy, false reporting to law enforcement, and harassment are not civil claims, but rather based upon criminal statutes. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1003 (conspiracy), -2907.01 (false reporting to law enforcement), and -2921 (harassment). Jamali does not have standing to prosecute them. See generally Ariz. R. Crim. P. 2.1 and 2.2 (stating criminal actions may only be commenced by information, indictment, or complaint, none of which may be filed by a private citizen). Therefore, the trial court did not err in dismissing the remainder of Jamali's claims.

C. Jamali's Arguments Regarding Service Are Moot.

¶14 Jamali argues the trial court erred in considering the grounds set forth in Hyatt's second motion to dismiss when it had already ordered dismissal on insufficient service of process grounds. We disagree. The court's initial minute entry order was unsigned, was not certified as a final order, and was therefore "subject to revision at any time prior to entry of judgment." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (requiring an express determination that an order is final in an action involving multiple parties). These additional defenses were properly brought and not waived simply because they were not raised in Hyatt's first motion. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2) ("A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . may be made in any pleading . . . or at the trial on the merits."); Engle Bros., Inc. v. Superior Court, 23 Ariz.App. 406, 408 (1975) ("It is well settled in this state that the defense of the statute of limitations may be raised by way of a motion to dismiss where it conclusively appears from the face of the complaint that the claim is barred.") (citing Ross v. Ross, 96 Ariz. 249, 252 (1964), and Gomez v. Leverton, 19 Ariz.App. 604, 606 (1973)).

¶15 Because it is clear Jamali is not entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts he presented within his complaint, his arguments that Hyatt was timely served in accordance with the court's September 2014 order and that he was entitled to a trial by jury on this issue are moot. Generally, we will not consider a moot issue unless it "[is] of great public importance or [is] capable of repetition yet evading review." See Slade v. Schneider, 212 Ariz. 176, 179, ¶ 15 (App. 2006) (citing Lana v. Woodburn, 211 Ariz. 62, 65, ¶ 9 (App. 2005)). We conclude the issue of Hyatt's service of process is neither.

II. Summary Dismissal

¶16 Finally, Jamali argues the trial court erred by failing to articulate its "thought process, logic, facts or conclusion[s] of law or connection between the facts and the judgment made, etc." However, under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(a) and (b), if the non-moving party does not respond to a motion within ten days, the court may deem the lack of response "a consent to the granting of the motion, and the court may grant the motion summarily." The court acted within its discretion to grant the motion in the absence of a response. See Strategic Dev. & Constr., Inc. v. 7th & Roosevelt Partners, L.L.C., 224 Ariz. 60, 65, ¶ 17 (App. 2010). Moreover, even if we disregarded Jamali's failure to respond to the merits of the motion, he provides no authority, and we find none, for the proposition that the court has a general responsibility to give a detailed explanation for its order, particularly where, as here, obvious reasons appear in the record. See supra ¶¶ 9-13.

CONCLUSION

¶17 We affirm the trial court's dismissal of Jamali's complaint against Hyatt.