JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Associate Justice.

This interlocutory appeal arises from a lawsuit filed pursuant to the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act and state and federal civil rights claims. Charles Smith, in his official capacity as the Administrator of the Arkansas State Hospital (State Hospital) and Betty Mains in her individual capacity appeal from the denial of their motion for summary judgment. The circuit court found that Gloria Daniel's claim for retaliation was not barred by sovereign immunity and that the remaining defendants in the lawsuit are not entitled to qualified immunity. On appeal, appellants argue: (1) the Circuit Court erred in denying the appellants' motion for summary judgment based on sovereign immunity; and (2) the Circuit Court erred in denying the appellants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified/statutory immunity grounds. We affirm in part; reverse in part; and remand.

Daniel was fired from her position as a registered nurse at the State Hospital thirteen months after she reported to Charles Smith, the Director of Behavioral Health Services and others that a patient's death was attributable to abuse or neglect and the failure of the hospital to have present basic life-saving equipment. The purported reason for terminating Daniel was that she violated the seclusion/restraint policies for a patient and for making "unprofessional" comments.

Daniel filed suit, asserting claims under the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act, the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.1 In the body of her third amended complaint, in the paragraph styled "PARTIES AND JURISDICTION," Daniel recited the following:

Appellants' summary judgment motion recited that it was seeking relief for "Charles Smith, in his official capacity, and Betty Mains, in her official and individual capacities.2" It alleged the following:

In its December 31, 2013 order, the circuit court dismissed the Whistle-Blower claim against Maims and all individual-capacity claims against Smith. It denied summary judgment for the Whistle-Blower claim against Smith in his official capacity, denied qualified immunity to any defendant, and, after acknowledging that it had considered all of the other arguments submitted by the Defendants denied summary judgment as to each argument.

On appeal, appellants first argue that the circuit court erred in denying the appellants' motion for summary judgment based on sovereign immunity. They acknowledge that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is "not a suit against that person, but rather is a suit against that official's office." Appellants further note that the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act contemplates suits only against a "public employer," not an individual.3 While appellants concede that the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act "implies a waiver of immunity as to `an agency, department, or institution of state government,'" it nonetheless asserts that it does not waive immunity in this case because "public employer" does not include individuals.

In an interlocutory appeal from a denial of summary judgment based on sovereign immunity, two standards of review can apply. Ark. Lottery Comm'n v. Alpha Mktg., 2013 Ark. 232, 428 S.W.3d 415. Where the circuit court makes no "substantive interpretations of law," but instead makes its decision based on whether the pleadings state "sufficient facts for [an] exception to sovereign immunity," we apply the abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Id. In those instances, we treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the party who filed the complaint. Id. However, where the issue is whether a statute provides a waiver of sovereign immunity, our review is de novo, giving no deference to the circuit court's interpretation of the statute. Weiss v. McLemore, 371 Ark. 538, 268 S.W.3d 897 (2007). The case before us implicates both standards of review.

The defense of sovereign immunity originates from the Arkansas Constitution, which provides that "[t]he State of Arkansas shall never be made defendant in any of her courts." Ark. Const. art. V, § 20. We have recognized three ways in which a claim of sovereign immunity may be waived: (1) where the State is the moving party seeking specific relief; (2) where an act of the legislature has created a specific waiver of sovereign immunity; and (3) where the state agency is acting illegally or if a state agency officer refuses to do a purely ministerial action required by statute. Ark. Dept. of Cmty. Corr. v. City of Pine Bluff, 2013 Ark. 36, 425 S.W.3d 731. A statutory waiver of sovereign immunity may be express or implied. Id.

We agree with appellants that when the legislature authorized a cause of action against a "public employer" in the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act, it expressly waived sovereign immunity. We likewise agree that a suit against a public official in his or her official capacity is essentially a suit against that official's agency. See, e.g., Simons v. Marshall, 369 Ark. 447, 255 S.W.3d 838 (2007); Fegans v. Norris, 351 Ark. 200, 89 S.W.3d 919 (2002). We have held that official-capacity suits generally represent a way of pleading a cause of action against the entity of which the officer is an agent. Simons, supra. While it is true that the Arkansas Whistle Blower Act does not directly state that a suit against a director of a state entity is a suit against the public employer, in interpreting a statute, we presume that the legislature is familiar with our decisions. Books-A-Million, Inc. v. Ark. Painting & Specialties Co., 340 Ark. 467, 10 S.W.3d 857 (2000). Accordingly, we hold that the suit against Smith in his official capacity as chief executive officer of the Arkansas State Hospital was in effect a suit against a public employer.4 We note as well that in the style of her complaint, Daniel did name "the Department of Behavioral Sciences serving the Arkansas State Hospital." Moreover, in full compliance with Rule 9 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, Daniel fully pleaded her employment relationship with a public employer — the "Department of Human Services AND DEPARTMENT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES at the Arkansas State Hospital, an instrumentality of the State of Arkansas," as well as Smith in his official capacity. Appellants make no argument why the circuit court, or this court on appeal, should not consider those entities as named plaintiffs and, as such, Daniel's public employer. We affirm the circuit court on this point.

We are mindful that appellants' summary-judgment motion asserted that "the official capacity Arkansas Civil Rights Act claims are barred by sovereign immunity" and that "Defendants are protected by sovereign and statutory immunity from Daniel's discrimination and retaliation claims." We are also mindful that the circuit court makes no specific finding with regard to these assertions. However, we believe that it was appropriate for the circuit court to summarily dispose of these assertions as the "other arguments," for without an express ruling on an a legitimate issue of sovereign immunity, the State would be precluded from bringing this appeal. Arkansas Lottery Com'n v. Alpha Marketing, 2012 Ark. 23, 386 S.W.3d 400. As we noted previously, the third amended complaint asserted no official capacity claims against any of the defendants under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. Although, on appeal, appellants correctly note that the State has not waived sovereign immunity for claims brought under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act,5 this statement is of no moment because, again, it is obvious from the previously quoted PARTIES AND JURISDICTION paragraph in the third amended complaint that the only official capacity claim was asserted under the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act. The other defendants were sued only in their individual capacity.6

For their second point, appellants argue that the circuit court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment based on qualified/statutory immunity grounds. They contend that they "acted in good faith in performing their duties;" consequently, they are immune from this lawsuit because they are protected by statutory immunity pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 19-10-305. Appellants further assert that Daniel has not alleged "any specific act "by Smith or Mains7" that constitutes malice.

Daniel argues that the circuit court properly denied the appellants' summary-judgment motion because there are material issues of fact with regard to whether the individuals named in her complaint were entitled to qualified immunity. She notes that there is a spoliation issue associated with a video tape that she believes would exonerate her. Further, she notes that she denied the conduct of which she was accused. Furthermore, she contends that she raised an issue of material fact regarding whether her discharge was pretextual. In support of the latter, she alleges a long history of racial discrimination at the State Hospital. She specifically pointed to the fact that non-African Americans were not terminated after an independent report found them to be responsible for the death of a patient, the incident that gave rise to her cause of action under the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act. She likewise alleged disparate treatment with regard to similarly situated employees of a different gender. She again specifically cited an independent report concerning a restraint situation in which male nurses engaged in conduct that was more egregious than the conduct that resulted in her termination, i.e., simply closing the door of an agitated patient's room to allow the patient to sleep.

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Brt, 363 Ark. 126, 211 S.W.3d 485 (2005). On appellate review, we determine if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of the motion leave a material fact unanswered. Id. We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Id. Our review focuses not only on the pleadings, but also on the affidavits and other documents filed by the parties. Id.

In the case before us, all of the factual allegations made by Daniel suggests that racial and gender animus may exist at the Arkansas State Hospital. However, the Arkansas Civil Rights Act claims against Mains are directed against her in her individual capacity. Nowhere can we find in Daniel's complaint specific factual allegations against Mains that assert that she personally acted with malice. Likewise, we can find no proof in the materials that she submitted to oppose the appellants' summary judgment motion that indicate that she personally acted with malice. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred when it denied the appellant's summary-judgment motion to dismiss the individual-capacity claims.

Affirmed in part; reversed and dismissed in part; and remanded.

Hannah, C.J., and Danielson, J., concur in the disposition of the claim under the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act and dissent from the balance of the opinion.

Corbin, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

Baker, Goodson, and Hoofman, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.

Donald L. Corbin, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur with the majority's disposition of the claim under the Arkansas Whistle-blower Act, but I respectfully dissent as to the remaining points on appeal. Appellants chose to bring forth an abbreviated record of the circuit court proceedings, and I simply cannot ascertain from that record whether Appellants' remaining arguments have merit.

Karen R. Baker, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

By misinterpreting the General Assembly's acts, the majority has judicially created a waiver of any and all sovereign immunity for the State under the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act (AWBA). The majority also errs by failing to address an entire substantive claim on appeal, the denial of Smith's motion for summary judgment based on sovereign immunity on the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA) claims. Finally, the majority's analysis blurs the standard adopted by this court for the review of claims of qualified or statutory immunity. I concur in part and dissent in part.

First, the majority errs in affirming the circuit court's denial of Smith's motion for summary judgment based on sovereign immunity as to the AWBA claim. The majority erroneously concludes that the AWBA creates a blanket broad-sweeping waiver of sovereign immunity for all claims made pursuant to the Act. Specifically, the majority holds that because suing a state employee in his official capacity means that you have in effect sued the State, it also means that by suing a state employee in his official capacity you have sued a "public employer" under the AWBA. The majority holds:

Based on this analysis, the majority has judicially created an express waiver of immunity for the State under the AWBA for any and all actions brought under the Act. Further, the majority supports this interpretation by stating, "We note as well that in the style of her complaint, Daniel did name "the Department of Behavioral Sciences serving the Arkansas State Hospital." This statement is incorrect. The style of Daniel's third amended complaint is as follows:

Daniel clearly did not name the "public employer," the State, or its agencies; rather she named only individual employees in their official capacities.

Rather than affirm, I would reverse and remand the case based on the following analysis. Public employers are traditionally entitled to sovereign immunity from suit. In limited circumstances, the Arkansas General Assembly has created a statutory exception to sovereign immunity. Ark.Code Ann. § 21-1-604 (Repl. 2004), "Civil action for violation," provides a limited waiver of immunity and allows for suit against a public employer under this statute, which provides in pertinent part: "A public employee who alleges a violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages, or both." Accordingly, pursuant to the AWBA, immunity is waived and suit against a "public employer" is available.

The definition of "public employer" in the AWBA, is found in Ark.Code Ann. § 21-1-602 (Supp. 2013). However, in order to properly review Ark.Code Ann. § 21-1-602, the court must look to the surrounding applicable statutes under the AWBA.

Daniel asserts that Smith, in his official capacity as the director of ASH, retaliated against her in violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 21-1-603 (Repl. 2004), under the AWBA, "Retaliation prohibited," which provides in pertinent part:

Id. (emphasis added).

Therefore, the narrow issue before us is whether Smith is a "public employer" pursuant to the AWBA. Ark. Code Ann. § 21-1-602, "Definitions," provides in pertinent part:

The plain reading of Ark. Code Ann. § 21-1-602(5)(A)-(E) in its entirety does not include individuals. In fact, the statutory definition does not contain any language referring to a person or an individual. Therefore, a plain reading of this statute demonstrates that a "public employer" does not contemplate an individual. When a statute is clear, it is given its plain meaning, and this court will not search for legislative intent; rather, that intent must be gathered from the plain meaning of the language used. Lambert v. LQ Mgmt., L.L.C., 2013 Ark. 114, 426 S.W.3d 437. Thus, an unambiguous statute presents no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation as "[i]t is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation." City of Little Rock v. Ark. Corp. Comm'n, 209 Ark. 18, 21, 189 S.W.2d 382, 384 (1945). Here, the language employed by the General Assembly is so plain and unambiguous that judicial construction is limited to what was said. Based on the plain language of Ark. Code Ann. § 21-1-602(5)(A), the waiver of immunity from suit against a "public employer" under the AWBA is limited to a "public employer" and does not include a waiver of immunity for individuals. "Generally, the rules of statutory construction do not permit this court to read into a statute words that are not there. McMillan v. Live Nation Entm't, Inc., 2012 Ark. 166, at 6, 401 S.W.3d 473, 476-77." Clinical Study Ctrs., Inc. v. Boellner, 2012 Ark. 266, at 8, 411 S.W.3d 695, 700.

Additionally, while this court has not had the occasion to interpret the term "public employer" under Ark. Code Ann. § 21-1-602(5)(A), the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas has in Crosby v. Pulaski Technical College Board of Trustees, No. 4:06CV01003SWW, 2007 WL 2750672 (E.D.Ark. Sept. 18, 2007). In Crosby, Crosby sued the Pulaski Technical College Board of Trustees ("PTC") and Dan Bakke, the President of PTC in his official and individual capacities; and Robert Blackiston, the Chief of Police of PTC in his official and individual capacities, asserting among other things a violation of the AWBA. The federal district court held as follows

Id. at *5; see Greer v. City of Warren, Civ. No. 1:10-CV-01065, 2012 WL 1014658 at *3 (W.D.Ark. March 23, 2012).1

Further, in reviewing the entire subchapter, this interpretation is supported by Ark. Code Ann. § 21-1-604, "Civil Liability," subsection (e)(1) provides in pertinent part: "A public employer shall have an affirmative defense to a civil action brought by a public employee under this subchapter." Also, Ark.Code Ann. § 21-1-605 (Repl. 2004), "Remedies," subsection (5) provides, "The payment by the public employer of reasonable court costs and attorney's fees." Both statutes specifically identify the defendant to the civil action as the "public employer" and do not reference an individual.

Thus, the majority bypasses the General Assembly's unambiguous language and judicially creates a waiver of immunity that is simply not expressed or implied in the AWBA. Because this court does not have the authority to expand the waiver of immunity set out in the AWBA, I would hold that the circuit court erred when it denied Smith's claim of entitlement to sovereign immunity on the AWBA claim.

Next, the majority fails to specifically address Smith's claim on appeal asserting that the circuit court erred in denying Smith's motion for summary judgment on the ACRA claims against Smith and Mains in their official capacities based on sovereign immunity. The majority states that the ACRA official-capacity claims are not before this court when it states:

To make matters worse, immediately after stating that the claims were not made, the majority states the opposite, that the ACRA claims were made, by stating:

(Emphasis added).

Ironically, the majority recognizes that (1) the ACRA official capacity claims were made, "sandwiched between paragraphs 35 and 38, in the enigmatic paragraph 37", (2) recognizes that this court should not create a barrier for litigants2 but then, (3) precludes the litigant here from making his claim on appeal. Stated differently, the majority states that the claims were not made, but then states the claims were actually made, and the majority goes on to preclude Smith from litigating his claim after it stated that this court should not construe the pleadings to create a barrier for a litigant. Such an analysis is nonsensical.

Further, the "PARTIES AND JURISDICTION" section simply does not provide that "the only official capacity claim ... asserted [was] under the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act. The other defendants were sued only in their individual capacity," as the majority contends. This is wrong. The majority fails to recognize that the PARTIES AND JURISDICTION section states in its entirety:

As the majority recognizes, I agree that this language is not a "model of clarity," but the language asserts both individual and official capacity claims. The style of the complaint, the PARTIES AND JURISDICTION section and the complaint itself all state that defendants are sued in their official capacities.

In sum, the majority's analysis is fatally flawed. We cannot recognize that the official-capacity ACRA claims were made but then hold that that "is of no moment." Simply put, the record does not support the majority's analysis on these claims. Rather, a careful review of the entire record demonstrates otherwise. The following supports that the ACRA official-capacity claims are before this court and must be addressed: (1) Daniel's third amended complaint, (2) Smith's motion for summary judgment and brief in support, (3) the circuit court's hearing and written order, (4) Smith's brief before this court on appeal, and (5) Daniel's brief before this court on appeal.

First, in Daniel's third amended complaint, in the style of her complaint she has sued:

Additionally, in paragraph 31 of her complaint, Daniel asserted:

Further, as discussed above, in paragraph 37 of her complaint she asserted:

Second, the ACRA official-capacity claims were presented in Smith's motion for summary judgment and brief in support. In paragraph 5 of Smith's motion, he states "The official capacity Arkansas Civil Rights Act claims are barred by sovereign immunity." Also, in his brief in support of his motion for summary judgment, in "IX. Defendants Are Immune From Plaintiff's Claims," Smith asserted:

Further, subsection (A) of Smith's brief in support entitled, "Official Capacity Claims — Article 5, Section 20," specifically addresses the ACRA official-capacity claims on pages 27-28.

Third, the record from the circuit court's December 23, 2013 hearing on the motion for summary judgment demonstrates that the ACRA official-capacity claims were presented, summary judgment was denied, and the claims remain in the case. In granting in part and denying in part Smith's motion for summary judgment, the following colloquy occurred:

Accordingly, the circuit court ruled that the ACRA claims survived Smith's motion for summary judgment and remained in the case. The circuit court denied "all the rest" of the grounds and the ACRA official-capacity claims remained. This same ruling is memorialized in the circuit court's written order, which the majority quotes in its opinion, "[T]he court has considered all of the other arguments for summary judgment submitted by the Defendants and finds that summary judgment should be denied as to each argument."

Fourth, Smith's brief on appeal demonstrates that the ACRA official-capacity claims were presented, denied summary judgment on, and remain in the case. Smith has clearly raised the ACRA official-capacity claims on appeal. In his brief on pages 2-3, Smith presents the ACRA official-capacity claims on appeal:

Additionally, on page 16, Smith states as follows:

The ACRA official capacity claims are barred by sovereign immunity.

Fifth and finally, in her response brief to Smith, Daniel generally responds to Smith's argument on sovereign immunity and does not assert that the ACRA official-capacity claims are not before the court.

Accordingly, based on the record before the court discussed above, I would address this claim based on the following analysis.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-104, "Sovereign immunity not waived," of the ACRA provides: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the sovereign immunity of the State of Arkansas." In Simons, 369 Ark. 447, 450-51, 255 S.W.3d 838, 840-41, we addressed sovereign immunity and its application to public employees in their official capacities and the ACRA. In that case, Simons, an Arkansas State Trooper, was sued in his official capacity, including an ACRA claim. Simons responded with a motion to dismiss, asserting that he was entitled to sovereign immunity. The circuit court denied his motion to dismiss; we reversed and remanded and held that Simons was entitled to immunity. In our discussion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity we explained:

Id. at 450-451, 255 S.W.3d at 840-41 (internal citations omitted) (quoting State v. Goss, 344 Ark. 523, 526, 42 S.W.3d 440, 442-43 (2001)).

Here, Smith and Mains, like Simons, have been sued in their official capacities for claims under the ACRA and are also entitled to sovereign immunity. As we explained in Simons above, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is rigid and can be waived only in limited circumstances. "This court has recognized three ways in which a claim of sovereign immunity may be surmounted: (1) where the State is the moving party seeking specific relief; (2) where an act of the legislature has created a specific waiver of sovereign immunity; and (3) where the state agency is acting illegally or if a state agency officer refuses to do a purely ministerial action required by statute." Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Eddings, 2011 Ark. 47, at 6, 378 S.W.3d 694, 698 (internal citations omitted). These exceptions to immunity are not applicable to the case before us.

Based on the record before the court, art. 5, section 20, of the Arkansas Constitution, and Simons, Smith and Mains are entitled to sovereign immunity. Pursuant to our standard of review, I would hold that the circuit court erred in denying Smith's motion for summary judgment on the ACRA official-capacity claims based on sovereign immunity.

Next, I concur in the majority's result on Smith's final argument that the circuit court erred when it denied Smith's motion for summary judgment regarding the ACRA claim against Mains in her personal capacity. However, I write separately because the majority fails to apply the correct analysis adopted and applied in cases such as these by this court. Rather, the majority applies the traditional summary-judgment standard which is not the standard to be applied in cases such as Smith's. The majority holds that

This analysis is incorrect. Although the parties both cite to the correct standard, the majority fails to apply that standard, but instead applies the traditional summary judgment standard and disposes of the claim. This is simply wrong. Rather, this court must look to the specific allegations made against Mains that entitle Daniel to relief, but the majority has blurred the standard for summary judgment required to be applied to these cases. See Smith v. Brt, 363 Ark. 126, 211 S.W.3d 485 (2005); Fegans v. Norris, 351 Ark. 200, 89 S.W.3d 919 (2002).

In deciding whether Mains is entitled to statutory or qualified immunity, this court must first determine what statutory or constitutional violations Daniel has alleged. In her third amended complaint, Daniel claimed that Mains violated her rights under the ACRA by terminating Daniel without cause and further alleged that she was discriminated against based on race and gender. Specifically, Daniel sued "[Mains] individually for First Amendment retaliation, harassment, coercion, and violation of Plaintiffs right to remonstrate under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act as allowed by Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-105 and Ark. Code Ann. § 16-123-108(a) and (b)."

Under Ark.Code Ann. § 21-9-301 (Repl. 2004), the State and its agencies enjoy immunity from suit except to the extent it may be covered by liability insurance, or acts as a self-insured for certain amounts as provided by statute. Smith, 363 Ark. 126, 211 S.W.3d 485. "Despite this grant of statutory immunity, a state officer or employee may still be liable in a personal capacity. This court stated that suits against officers and employees alleged to be malicious are suits against the officers or employees personally, and they are liable to the extent anyone would be liable under tort law." Sullivan v. Coney, 2013 Ark. 222, at 6, 427 S.W.3d 682, 685. In Smith, we explained our analysis for qualified or statutory immunity:

Smith, 363 Ark. at 130-31, 211 S.W.3d at 488-89.

Therefore, "[a]n official is immune from suit if his or her actions did not violate clearly established principles of law of which a reasonable person would have knowledge. We have noted that this objective reasonable-person standard is a legal inquiry and that whether summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity is appropriate from a particular set of facts is a question of law." Sullivan, 2013 Ark. 222, at 6, 427 S.W.3d at 685 (internal citations omitted).

In applying the analysis adopted by this court to this case, Daniel has alleged that her protected activity, the report to Smith in 2009, her First Amendment rights and her race and gender, were the bases for her termination in violation of the ACRA. However, Daniel has failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether Mains would have known that her termination of Daniel violated her rights. In addition, Daniel does not allege any facts connecting Mains to an ACRA violation. The record demonstrates that Mains terminated Daniel thirteen months after the report, over a year after an alleged violation of the protected right had occurred. Instead, Daniel asserts only the conclusory allegations: "Defendants acted with malice, were willful, and wanton. Accordingly, [Daniel] seeks punitive damages against [Mains], in [her] individual capacity." Daniel also makes only conclusory allegations that she was terminated because of her race and gender: "Each defendant ... discriminated against her on the basis of her race and gender ... by terminating her under circumstances similarly situated whites or males were not. [Daniel] was terminated because she is black and a female." These conclusory allegations are not sufficient to create a question of fact that will survive a motion for summary judgment based on qualified or statutory immunity. See Sullivan, supra; see also City of Fayetteville, supra.

In sum, Daniel has failed to demonstrate, and the record fails to demonstrate that Mains could have reasonably known that her termination of Daniel's employment would violate Daniel's rights. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in denying immunity to Mains.

Because Smith and Mains are entitled to immunity on the AWBA and ACRA claims, I would hold that the circuit court erred in denying Smith's motion for summary judgment.

Therefore, I respectfully concur only as to the result reached by the majority concerning the ACRA claims against Mains in her individual capacity and respectfully dissent from the remainder of the majority opinion.

Goodson, J. and Hoofman J., join.