ROBIN F. WYNNE, Judge.

Asbury Automotive Group, Inc., and Asbury Atlanta Jaguar, L.L.C., appeal from the Ashley County Circuit Court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration of a lawsuit brought against them by appellees Robert McCain and Tafta McCain. We reverse and remand.

In May 2009, appellees, who are residents of Arkansas, entered into an agreement to purchase a 2008 GMC Acadia from Asbury Atlanta Jaguar in Roswell, Georgia, via the Internet. According to appellants, Asbury Atlanta Jaguar does business as Nalley Jaguar-Roswell (Nalley Jaguar), and Asbury Automotive Group (Asbury) is its parent company. The contract provided that appellees purchased the vehicle "as is," along with the remaining balance of the limited factory warranty; that the law of Georgia would govern all actions arising from the agreement; that venue would lie in the county of the seller's domicile; and that it was not binding unless signed by an officer or manager of the seller. Appellees signed the contract but the seller did not.

The contract also provided for arbitration:

Immediately after delivery, appellees experienced significant problems with the vehicle and were unsuccessful in getting it repaired. In June 2011, they sued Asbury; Holt Auto Group, LP (a local dealer that performed repair work on the vehicle); and General Motors Corporation. Asbury moved to dismiss because it had not sold the vehicle; at the same time, it moved to compel arbitration. Appellees filed an amended complaint that added Nalley Jaguar as a defendant. Appellants moved to dismiss and to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and Georgia law. Appellees filed a second amended complaint against appellants; Holt Auto Group; General Motors Corporation; General Motors Company; and General Motors, LLC. They asserted claims for breach of implied and express warranties, Arkansas's lemon law, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, Arkansas's product-liability statutes, negligence, and misrepresentation. Appellants filed another motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss. Asbury argued that, as the parent company of Nalley Jaguar, it was not liable for its subsidiary's actions.

At the hearing on the motion to compel arbitration, appellees' attorney argued that the arbitration agreement was not enforceable because the contract had not been signed by an officer or manager of the seller. He also contended that it was unconscionable that he would have to go to Atlanta or New York to arbitrate this action. The trial court stated that it would deny the request for arbitration because the contract lacked mutuality as a result of Nalley Jaguar's failure to sign the contract and the fact that there was nothing between Asbury and appellees. The court entered an order denying arbitration "for lack of mutuality and lack of contractual obligation." Appellants then pursued this interlocutory appeal.

An order denying a motion to compel arbitration is an immediately appealable order. Phillippy v. ANB Fin. Servs., LLC, 2011 Ark.App. 639, 386 S.W.3d 553; Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 2(a)(12) (2012). We review a circuit court's order denying a motion to compel arbitration de novo on the record. Id. In a de novo review, we analyze the evidence and the law without giving deference to the trial court's ruling. Id.

The parties agree that the FAA, which Congress enacted to overcome judicial resistance to arbitration, HPD, LLC v. Tetra Technologies, Inc., 2012 Ark. 408, ___ S.W.3d ___, applies to this dispute. When the underlying dispute involves interstate commerce, the FAA applies. Phillippy, supra. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to enforce rights granted by the FAA. Id. There is a strong national policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Id. Arbitration is a matter of contract between parties. Id. In deciding whether a party has entered into an agreement to arbitrate under the FAA, courts are to apply general state-law principles, giving due regard to the federal policy favoring arbitration. Id. The threshold question is whether there is a valid arbitration provision, which is a question of state law. Id. The same rules of construction and interpretation apply to arbitration agreements as apply to contracts generally. Id. The liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements requires that any doubts regarding arbitrability should be resolved in favor of coverage under the agreement unless it can be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc. v. Way, 101 Ark.App. 23, 270 S.W.3d 369 (2007).

In their first point on appeal, appellants argue that the arbitration clause is sufficiently broad to encompass any dispute between the parties regarding the sale of the vehicle, including the claims asserted in this action. We agree. The next question is whether there is a valid arbitration agreement. In their second point, appellants argue that the trial court erred in ruling that the contract lacked an essential term—mutuality—because they did not sign the document. Appellants are correct.

The FAA does not require that an arbitration provision be signed by the parties, even though it does require the agreement to be written. Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2002); Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2000); Valero Refining, Inc. v. M/T Lauberhorn, 813 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1987); Letizia v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 802 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1986); Med. Dev. Corp. v. Indus. Molding Corp., 479 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1973). Georgia law does not require parties to sign a contract in order to be bound by it. As in Arkansas,1 parties may become bound by the terms of the contract even if they do not sign it, if their assent is otherwise indicated, such as by the acceptance of benefits under the contract or by the acceptance of the other's performance. Lankford v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 597 S.E.2d 470 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); Comvest, L.L.C. v. Corporate Sec. Grp., 507 S.E.2d 21 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).

Appellees contend that appellants are not parties to the agreement, and that it places no legal obligations on them. This argument has no merit in light of the facts that appellees paid the purchase price; that the dealership accepted the purchase price and delivered the Acadia to appellees; and that appellees, who did sign the contract, have sued appellants on the contract, asserting that both had sold the vehicle. Appellees included claims for breach of express and implied warranties created by the contract in their complaint and obviously viewed the contract as valid and binding upon both appellants. Although no representative from the dealership signed the contract, it performed by delivering the Acadia to appellees. In Georgia, mutuality is an essential element of a contract, Rushing v. Gold Kist, Inc., 567 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); however, part performance can furnish the required consideration and mutuality. Rowe v. Law Offices of Ben C. Brodhead, PC., 735 S.E.2d 39 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).The contract, including its arbitration clause, is therefore binding on the parties, and the trial court erred in refusing to compel arbitration. See Int'l Paper Co., supra.2

In their third point, appellants argue that Asbury is entitled to enforce the arbitration agreement as a third-party beneficiary to it. Because the trial court did not rule on whether Asbury is a third-party beneficiary under the contract, we will not address appellants' argument on this point. Wilson v. Dardanelle Dist. of Yell Cnty. Dist. Court, 375 Ark. 294, 300, 290 S.W.3d 1, 4 (2008) ("We will not review a matter on which the circuit court has not ruled, and a ruling should not be presumed.").

Reversed and remanded.

HARRISON and WHITEAKER, JJ., agree.