JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge.
This is an appeal from a finding of civil contempt. Appellant contracted to purchase a home but did not close the transaction, citing structural defects in the foundation as his reason. Appellees sued for specific performance and prevailed at trial. Appellant appealed to this court, and we affirmed the trial court's decision in Flippen v. Jones, 2011 Ark.App. 191, 382 S.W.3d 695. Following the appeal upholding the order of specific performance, appellant twice attempted to obtain financing for the home purchase but was unable to do so because he lacked sufficient funds for an adequate down payment and his debt-to-income ratio was too high. Appellant filed a report of these efforts with the trial court. Shortly thereafter, appellant purchased a different home with his fiancée as a co-signer. The trial court found him in contempt for failure to explore alternative financing options and for rendering himself incapable of specifically performing by purchasing another home. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's order.
The trial court wrote a well-reasoned opinion explaining the finding of contempt and award to appellees of $3,906.37 for real-estate taxes and insurance. The court said:
The disobedience of any valid judgment, order, or decree of a court having jurisdiction to enter it may constitute contempt. Scudder v. Ramsey, 2013 Ark. 115, ___ S.W.3d ___. Noncompliance with a court's order is not of itself contemptuous; the noncompliance must constitute willful disobedience for a finding of contempt. Albarran v. Liberty Healthcare Management, 2013 Ark.App. 738, ___ S.W.3d ___. Civil contempt proceedings are instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to suits and to compel obedience to orders made for the benefit of those parties. Scudder v. Ramsey, supra. The standard of review for civil contempt proceedings is whether the circuit court's finding is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id. Here, although appellant filed a report with the trial court concerning his limited efforts to comply with the order of specific performance, he neither sought nor obtained the trial court's permission to terminate his efforts to comply with the court's order and our mandate before willfully rendering himself incapable of doing so by purchasing a different house. Under these circumstances, we hold that the trial court did not clearly err in finding appellant to be in contempt.
Affirmed.
GLOVER and VAUGHT, JJ., agree.