KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge.
Appellant Talvin Collins brings this appeal from an order of the Jefferson County Circuit Court quashing a writ of garnishment after Collins had been granted a default judgment. We affirm the circuit court.
The City of Gould (the City) is a municipal corporation located in Lincoln County operating under a mayor/aldermanic form of government. The City hired Talvin Collins as the police chief at an annual salary of $21,900. A dispute apparently arose between the City and the police chief, and the City allegedly refused to pay Collins his salary. Collins filed a lawsuit in neighboring Jefferson County
Collins served each alderman with process. None of the aldermen filed an answer or responsive pleading. Collins moved for a default judgment and it was granted in May 2013. The court set a hearing for damages. The record does not indicate whether the four aldermen attended the hearing. Following the hearing, the circuit court entered a judgment against the aldermen, individually and in their own official capacity as follows:
Defendant, Alderman Harry Hall $1,000.00 Defendant, Alderwoman Veronica Tensley $1,000.00 Defendant, Alderwoman Sonja Farley $1,000.00 Defendant, Alderwoman Rosieanna Smith-Lee 3 $1,000.00
Two writs of garnishment were subsequently issued to Merchants and Farmer's Bank (the bank) claiming that the aldermen, in their official capacity,
The circuit court stayed the enforcement of the garnishment pending a hearing on the City's objections. After a hearing and requesting briefs by the parties, the circuit court quashed the garnishment and entered an order containing the following:
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Collins contends that the court erred in quashing the writ of garnishment
In some circumstances, a suit against a government official in his official capacity may effectively be a suit against the official's governmental entity. See Simons v. Marshall, 369 Ark. 447, 255 S.W.3d 838 (2007). Official-capacity suits are necessary where the plaintiff cannot bring suit directly against the governmental unit itself. One example is the Eleventh Amendment bar against suing a state directly in federal court. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). Another is the bar of sovereign immunity found in Arkansas Constitution article 5, section 20. See Ark. Tech Univ. v. Link, 341 Ark. 495, 17 S.W.3d 809 (2000). By contrast, a municipal corporation is empowered to sue or be sued in its own name. Ark. Code Ann. § 14-54-101(1) (Repl. 1998). There is, therefore, no need to resort to an official-capacity suit against a municipal corporation. A plaintiff simply names the municipal corporation directly as a defendant and serves process upon the chief executive officer. See Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(7). In this case it is undisputed that there was no compliance with Rule 4(d)(7) and that the mayor of Gould as chief executive was not served with process.
A writ of garnishment is a suit directed to a third party to determine whether the third party possesses properly of the judgment debtor. The effect of the service of a writ of garnishment is to impound all property in the hands of the third-party garnishee that belongs to the judgment debtor at the time of the service, or that may thereafter come into his or her possession up until the filing of a true and correct answer. Thompson v. Bank of Am., 356 Ark. 576, 582, 157 S.W.3d 174, 178 (2004). Therefore, the appropriate inquiry is to determine whether the City of Gould was a judgment debtor in the underlying case for purposes of a writ of garnishment. Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that it was not. As previously discussed, a municipal corporation is empowered to sue or be sued in its own name and there is no need to resort to an official-capacity suit against a municipal corporation. A plaintiff simply names the municipal corporation directly as a defendant and serves process upon the chief executive officer. Here, the appellant recovered a judgment against the four aldermen and not against the City. Consequently, we cannot say that the circuit court was clearly erroneous in quashing the garnishment. See Thompson v. Bank of Am., supra.
Appellant's second point on appeal concerns service of process and is somewhat intertwined with the first point. The appellant contends that because the four aldermen were the "persons named in the complaint," service upon the aldermen as individuals was proper pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1). The appellant continues that because service was proper upon the defendants/aldermen as individuals under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1), he was not required to serve the chief executive officer of the municipal corporation under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(7) and that the service upon the aldermen was effectively service on the City. We disagree. As previously explained, the City of Gould is empowered to sue or be sued in its own name and service is effectuated by serving the chief executive officer. While Rule
Finally, Collins contends that the circuit court erred in going behind the default judgment, arguing that there are only certain arguments that a judgment debtor can make in a garnishment proceeding, such as lack of notice or to claim exemptions. Here the circuit court did not address or "go behind" the underlying judgment. The underlying judgment remains in full force and effect against the parties as named in the judgment.
We hold that the circuit court was not clearly erroneous in quashing the garnishment. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Gladwin, C.J., and Whiteaker, J., agree.