WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge

Appellant appeals from the circuit court's termination of his parental rights to G.E., born 9/12/14. On appeal, appellant argues that the circuit court erred in terminating his parental rights to G.E. because his rights were "nonexisting." We reverse.

On September 26, 2014, appellee Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect of G.E. due to her birth to an incarcerated mother.1 Brandon Edgar was listed as G.E.'s putative father in the petition. The circuit court entered an order granting emergency custody on September 29, 2014. Appellant was not listed as a party in the petition or the order.

Following a hearing on September 30, 2014, the circuit court entered a probable-cause order on the same date noting that the parties had stipulated that probable cause existed at the time of removal and continued to exist. A determination of Edgar's paternity was reserved therein for adjudication and he was listed in the order as G.E.'s "LEGAL/PUTATIVE FATHER[.]"2 Appellant still was not listed as a party.

An agreed adjudication order was entered on November 10, 2014. In that order, Edgar's status was changed to that of the putative father only, and appellant was added as G.E.'s "LEGAL FATHER[.]" DHS was ordered "to amend the pleadings to make Mr. Howerton a party to this matter."

A review order was entered on November 25, 2014, after a hearing on the same date. It stated that appellant was incarcerated in Tucker, Arkansas. Both appellant and Edgar were ordered to comply with the case plan and the orders of the circuit court.

DHS filed a motion to terminate reunification services to appellant on December 22, 2014. It alleged therein that appellant had subjected G.E. to aggravated circumstances where an older sibling of G.E. was subjected to sexual abuse by appellant.3 It also alleged that appellant had subjected G.E. to aggravated circumstances where there was little likelihood of successful reunification with appellant, who was sentenced to 360 months' imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) for the abuse of G.E.'s siblings, a period of time which constituted a substantial period of time from G.E.'s perspective.4 It specifically alleged that the fact that appellant was a legal father, and not an apparent biological father of G.E., was a basis for termination.5 The circuit court noted that Edgar had not established paternity at that point.

The circuit court entered a review-and-no-reunification-services order on April 6, 2015, following a March 12, 2015 hearing. It noted that appellant was G.E.'s legal father "by virtue of his continued marriage" to G.E.'s mother and granted DHS's no-reunification-services motion finding that G.E. had been subjected to aggravated circumstances in that there was little likelihood of successful reunification with appellant based on his thirty-year sentence for his rape conviction.6

Following an October 19, 2015 hearing, a permanency-planning order was entered on January 19, 2015, authorizing a plan of adoption and a petition for termination of parental rights from DHS. Though appellant was referenced as the legal father, the circuit court stated therein that "[h]aving set the goal to be adoption, the Court finds that Brandon Edgar is indigent; the Court finds the putative parent has established significant contacts with the juvenile such that parental rights [h]ave attached." It stated that appellant "shall be removed as a party to this case as he testified today he is not the biological father of the child." Appellant was denied any contact with G.E., and Edgar was granted supervised visitation.

DHS filed a petition for termination of parental rights on November 18, 2015, listing appellant as G.E.'s legal father and Edgar as her putative father. It alleged the following grounds for termination of appellant's rights:

The circuit court held a hearing on the petition on February 16, 2016.

At the beginning of the hearing, the following exchange ensued:

Testimony at the hearing was as follows.

Holly Johnson, family services worker for DHS, testified in pertinent part that appellant is the legal father of G.E. due to her mother being married to appellant at the time G.E. was conceived. However, Edgar was the putative father who was at that time the biological father.

In the midst of Johnson's testimony, appellant's attorney questioned why the court was "terminating on [his] client" when Edgar was the legal father and the biological father, to which the attorney for DHS responded that it was because appellant was married to G.E.'s mother when G.E. was conceived, making him a legal father. Appellant's attorney sought clarification on whether the court had just "made a finding that the other gentlemen was legal dad" to which the circuit court responded "[w]hat I did was establish paternity based upon a test and [Edgar's] name on the birth certificate. If that means I made two legal fathers, that's what I did. This man has legal rights because of marriage."

Following Johnson's testimony, appellant's counsel moved for a directed verdict, arguing lack of sufficiency on each ground. Of pertinence to this court was his argument regarding the parent-sentenced-to-a-substantial-period-of-the-juvenile's-life and presumptive-legal-father-not-biological-father grounds in which he argued that appellant was not a parent because the circuit court made a finding that Edgar was G.E.'s biological and legal father and G.E. "can't have two legal fathers." He argued that once Edgar was found to be G.E's legal father, appellant was "divested" of any parental rights and "[had] no parental rights to be terminated." The circuit court questioned why the parties were "going through this hearing" and why appellant's counsel did not file a motion at the beginning to have appellant removed as a party. He responded that he was representing his client as appointed. His motion for directed verdict was denied.

Of pertinence, appellant then testified that he was not G.E.'s biological father and did not believe he could be her father because he had been incarcerated since April 6, 2012. He did not have conjugal visits with G.E.'s mother. Following appellant's testimony, he renewed his motion for directed verdict. The motion was denied.

Appellant's counsel then reiterated his argument stating that "[i]f Mr. Edgar has been found, factually, to be the biological father and legally to be legal father, then my client is not the legal father. I don't think that you can have two legal fathers, so his rights shouldn't be terminated because he has not [sic] rights to be terminated." The circuit court responded:

The circuit court then terminated appellant's parental rights. Its order terminating appellant's parental rights was entered on March 28, 2016. Therein, the circuit court stated that "Edward Howerton was married to Samantha Howerton at the time of [G.E.'s] birth. It was determined by this court through evidence of a birth certificate with Brandon Edgar's name included as father and evidence of genetic testing that Brandon Edgar is the biological father of [G.E.]" This timely appeal followed.

This court reviews termination orders de novo.14 According to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-303, parent means "a biological mother, an adoptive parent, or a man to whom the biological mother was married at the time of conception or birth or who has signed an acknowledgment of paternity pursuant to § 9-10-120 or who has been found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be the biological father of the juvenile[.]"15 We construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous or insignificant, and we give meaning and effect to every word in the statute, if possible.16 In its ordinary sense, the word "or" is a disjunctive particle that marks an alternative, generally corresponding to "either," as "either this or that"; it is a connective that marks an alternative.17

A plain reading of the statute means that a parent can be biological, or by adoption, or by a man who is married to a biological mother at the time of conception or by a man who has signed an acknowledgement of paternity, or by being found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be the biological father. In this case, though initially not included, appellant was eventually added as a party and deemed G.E.'s legal father because she was conceived while appellant was married to her mother. Though Edgar was initially named a legal/putative father and then only a putative father, the circuit court eventually deemed him to be G.E.'s legal father on account of his acknowledged paternity from being listed as the legal father on G.E.'s birth certificate and on account of being found to be G.E.'s biological father through a paternity test. Accordingly, the circuit court gave G.E. two legal fathers. In reference to establishing Edgar's paternity, it stated "If that means I made two legal fathers, that's what I did."

The circuit court gave no legal basis to support its finding that G.E. had or could have two legal fathers. A review of Arkansas statutes provides no definition of a "legal father."18 Likewise, a review of Arkansas law reveals no basis for a child having two legal fathers, and there is no case directly on point addressing whether a child can have more than one legal father. A review of case law from other jurisdictions shows a consensus that a child can have only one legal father.19 While the decisions of other states are not binding on this court, we find such decisions to be persuasive.

Once the circuit court found that Edgar was G.E.'s legal father, it changed appellant's status.20 Appellant could not be G.E.'s legal father — presumptive or otherwise — once the circuit court found that Edgar was G.E.'s legal father. By finding Edgar to be G.E.'s legal father, the circuit court effectively divested appellant of all parental rights to G.E.; therefore, appellant had no rights to G.E. that the circuit court could terminate. We note that an alternative ruling would mean that if appellant were to have another child and became subject to a petition for termination of his parental rights to that child, this termination could be used to justify termination in that case.21 We hold that the circuit court's ruling terminating appellant's parental rights to G.E. was clearly erroneous because he had no rights. We reverse.

Reversed.

Whiteaker, Hixson and Hoofman, JJ., agree.

Gruber and Vaught, JJ., dissent.

Larry D. Vaught, Judge, dissenting.

I dissent from the majority's holding that Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-303 (40) (Repl. 2015), which defines the term "parent" as used throughout the juvenile code, allows only one man to be deemed a "parent" for each child in a dependency-neglect case. I fear that the majority's approach prioritizes the interests of adult defendants at the expense of the juveniles' need for permanency.

Section 9-27-341(a)(2) states that termination may only be used in order to clear juveniles for permanent placement. Section 9-27-341(a)(3) states that it is the intent of the legislature that termination be used to provide permanency for the juvenile. In order to accomplish that goal, all outstanding rights to the child that may be claimed now or in the future must be conclusively disposed of. Section 9-27-303(40) establishes that certain persons are automatically deemed to have parental rights as a matter of law. It defines a "parent" as "a biological mother, an adoptive parent, or a man to whom the biological mother was married at the time of conception or birth or who has signed an acknowledgment of paternity pursuant to section 9-10-120 or who has been found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be the biological father of the juvenile."

Nowhere in the juvenile code or the caselaw does it state that only one man can be recognized as a parent for each child in a dependency-neglect case. While there can certainly be only one biological father, the code recognizes that there are alternative definitions of a parent and establishes five different avenues by which a person may be legally deemed a parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(40). I believe the circuit court was correct in recognizing that section 9-27-303(40) vests parental rights in anyone who meets the statutory definition of a parent and that termination is the only mechanism for extinguishing those rights.

Arkansas law has long held that a child born of a marriage is legally deemed to be the legitimate child of both spouses. See R.N. v. J.M. and B.M., 347 Ark. 203, 61 S.W.3d 149 (2001); Leach v. Leach, 57 Ark.App. 155, 942 S.W.2d 286 (1997). Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-43-901 governs the admissibility, in paternity and child-custody cases, of evidence calling into question the legitimacy of a child born of the marriage. In Leach, we held that, while section 16-43-901 abolished Lord Mansfield's Rule, which was the common-law doctrine that made declarations of a husband or wife inadmissible to bastardize a child born after marriage, "the strong presumption of the legitimacy of a child born of marriage continues to be one of the most powerful presumptions in Arkansas law." Leach, 57 Ark. App. at 158, 942 S.W.2d at 288; See also R.N., 347 Ark. at 213, 61 S.W.3d at 155; Lakey v. Lakey, 18 Ark.App. 182, 184-85, 712 S.W.2d 663, 665 (1986) (providing in-depth analysis of the common-law and statutory roots of the presumption of legitimacy). Section 16-43-901 (Repl. 1999) codifies the presumption of legitimacy by providing that "upon a finding of the court by clear and convincing evidence that the presumption of legitimacy of a child born of a marriage has been rebutted," the court shall relieve the putative father of further support liability, establish the biological father of the child, and set a support obligation for the child to be paid by the biological father.

I mention the presumption of legitimacy for two reasons. First, the majority appears to be applying section 16-43-901 to the case at bar and interpreting the circuit court's findings as having sufficiently rebutted the presumption of G.E.'s legitimacy. Such an approach ignores the fact that section 9-27-303(40)'s definition of a "parent" addresses a separate and distinct area of the law. Legitimacy is not the issue in a dependency-neglect case. The aim of section 9-27-303(40) is to clear a juvenile for permanent placement. As such, the definition is not framed as a rebuttable presumption but instead establishes that anyone who meets the definition is a "parent" under the juvenile code.

Second, the presumption of legitimacy illustrates the legislature's wisdom in broadly defining "parent" in section 9-27-303(40). As evidenced by the presumption, both the mother's husband and the child's biological father may attempt to assert parental rights to the child. Section 9-27-303(40) recognizes this fact by empowering the circuit court to conclusively address the legal rights of everyone who falls within the statutory definition of a "parent."

Clearly, it is factually possible that multiple individuals may simultaneously meet the statutory definition of a "parent." For example, one man may be married to the mother at the time of the birth, while a second man acknowledges paternity and signs the birth certificate, and a third man is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be the biological father. The majority's approach assumes that, once the third man is found to be the biological father, such a finding will automatically divest the first two men of parental rights. This approach ignores the fact that those two men continue to meet the statutory definition of a "parent" under section 9-27-303(40). The majority has essentially invented an entirely new procedure for changing a person's status from "parent" to "nonparent," wholly unsanctioned by the juvenile code. The code establishes termination of parental rights, either voluntarily or involuntarily, pursuant to section 9-27-341, as the only legal mechanism for a circuit court to extinguish the legal rights of a person meeting the statutory definition of a "parent."

The facts of this case demonstrate the problem with the majority's approach. During the pendency of this action, Howerton was presented with proof that he is not G.E.'s biological father. Statutorily, he was entitled to voluntarily relinquish his parental rights, thereby eliminating the possibility that an involuntary termination may be used against him in a future dependency-neglect case.1 He chose not to do so. Instead, he testified that he wanted to be involved in G.E.'s life and argued that she should be placed in his mother's care until he is released from prison. Howerton's testimony makes clear that he considered himself a parent and intended to assert his legal rights to G.E. Therefore, termination was necessary to extinguish the legal rights bestowed on Howerton by virtue of his marriage to G.E.'s mother and to foreclose the possibility that he might later challenge the validity of G.E.'s adoption. While such a challenge would likely prove unsuccessful, it would still serve as an impediment to permanency for G.E. Anything short of conclusive termination of Howerton's parental rights casts a cloud of uncertainty over her future.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-102 mandates that "the best interests of the children must be paramount and shall have precedence at every stage of juvenile court proceedings." Here, termination of Howerton's parental rights provided G.E. with a level of permanency unavailable otherwise. The majority focuses on the prejudice that Howerton might suffer in the future as a result of being subject to an involuntary termination.2 Our legislature has made clear, however, that the parent's best interest and the child's best interest are not on equal footing; courts are unequivocally directed to favor the child's best interest. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-102. Therefore, I would affirm the circuit court's termination of Howerton's parental rights as being necessary to conclusively clear G.E. for adoption and provide her with true permanency.

Gruber, J., joins.