Filed: May 02, 2001
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: Counsel, For Appellant: Captain Steven P. Haight (argued);cash and property from AAFES. 46e(1) and 48e, Part IV, Manual for Courts-, Martial, United States (1998 ed.).that appellants conviction of Specification 4 of Charge II did, not have a substantial influence on the approved sentence.
IN THE CASE OF
UNITED STATES, Appellee
V.
Kurt C. HUHN, Sergeant
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 01-0032
Crim. App. No. 9900210
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued March 28, 2001
Decided May 2, 2001
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Steven P. Haight (argued); Colonel Adele
H. Odegard, Lieutenant Colonel David A. Mayfield, and Major
Jonathan F. Potter (on brief).
For Appellee: Captain Jennifer A. Parker (argued); Colonel David
L. Hayden, Lieutenant Colonel Edith M. Rob, and Major Anthony
P. Nicastro (on brief).
Military Judge: Patrick J. Parrish
This opinion is subject to editorial correction before publication.
United States v. Huhn, No. 01-0032/AR
Per Curiam:
A military judge sitting as a general court-martial
convicted appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of conspiracy to
commit larceny, larceny (5 specifications), and forgery, in
violation of Articles 81, l21, and 123, Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 10 USC §§ 881, 921, and 923, respectively. The military
judge sentenced appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement
for 3 years, total forfeitures, and reduction to the lowest
enlisted grade. Pursuant to a pretrial agreement, the convening
authority reduced the confinement to 18 months and waived the
total forfeitures for 6 months.
Before the Court of Criminal Appeals and this Court,
appellant asserted that his guilty plea to Specification 4 of
Charge II was improvident, because he pleaded guilty to
fraudulently canceling a debt, which is not a proper subject of
larceny. See United States v. Mervine,
26 M.J. 482, 483-84 (CMA
1988). The court below modified the specification and affirmed a
finding of guilty of larceny of the property appellant obtained
in exchange for the debt. See United States v. Epps,
25 M.J. 319,
323 (CMA 1987). The court below reassessed and affirmed the
approved sentence under the guidelines in United States v. Sales,
22 M.J. 305 (CMA 1986).
In its brief and in oral argument, the Government conceded
that Specification 4 of Charge II is multiplicious with
Specification 5 of Charge II, which alleges larceny of the same
property. We accept the Government’s concession. Accordingly,
we will set aside appellant’s conviction of Specification 4 of
Charge II, making it unnecessary to decide if appellant’s guilty
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United States v. Huhn, No. 01-0032/AR
plea to that specification was improvident under Mervine or if
the court below erred by modifying it.
Based on the entire record, we conclude that any error was
harmless with respect to the sentence. In a stipulation of fact,
appellant admitted conspiring with his wife, an employee of the
Army and Air Force Exchange System (AAFES), to steal $10,000 in
cash and property from AAFES. The conduct to which appellant
pleaded guilty in the five larceny specifications and one forgery
specification was in furtherance of that conspiracy. Our action
setting aside appellant’s conviction of Specification 4 of Charge
II does not change what appellant admitted during the plea
inquiry. It also does not significantly change the maximum
punishment, reducing the maximum confinement from 30½ to 25½
years. See paras. 46e(1) and 48e, Part IV, Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States (1998 ed.). The military judge sentenced
appellant to approximately one-tenth of the maximum imposable
confinement, and the convening authority cut the adjudged
confinement in half. Under the circumstances, we are confident
that appellant’s conviction of Specification 4 of Charge II did
not have a “substantial influence” on the approved sentence. See
Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946).
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is reversed with respect to Specification 4 of Charge II.
The finding of guilty of Specification 4 of Charge II is set
aside, and that specification is dismissed. In all other
respects, the decision of the United States Army Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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