Filed: Aug. 23, 2001
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: Lance Corporal (LCpl) Epley and the appellant.According to the statement the appellant made to, an investigator, LCpl Epley leaned out of the window, with all of his weight, and his exit was different, from the others because he went right out instead of, crawling out as the others had done.
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Phillip S. OXENDINE, Private First Class
U.S. Marine Corps, Appellant
No. 01-0050
Crim. App. No. 99 0381
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued April 25, 2001
Decided August 23, 2001
BAKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which CRAWFORD, C.J., and GIERKE and EFFRON, JJ., joined.
SULLIVAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and in
the result.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant M. Eric Eversole, JAGC, USNR
(argued).
For Appellee: Captain Danny R. Fields, USMC (argued);
Colonel Marc W. Fisher, Jr., USMC and Lieutenant Commander
Philip L. Sundel, JAGC, USN (on brief); Lieutenant Danette
L. Walker, JAGC, USNR.
Military Judge: A. W. Keller, Jr.
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE PUBLICATION.
United States v. Oxendine, No. 01-0050/MC
Judge BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted
members convicted appellant, contrary to his pleas, of making a
false official statement (2 specifications), involuntary
manslaughter by culpable negligence, and disorderly conduct, in
violation of Articles 107, 119, and 134, Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 907, 919, and 934, respectively.
The panel sentenced him to a dishonorable discharge, confinement
for 10 years, total forfeitures, and reduction to pay grade E-1.
The convening authority approved the sentence but suspended all
confinement in excess of 6 years. The Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed only so much of the sentence as included a dishonorable
discharge (reduced by the Naval Clemency and Parole Board to a
bad-conduct discharge), confinement for 4 years, total
forfeitures, and reduction to pay grade E-1. 54 M.J. 508, 514 and
n. 3 (2000). We granted review on the following issue:
I
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE FOR INVOLUNTARY
MANSLAUGHTER WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT WHEN
APPELLANT DID NOT ACT WITH CULPABLE
NEGLIGENCE AND THE VICTIM’S NEGLIGENCE WAS A
SUPERCEDING CAUSE.
We resolve this issue against appellant.
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United States v. Oxendine, No. 01-0050/MC
Background
The court below summarized the facts as follows:
The facts are undisputed and tragic. On the night
of 20-21 December 1997 at Camp Schwab, Okinawa, Japan,
several Marines gathered in the third-floor barracks
room of PFC Minnicks to celebrate the birthday of PFC
Knox. Among those present were Corporal (Cpl) Tessier,
Lance Corporal (LCpl) Epley and the appellant. All of
the Marines, except for the appellant, had consumed
large amounts of beer and vodka. The appellant had
only two sips of a vodka drink and was not
intoxicated.
At some point during the festivities, the subject
of hanging people out of the barracks room window was
brought up. The Marines thought this would not only
provide them with a thrill and something to do, but it
would, in their minds, also be a way they could show
their comrades the ultimate trust they had in each
other. Four of the Marines were lowered headfirst out
of the third-floor window and were held by their
ankles without incident. They used no safety devices.
None of them believed that anyone would be dropped.
As they were being edged out the window and lowered
down the side of the building, each Marine would use
his hands to steady himself. The fifth Marine to be
lowered was LCpl Epley. LCpl Epley wore a cast on his
right arm and was one of the heavier Marines in the
group. He and the appellant were good friends. As he
willingly leaned out of the window, LCpl Epley could
not use both of his hands to edge himself down the
side of the building because of his injured arm. Cpl
Tessier and the appellant were holding his legs.
According to the statement the appellant made to
an investigator, LCpl Epley leaned out of the window
with all of his weight, and his exit was different
from the others because he "went right out" instead of
crawling out as the others had done. Prosecution
Exhibit 4 at 6. As soon as LCpl Epley went out of the
window, the appellant could feel that he was losing
his grip. Within seconds, both Cpl Tessier and the
appellant lost their hold on LCpl Epley, who fell to
the ground. Despite the best efforts of numerous
medical personnel, LCpl Epley died within a few hours.
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United States v. Oxendine, No. 01-0050/MC
The cause of death was blunt force trauma. His blood
alcohol level was .21.
54 M.J. at 509-10.
Discussion
Before this Court, appellant contends that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain his conviction for involuntary
manslaughter because LCpl Epley’s negligent manner in exiting
the window was "a superceding cause of his death" that relieved
appellant of criminal responsibility. Alternatively, he argues
that Epley’s death was not reasonably foreseeable from the
standpoint of "a reasonable eighteen to twenty-year-old"
Marine. Final Brief at 3.
Our standard for reviewing legal sufficiency of the
evidence is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319,
99
S. Ct. 2781, 2789,
61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)(emphasis in original);
United States v. Turner,
25 M.J. 324 (CMA 1987). In resolving
such questions, we are "bound to draw every reasonable inference
from the evidence of record in favor of the prosecution."
United States v. Rogers,
54 M.J. 244, 246 (2000) (quoting United
States v. Blocker,
32 M.J. 281, 284 (CMA 1991)).
4
United States v. Oxendine, No. 01-0050/MC
The elements of involuntary manslaughter are:
(i) "That a certain named or described person is dead;"
(ii) "That the death resulted from the act or omission
of the accused;"
(iii) "That the killing was unlawful; and"
(iv) "That this act or omission of the accused
constituted culpable negligence . . . ."
Para. 44b(2), Part IV, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States
(1995 ed.).
Negligence is conduct that "involves the creation of
substantial and unjustifiable risk of which the person should be
aware in view of all the circumstances." United States v.
Brown, 22 M.J. 448, 450 (CMA 1986)(emphasis in original).
Culpable negligence is defined as "a negligent act or omission
accompanied by a culpable disregard for the foreseeable
consequences to others of that act or omission." This means
that the "basis of a charge of involuntary manslaughter may be a
negligent act or omission which, when viewed in the light of
human experience, might foreseeably result in the death of
another." Para. 44c(2)(a)(i), Part IV,
Manual, supra. The
test for foreseeability is “whether a reasonable person, in view
of all the circumstances, would have realized the substantial
and unjustifiable danger created by his acts.” United States v.
Henderson,
23 M.J. 77, 80 (CMA 1986).
5
United States v. Oxendine, No. 01-0050/MC
Reasonable Foreseeability
Having decided to participate with the deceased and the
other Marines in a dangerous joint enterprise, appellant was
bound by the circumstances that would have put a reasonable
person on notice as to the risk he was creating or helping to
create, and the foreseeable consequences of that risk. It was
not necessary that appellant himself "be aware of the
substantial risk he is creating, but only that a reasonable
person would have realized the risk.” Brown, 22 M.J. at 450.
In addition to the facts found by the Court of Criminal
Appeals, the record contains additional evidence available to
the members for their evaluation of the circumstances relating
to the reasonable foreseeability of Epley’s fall. The
participants were aware of the cast on Epley’s right arm that
extended from his elbow down to his wrist and looped around his
thumb. While appellant did not testify, his statements to
investigators were admitted in evidence. In them he describes
how when he entered the barracks room, he noticed Epley
"drinking vodka and Kool-aid . . . from a large size Burger King
cup.” Private Minnicks, one of the participants, testified
that, to him, it appeared Epley "was under the influence of
alcohol." Appellant also described one Marine as “passed out on
the floor in the head” when he got to the room. He also
6
United States v. Oxendine, No. 01-0050/MC
remembered a comment by Minnicks that "he had already drank
about one case of beer” at that point.
Appellant’s statement also indicates that his motivation
for participating in the “game” was to show that “you could
trust that person with your life.” One could strongly infer
from this statement that appellant realized the risk presented
by the game included the real possibility of loss of life.
Another participant, PFC Grant, testified that while being
lowered by his ankles, his loose-fitting trousers slipped down
to about his thigh and he became nervous. At this point, Grant
asked to be pulled back into the room and the holders complied.
Appellant admitted to being one of those who held PFC Grant as
he was lowered out of the window and described how his trousers
had begun to slip off. He also admitted to holding Minnicks and
Tessier out of the window. Notwithstanding the degree of
alcohol use he encountered and the incident with Grant,
appellant continued his participation as one of the holders
until the game concluded with Epley’s tragic fall.
Appellant relies on United States v. Adams, 49 M.J. 182
(1998), for the proposition that the objective-reasonableness
standard must be applied from the viewpoint of appellant and the
18 to 20-year-old enlisted Marines participating in this
dangerous enterprise. Adams had been convicted of having used
provoking speech to a military policeman who was part of a group
7
United States v. Oxendine, No. 01-0050/MC
which "had surrounded him and ordered him out of his car." The
lower court in exercising its unique factfinding powers found as
a matter of factual sufficiency that Adams' statements "would
not provoke a reasonable military policeman to violence because
of his special police training." We upheld the lower court’s
action as "a permissible exercise of its factfinding power."
Id. at 184-85.
However, in doing so we made clear that from a legal-
sufficiency standpoint, the status as a military policeman was
but one of several circumstances to be considered in determining
whether a reasonable person would have been provoked. Id. We
did not hold or suggest that the objective standard of “a
reasonable person” was being altered in any way. Thus, Adams
simply stands for the proposition that all the circumstances
surrounding the particular event are to be considered in
determining the issue of legal sufficiency of the evidence of
how a reasonable person would view the language.
Id.
No authority offered by appellant stands for the
proposition that the status or attributes of a particular person
are to be imputed to “a reasonable person.” Adopting such a
proposition would convert this long-standing common-law concept
from an objective standard to a subjective one. We decline to
do so. Thus, we are convinced that this record supports a
finding by rational members that an objectively reasonable
8
United States v. Oxendine, No. 01-0050/MC
person would have known the risk he was creating and the
foreseeable consequences of that risk.
The Deceased’s Conduct as a Superseding Cause
Appellant contends that LCpl Epley was contributorily
negligent in deciding to join the enterprise and that the manner
in which he pushed himself away from the windowsill while
Tessier and appellant were holding him was a superseding cause
eliminating appellant from the field of proximate causation.
Assuming arguendo that Epley’s decision to participate amounted
to negligence on his part, that alone would not suffice to
create the proximate cause of his death required in the context
of this particular joint enterprise to exonerate appellant.
The dangerous game of trust these participants engaged in
is unlike drag-racing scenarios, for example, that result in
convictions for homicide for the death of a co-participant.
Some courts have held that a conviction for homicide cannot
stand "when the sole basis" for attaching criminal liability for
the death "is the defendant’s participation in" the race.
Velazquez v. State, 561 So. 2d 347, 348 (Fla. App. 3 Dist.
1990)(emphasis added); Thacker v. State,
117 S.E.2d 913 (Ga.App.
1961)(dismissing indictment of surviving racer because it failed
to allege any act of the defendant, save his own participation
in the race, which caused the death); State v. Uhler,
402 N.E.2d
556 (Ohio Ct Com Pleas 1979)(ruling that "criminal liability"
9
United States v. Oxendine, No. 01-0050/MC
will not be imposed "on the survivor of a drag race whose only
contribution to the death of the other participant was his own
participation in the race"). Contra Goldring v. State, 654 A.2d
939, 942-44 (Md. App. 1995).
As the record makes clear, unlike a decision to participate
in a race, this joint enterprise required more than just each
participant’s decision to participate. The objective of the
game sought by the individual participants could not have been
achieved but for the assistance of others in holding them
outside the window. Thus, Epley’s decision to expose himself to
the danger could not have resulted in his death had appellant
not agreed to be his holder, at least as far as appellant’s
liability is concerned.
Even if one is found "criminally negligent. . . it is
possible for negligence of the deceased . . . to intervene
between" an accused’s "conduct and the fatal result in such a
manner as to constitute a superseding cause, completely
eliminating the defendant from the field of proximate
causation.” However, "[t]his is true only in situations in
which the second act of negligence looms so large in comparison
with the first, that the first is not to be regarded as a
substantial factor in the final result.” United States v.
Cooke, 18 M.J. 152, 154 (CMA 1984)(quoting R. Perkins, Criminal
Law 703 (2d ed. 1969)(emphasis omitted)).
10
United States v. Oxendine, No. 01-0050/MC
The question, then, is whether the manner in which LCpl
Epley hoisted himself away from the windowsill when compared to
appellant’s culpably negligent participation as one of his
holders “loom[ed] so large” that appellant’s actions could not
"be regarded as a substantial factor in the fatal result." See
United States v. Lingenfelter, 30 M.J. 302, 307 (CMA 1990).
As discussed earlier, the circumstances appellant
encountered when he decided to participate foreshadowed a tragic
outcome. Young Marines under the influence of alcohol, the
clumsy handling of Grant, the intoxicated state of Epley and the
others, and Epley’s cast were bugles warning appellant that
something might go terribly wrong during this unjustifiably
dangerous game.
Conclusion
This case is the tragic result of a group of young men’s
decision to confirm their trust in each other as Marines through
foolhardy and dangerous means. While from the participants’
perspective their actions may have been well intended, their
lack of mature judgment resulted in the death of one of their
brethren and appellant’s best friend. The military expects
young Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines to exercise good
judgment in combat and no less in the barracks.
We hold that a rational trier of fact could have properly
concluded that a reasonable person in this scenario would have
11
United States v. Oxendine, No. 01-0050/MC
been on notice that he was participating in the creation of
substantial risk of serious harm to the participants. Likewise,
on this record the trier of fact could reasonably have found
that dropping Epley to his death, when viewed in the light of
human experience, was a foreseeable result of the culpable
disregard required by the statute. Finally, we hold the
evidence of record was sufficient to support a rational
factfinder’s conclusion that Epley’s conduct was not a
superseding cause and that appellant’s conduct was a substantial
factor in Epley’s fall and thus, the proximate cause of his
death.
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
12
United States v. Oxendine, 01-0050/MC
SULLIVAN, Judge (concurring in part and in the result):
This case can be resolved solely under military case law.
See United States v. Martinez, 42 M.J. 327, 330 (1995) (citing
United States v. Brown,
22 M.J. 448 (CMA 1986), and United States
v. Gordon,
31 M.J. 30 (CMA 1990)). As I have said before, “The
Bible (Genesis 4:9) asks the question, ‘Am I my brother’s
keeper?’ . . . There are instances in military life where the
high standards set for membership in the profession of arms
require that Armed Forces members not only take care of
themselves but also their fellow warriors.” United States v.
Martinez, supra at 330-31 n.5. (emphasis added).
This case is one of those instances.
