Filed: Aug. 22, 2001
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: reviewing his case.1, Our decision in United States v. Lynn, 54 MJ 202 (2000), describes, the practice of the Appellate Government Division in responding to defense, motions for enlargement of time, as well as Judge Dormans policy on recusal, related to his prior assignment.
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Terrence M. JONES, Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Handler) Third
Class,
U.S. Navy, Appellant
No. 99-0252
Crim. App. No. 97 00486
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued February 28, 2001
Decided August 22, 2001
EFFRON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
CRAWFORD, C.J., and GIERKE, J., joined. BAKER, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the result. SULLIVAN, J., filed a
dissenting opinion.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant M. Eric Eversole, JAGC, USNR (argued); Lieutenant
Omar R. Lopez, JAGC, USNR.
For Appellee: Lieutenant James E. Grimes, JAGC, USNR (argued); Colonel Marc
W. Fisher, Jr., USMC, and Lieutenant Commander Philip L. Sundel, JAGC,
USNR (on brief); Colonel K. M. Sandkuhler.
Military Judge: Thomas P. Tielens
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE PUBLICATION.
United States v. Jones, No. 99-0252/NA
Judge EFFRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted
members convicted appellant, contrary to his pleas, of rape and
adultery, in violation of Articles 120 and 134, Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 920 and 934, respectively. He was
sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 3 years,
total forfeitures, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade.
The convening authority approved these results, and the Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion in October
1998. The decision was set aside by order of this Court (52 M.J.
442) on September 20, 1999, and the case was returned to the
Court of Criminal Appeals for further review concerning
sufficiency of the evidence under Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 USC
§ 866(c). On remand, the lower court affirmed the findings and
sentence in an unpublished opinion dated February 29, 2000.
On appellant’s petition, we granted review of the following
issue:
WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT
ALLOWED A JUDGE WITH A CONFLICT OF INTEREST
TO REVIEW APPELLANT’S CASE ON APPEAL.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
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United States v. Jones, No. 99-0252/NA
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant asserts that Judge Dorman should have recused
himself from the panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals
reviewing his case. Prior to his appointment to the Court of
Criminal Appeals, Colonel Dorman served as the Director of the
Appellate Government Division of the Navy-Marine Corps Appellate
Review Activity (Appellate Government Division). He served as
Director from July 1995 to May 26, 1998. On June 16, 1998, Col.
Dorman was sworn in as a judge on the lower court.
Appellant’s case was docketed with the Court of Criminal
Appeals in March 1997; a copy of the docketing notice and record
of trial were provided by the court to both appellate divisions.
Appellate defense counsel filed numerous motions for enlargement
of time with the lower court. In accordance with the practice
of the Appellate Government Division, the first seven motions
went unopposed. Appellant’s combined eighth-ninth motion for
enlargement of time, filed on March 13, 1998, and his tenth
motion, filed on April 6, 1998, were opposed by the Government.
In both instances, the Government’s opposition to the motions
for enlargement consisted solely of the assertion that “[t]he
Government believes that appellant has had ample time to
research and raise potential issues, and requests this Court to
set a date certain for appellant to file his Assignment of
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United States v. Jones, No. 99-0252/NA
Errors and Brief.” Both documents were filed by the Deputy
Director of the Appellate Government Division during Col.
Dorman’s tenure as Director of the Division. The lower court
granted appellant’s combined eighth-ninth motion and the tenth
motion for enlargement of time. Appellant filed an assignment
of errors and brief with the court on August 4, 1998, more than
2 months after Judge Dorman left the Appellate Government
Division and became an appellate judge. The Government filed
its answer on September 3, 1998. The Court of Criminal Appeals
issued its initial decision on October 29, 1998. Judge Dorman
had joined the court at this point, but did not sit on the panel
that issued the decision, which was composed of Judges Sefton,
Troidl, and Anderson. After that decision was set aside by our
Court, 52 M.J. 442, the case was considered upon remand by a
different panel of the Court of Criminal Appeals, composed of
Judges Dorman, Rolph, and Naugle. That panel issued its
decision on February 29, 2000. Appellant did not seek Judge
Dorman’s disqualification at any point while the case was under
consideration by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
In an affidavit filed with our Court, Judge Dorman avers
that he “had no involvement” with appellant’s case while he was
the Director of the Appellate Government Division; that he gave
no “specific or general guidance” to the Deputy Director about
filing oppositions to the motions for enlargement in this case;
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United States v. Jones, No. 99-0252/NA
and that he was “not aware” that the Government had made replies
in opposition to appellant’s motions until the present appeal
was filed with our Court. Judge Dorman also stated that the
Appellate Government Division, “[w]ith rare exception, . . .
took no action on a record of trial until” an appellant “filed
assignments of error” with the Court of Criminal Appeals. In
light of these circumstances, he decided that he would generally
recuse himself “from participating in any case in which an
appellant had filed a brief raising an assignment of error with
the NMCCA on or before 26 May 1998, the day I was relieved of
duties as the Director of the Appellate Government Division.”1
II. STANDARDS FOR RECUSAL
Title 28 USC § 455 governs the recusal of judges and is
applicable to cases involving the actions of appellate military
judges. United States v. Lynn, 54 M.J. 202, 205 (2000).
Appellant claims that Judge Dorman’s participation in the review
of his case violates the following provisions of § 455:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of
the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
1
Our decision in United States v. Lynn, 54 M.J. 202 (2000), describes
the practice of the Appellate Government Division in responding to defense
motions for enlargement of time, as well as Judge Dorman’s policy on recusal
related to his prior assignment.
5
United States v. Jones, No. 99-0252/NA
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the
following circumstances:
* * *
(3) Where he has served in governmental
employment and in such capacity
participated as counsel, adviser or
material witness concerning the
proceeding or expressed an opinion
concerning the merits of the particular
case in controversy.
Subsection (a) enhances public confidence in the judicial
system by ensuring that judges avoid the appearance of
partiality. See Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.,
486 U.S. 847 (1988). The test for determining if recusal is
necessary under this section is “whether a reasonable person who
knew all the facts might question these appellate military
judges’ impartiality.” United States v. Mitchell,
39 M.J. 131,
143 (CMA)(emphasis in original), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 874
(1994).
Subsection (b)(3) shields parties from having their case
tried before a judge who may have formed opinions or gained
knowledge via prior contact with the case in a governmental
capacity. Recusal is mandatory for a judge who falls within the
specific circumstances of this section because those
circumstances are viewed as inconsistent with impartiality.
6
United States v. Jones, No. 99-0252/NA
The Federal Courts of Appeals have applied two different
approaches to evaluating whether a judge who previously served
as a U.S. Attorney may preside over a case investigated by the
U.S. Attorney's office during his or her tenure as the head of
that office. The Ninth Circuit has applied a “vertical
imputation” theory under which the knowledge and actions of
subordinates are attributed to the U.S. Attorney, holding that
“[a] United States District Judge cannot adjudicate a case that
he or she as United States Attorney began.” United States v.
Arnpriester, 37 F.3d 466, 467 (1994). By contrast, the Tenth
Circuit has interpreted the phrase “participated as counsel” in
subsection (b)(3) as connoting activity by the individual and
has held that a judge is not required to recuse himself absent a
specific showing of actual prior involvement with the case.
United States v. Gipson,
835 F.2d 1323, cert. denied,
486 U.S.
1044 (1988). The court focused on the fact that Congress
specifically amended the statute in 1974 to modify the phrase
"of counsel" to read "participated as counsel." See
id. at
1326, citing 28 USC § 455(b)(3); see also Mangum v. Hargett,
67
F.3d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1995)(agreeing with the analysis in
Gipson), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1133 (1996).
III. DISCUSSION
A trial or appellate judge’s decision on recusal is
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United States v. Jones, No. 99-0252/NA
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Lynn, 54 M.J. at 205. In the
present case, appellant did not question Judge Dorman’s
participation until his appeal before our Court. When an
appellant does not raise the issue of disqualification until
appeal, the reviewing court examines the claim under the plain
error standard of review. United States v. Schreiber,
599 F.2d
534, 536 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 843 (1979).
Our recent decision in Lynn involved a factually related
case in which we held that Judge Dorman’s prior position as
Director of the Appellate Government Division did not require
him to recuse himself under § 455(a) because (1) the Government
took no action on the accused’s case except to receive and store
the record of trial during the period Col. Dorman headed the
division; (2) the seven defense motions for enlargement of time
filed during Col. Dorman’s tenure went unopposed; and (3) there
was unrebutted evidence that Col. Dorman had no involvement in
the case while at the Appellate Government Division. 54 M.J. at
203, 204, 206. We held that Judge Dorman’s policy on recusal
was “reasonable” in light of the Division’s practice of not
reviewing the record until a brief was filed or until the eighth
request for enlargement of time,
id. at 204,“because it limits
his participation to those cases in which Appellate Government
had no substantive involvement.”
Id. at 207.
8
United States v. Jones, No. 99-0252/NA
The sole difference between Lynn and the present case is
the fact that the Government opposed two of appellant’s motions
for enlargement of time -- the combined motion for the eighth
and ninth enlargements -- and the tenth motion, while Col.
Dorman headed the Division. In Lynn, we provided the following
description of the Government’s policy concerning responses to
defense motions for enlargement:
[L]engthy defense appellate delays are
sufficiently common that the Government has
gone to the extent of formulating a policy
of not even opposing the first seven motions
for enlargement of time, and indeed it
appears that even the succeeding oppositions
are quite perfunctory.
Id. at 206-07 (footnote omitted). The same characterization
applies to the record of the present case, which reflects
government opposition limited to the rote assertion that “[t]he
Government believes that appellant has had ample time to
research and raise potential issues.” Such a perfunctory and
mechanical response does not create a reasonable question about
Judge Dorman’s lack of impartiality, especially when, as in
Lynn, appellant does not contest Judge Dorman’s lack of
knowledge about and personal involvement with appellant’s case.
We hold that no error was committed because Judge Dorman was not
required to recuse himself under 28 USC § 455(a).
Appellant argues that the present case should be
distinguished from Lynn because Judge Dorman held supervisory
9
United States v. Jones, No. 99-0252/NA
power, which would impute the actions of the attorneys under his
charge to him if we were to apply the Ninth Circuit’s vertical
imputation theory. See United States v. Arnpriester, supra.
As we noted earlier, the vertical imputation theory is one
of two standards for viewing a judge’s former role as attorney
under the statute. The other is the Tenth Circuit's requirement
for actual prior involvement. See United States v. Gipson,
supra. The record and Judge Dorman’s unrebutted affidavit
demonstrate that he had no actual involvement with this case
during his tenure at the Appellate Government Division. In view
of the perfunctory nature of the oppositions filed by the Deputy
Director in this case, in mechanical adherence to standard
Division practice, we conclude that it is appropriate to apply
the actual prior involvement standard to this case, rather than
the vertical imputation standard. Accordingly, the fact that
Judge Dorman did not recuse himself sua sponte did not amount to
plain error.
We reserve judgment as to which standard should be applied
in other circumstances. There may be cases, for example, in
which denial of an extension might have substantive
consequences or in which the nature of the actions taken by the
Deputy Director would involve deficiencies for which the
Director could be held accountable and responsible. Regardless
of which standard should be applied, we emphasize that the
10
United States v. Jones, No. 99-0252/NA
difficulty of determining which actions are so perfunctory that
recusal is not required can be readily avoided in the future if
judges appointed to the lower courts after prior appellate
division service would recuse themselves from all cases that
were pending during their tenure in the division.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals upon remand is affirmed.
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United States v. Jones, No. 99-0252/NA
BAKER, Judge (concurring in the result):
I agree with the lead opinion's sound conclusion
that Judge Dorman had no "actual prior involvement" with
this case. __ MJ at (10). Therefore, based on the
specific facts of this case, he did not violate 28 USC §
455(a) or (b).
I write separately to emphasize the contextual
nature of my vote and to articulate a different shade of
analysis with respect to § 455(a). I do not believe that
§ 455(a) is susceptible to general rules of the road
based on characterizations of an attorney’s work as
“substantive,” “non-substantive,” “mechanical,” or
“rote.” These terms may have meaning in a specific
context, but they offer dim light as buoys to guide
appellate judges through the rocks and shoals of §
455(a). Clearly, these terms are not relevant to a
decision as to whether Judge Dorman was actually involved
in this or any other case for the purpose of § 455(b);
the majority opinion does not argue so.
There are at least three analytic options for
addressing § 455(a) questions, such as that presented in
this case. First, courts could apply a strict black-
letter interpretation to § 455(a) as Judge Sullivan has
argued for in United States v. Lynn, 54 M.J. 202 (2000), and
United States v. Jones, No. 99-0252/NA
again today. This is attractive as a principle that
guides with clarity and certainty of result. However,
such an interpretation goes beyond what the law requires.
The statutory language presents a reasonable-person test
and not a strict-appearance standard. There are
scenarios where a reasonable person knowing all the facts
would not reasonably question a judge's impartiality,
even where there is an initial appearance of partiality.
This is one of them. A reasonable person knowing all the
facts would not reasonably question Judge Dorman’s
impartiality in this case.
Second, while addressing cases as they come, courts
can seek to distinguish between acts that are substantive
and non-substantive in determining when to apply a theory
of vertical imputation with respect to § 455(a); and,
more broadly, in determining whether a judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. This is the
approach taken in Lynn and by the majority of the Court
today. These distinctions are not offered as black-
letter law, but they do represent common-law guidance to
the field.
I believe a third analytic option is the most apt
in applying § 455(a). Courts can accept that as a matter
of law, the application of § 455(a) is highly contextual
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United States v. Jones, No. 99-0252/NA
so as to defy advance and meaningful guidance with
general terminology like substantive and non-substantive.
While the non-substantive nature of an act may inform a
specific decision as to whether a judge’s impartiality is
reasonably questionable, under this construct, it is
simply too speculative to determine in advance that a
reasonable person will generally find that non-
substantive acts do not violate § 455(a). This is not a
reliable benchmark.
Terms like "rote," "perfunctory," "mechanical,"
"non-substantive,” and “substantive” are amorphous and
subject to multiple and conflicting good-faith
interpretations depending on the actor and their
perspective. As those who have worked within a
government bureaucracy know, substance and process are
often flip sides of the same coin. To whom one sends a
question or seeks a concurrence often dictates the
measure of the substantive answer received. Likewise, a
“pro forma” continuance can also have profound
substantive effect. A lawyer given 1 day to respond to a
brief will offer a different level of response than one
given 2 weeks. When viewed from an accused’s
perspective, a continuance can have a profound
substantive consequence, depending on the skill,
3
United States v. Jones, No. 99-0252/NA
experience, and workload of his or her lawyer.
Whether or not the Appellate Government Division’s
actions were non-substantive in this case, Colonel
Dorman's unrebutted affidavit and the majority opinion
make clear that he took no action whatsoever involving
this case. Colonel Dorman did not participate as counsel
or express an opinion concerning the merits of this case.
Further, while he set office policies and made clear to
his subordinates that he was in command of the appellate
government ship, the policy in question was applicable to
all cases and, once established, did not require Colonel
Dorman's concurrence or consent before it was applied to
particular cases. Therefore, Judge Dorman's impartiality
cannot reasonably be questioned under § 455(a), unless we
adopt an appearance standard that posits an inherent
issue of partiality whenever an appellate government
attorney subsequently serves as a judge of the Court of
Criminal Appeals.
Of course, there may be a difference between
what is legally required and what is prudent. I readily
agree with the majority that the difficulty in applying
§ 455(a) would be avoided if judges appointed to the
Courts of Criminal Appeals after prior appellate division
service recused themselves from cases that were pending
4
United States v. Jones, No. 99-0252/NA
during their tenure in the division.
5
United States v. Jones, 99-0252/NA
SULLIVAN, Judge (dissenting):
I write to reaffirm my position in the Lynn case. See United
States v. Lynn, 54 M.J. 202, 207 (2000)(Sullivan, J., dissenting).
Here, Colonel Dorman was the Chief of the Appellate Government
Division when his government subordinate filed opposition to two
of appellant’s motions in this case. Judge Dorman thus later sat
on a case in which he had a prior direct supervisory-attorney
role. In my view, this contravenes Congress’ will as reflected
in 28 USC § 455(b)(3) and 455(a). See United States v.
Arnpriester,
37 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 1994). In addition, the
acknowledged filing of opposing legal documents by the Appellate
Government Division in this case was more compelling than the
Lynn case and warranted relief under the rationale of that case.
I would remand this case.
As such, I respectfully dissent.
