Filed: Sep. 05, 2002
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: In the, instant case, the Court of Criminal Appeals similarly observed, We, understand that evidence of a civilian conviction often contains little, more than a citation to the statute the appellant was convicted of, violating and notice of the sentence imposed.
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Phines J. DOUGLAS III, Airman Basic
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 01-0777
Crim. App. No. 33940
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued April 1, 2002
Decided September 5, 2002
CRAWFORD, C.J., delivered the judgment of the Court, in
which GIERKE, J., joined. BAKER, J., and SULLIVAN, S.J., each
filed an opinion concurring in the result. EFFRON, J., filed a
dissenting opinion.
Counsel
For Appellant: Major Jefferson B. Brown (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Beverly B. Knott, Lieutenant Colonel Timothy W. Murphy,
and Major Marc A. Jones (on brief); Captain Shelly W. Schools.
For Appellee: Major Mitchel Neurock (argued); Colonel
Anthony P. Dattilo and Major Jennifer R. Rider (on brief); Major
Lance B. Sigmon.
Military Judge: W. Thomas Cumbie
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
Chief Judge CRAWFORD delivered the judgement of the Court.
Pursuant to his pleas, appellant was convicted at a general
court-martial for wrongfully appropriating a motor vehicle,
uttering a bad check, and violating a lawful general regulation
by misusing his government travel charge card, in violation of
Articles 121, 134, and 92 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), 10 USC §§ 921, 934, and 892. The convening
authority approved the sentence adjudged by officer members: a
bad-conduct discharge, confinement for one year, and total
forfeiture of pay and allowances. The Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed the findings and sentence. 55 M.J. 563 (2001). We
granted review of the following issues:1
I. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PROSECUTION 3 – THE STIPULATION OF FACT FROM
APPELLANT’S FIRST COURT-MARTIAL – WAS PROPERLY
ADMITTED DURING SENTENCING AS “RELEVANT PERSONAL
DATA AND CHARACTER OF PRIOR SERVICE UNDER RCM
1001(B)(2).”
II. WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR SENTENCING
HEARING WHEN PORTIONS OF PROSECUTION EXHIBITS 1
AND 3, WHICH THE MILITARY JUDGE ORDERED REDACTED,
WERE PRESENTED TO THE COURT MEMBERS WITHOUT
REDACTION AND WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF A CURATIVE
INSTRUCTION.
We hold that while the trial judge erred in admitting the
evidence under RCM 1001(b)(3), Manual for Courts-Martial, United
1
We heard oral argument in this case at the United States Air Force Academy
in Colorado Springs, Colorado, as part of the Court’s “Project Outreach.”
See United States v. Allen, 34 M.J. 228, 229 n.1 (1992).
2
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
States (2000 ed.),2 the court below did not err in holding the
evidence properly admissible as part of appellant’s personnel
records under RCM 1001(b)(2). We also hold that the prosecution
erred in failing to redact the materials as ordered by the
judge, but that such error was harmless.
At sessions held pursuant to Article 39(a), UCMJ, 10 USC
§ 839(a), trial counsel sought to admit Attachment 9 to
Prosecution Exhibit (Pros. Exh.) 1, a copy of the promulgating
order from appellant’s first court-martial, and Pros. Exh. 3, a
stipulation of fact from appellant’s prior court-martial. The
charges on which appellant was court-martialed on the prior
occasion were unrelated to those in the instant case. Defense
counsel objected to Pros. Exh. 3, arguing that it was
(a) cumulative; (b) not necessary to explain the offenses of
which appellant had been previously convicted (as shown on the
promulgating order); and (c) contained references to uncharged
misconduct. Defense counsel further contended that the seven-
page stipulation of fact should be barred after application of
the balancing test under Mil.R.Evid. 403, Manual, supra. Trial
counsel countered that Pros. Exh. 3 was admissible to show
appellant’s rehabilitative potential and to put the prior
conviction in context.
2
RCM 1001(b)(3)(A) was amended on April 11, 2002, by Executive Order Number
13262 effective May 15, 2002. All other Manual provisions cited are
identical to the ones in effect at the time of appellant’s court-martial.
3
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
After conducting a Mil.R.Evid. 403 balancing test, the
military judge ruled that Pros. Exh. 3 was admissible, but
ordered the redaction of paragraph 123 and a portion of paragraph
44 of that exhibit. However, the judge announced that because
there was an overlap between the stipulation (Pros. Exh. 3) and
the promulgating order (Attachment 9 to Pros. Exh. 1):
I will inform the court members that the stipulation
and the order relate to the same court-martial
offenses and that the stipulation is offered only to
explain the facts underlying the court-martial
order. If the stipulation helps them to understand
the court-martial order, they may consider it. If
it does not, they are free to disregard it.
The military judge then granted the defense motion to redact the
sentence and action portions of the promulgating order.
Believing that the ordered redaction had taken place, the
military judge instructed the members not to speculate about
what information had been redacted, as well as the use to which
they could put Pros. Exhs. 1 and 3. While it is unclear from
the record whether the material was redacted, appellant argues
that it was not. Thus, appellant alleges trial counsel erred in
giving the unredacted exhibits to the members without the
benefit of a curative instruction.
3
Paragraph 12 of Pros. Exh. 3 reads:
During a lawful consent search of Amn Douglas’ dormitory room, numerous
insufficient fund checks and past due notices were seized. Some of the
items were in the trashcan, unopened and ripped in half.
4
The military judge ordered that the words “In order to determine whether or
not the stolen credit card was activated” be removed.
4
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
The Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) found that the exhibits
in the record of trial had not been redacted in accordance with
the military judge’s instructions. Contrary to appellant’s
assertions, the CCA held that the entire promulgating order, to
include its recitation of the sentence and convening authority
action which the military judge ordered to be redacted, was
relevant and admissible. 55 M.J. at 566 (citing United States v.
Maracle,
26 M.J. 431, 432-33 (CMA 1988)).
With regard to Pros. Exh. 3, the stipulation of fact, the
lower court rejected the rationale of United States v.
Bellanger, No. 32373, 1977 WL833874 (A.F.Ct.Crim.App. Oct. 29,
1997)(unpub. op.), and held that “the underlying details of a
prior conviction are not admissible as ‘evidence of civilian or
military convictions’ under RCM 1001(b)(3)[.]” 55 M.J. at 566.
Nonetheless, the lower court found that Air Force regulations
required records of trial to be kept through the appellate
process;5 appellant’s first court-martial was still under appeal;
and Pros. Exh. 3 was relevant data pursuant to RCM 1001(b)(2).
Id. at 567.
5
Paragraph 8.5.1, Air Force Instruction 51-201, Administration of Military
Justice (2 Nov. 1999), provides:
“Personnel records of the accused,” as referenced in RCM 1001(b) and
(d), includes all those records made or maintained in accordance with
Air Force directives that reflect the past military efficiency,
conduct, performance, and history of the accused, as well as any
evidence of disciplinary actions, including punishment under Article
15, UCMJ. The DD Form 493, Extract of Military Records of Previous
Convictions, may be used to introduce evidence of an accused’s previous
conviction.
5
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
Before this Court, appellant argues that the stipulation of
fact (Pros. Exh. 3) concerning the prior convictions was not
admissible under RCM 1001(b)(2) or RCM 1001(b)(3). With respect
to Issue II, the defense maintains that trial counsel’s failure
to redact portions of Pros. Exhs. 1 and 3, especially after the
military judge told the members that information from Attachment
9 to Pros. Exh. 1 had been redacted, denied appellant a fair
trial on sentencing.
DISCUSSION
The 1984 Manual expanded the information presented to the
sentencing authority. The Manual was intended to permit
the presentation of much of the same information
to the court-martial as would be contained in a
presentence report, but it does so within the
protections of an adversarial proceeding, to which
rules of evidence apply..., although they may be
relaxed for some purposes.
Drafters’ Analysis of RCM 1001, Manual, supra at A21-69. This
expansion of admissible sentencing evidence was reaffirmed in
the 2002 amendment to RCM 1001(b)(3)(A). See note
2, supra.
The new rule clarifies the term “conviction” and admits relevant
evidence of a civilian conviction without necessarily being
bound by the action, procedure, nomenclature, of the civilian
jurisdictions.
Id. at Analysis to RCM 1001(b)(3)(A).
RCM 1001(a)(1) provides: “After findings of guilty have
been announced, the prosecution and defense may present matter
6
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
pursuant to this rule to aid the court-martial in determining an
appropriate sentence.” The rule then lists a number of items
that may be submitted, including service data, personnel
records,6 and prior convictions.
In United States v. Ariail, 48 M.J. 285, 287 (1998), this
Court held that while evidence may not be admissible under one
rule (i.e., RCM 1001(b)(3) as a prior conviction), that does not
preclude its admission under a different rule (i.e., RCM
1001(b)(2) as a personnel record) if the evidence is relevant
and reliable. See United States v. Abel,
469 U.S. 45, 56
(1984).
We agree with the court below that a stipulation of fact
contained in the record of trial of a previous court-martial
(such as Pros. Exh. 3 in the case at hand) does not qualify as
“evidence of a conviction” under RCM 1001(b)(3). As the dissent
notes, there is a split among the service courts concerning
information that may be introduced under RCM 1001(b)(3) as
evidence of a prior conviction. __ MJ at (8); see United States
v. Brogan, 33 M.J. 588, 593 (NMCMR 1991), aff’d on other grounds,
40 M.J. 270 (CMA 1994); United States v. Nellum,
24 M.J. 693 (ACMR
1987). These cases deal with stipulations of fact created for
6
RCM 1001(b)(2) states that “trial counsel may ... introduce from the
personnel records of the accused evidence of the accused’s ... character of
prior service.... ‘Personnel records of the accused’ includes any records
made or maintained in accordance with departmental regulations that reflect
the past military efficiency, conduct, performance, and history of the
accused.”
7
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
use during current, ongoing courts-martial in order to explain
the facts, circumstances, and sentence of a prior court-martial.
That issue is not before this Court. Here, we are examining the
admissibility of a stipulation of fact, previously created for a
prior court-martial, that was maintained in appellant’s
personnel file.
While Pros. Exh. 3 was not admissible under RCM 1001(b)(3),
it was properly maintained in appellant’s personnel file in
accordance with Air Force departmental regulations, reflected
appellant’s conduct, and was the type of personnel record
envisioned by RCM 1001(b)(2). Accordingly, the lower court did
not err in finding that Pros. Exh. 3 was an admissible personnel
record at the time that it was admitted into evidence in this
case.
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
8
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
BAKER, Judge (concurring in the result):
Issue I presents two questions. First, is a
stipulation of fact from a previous court-martial
admissible on sentencing as evidence of a prior conviction
under RCM 1001(b)(3), Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States (2000 ed.)? Alternatively, or in addition, is a
stipulation of fact from a previous court-martial
admissible on sentencing as a personnel record under RCM
1001(b)(2) if offered as evidence of a prior conviction? I
agree with Senior Judge Sullivan’s response to these
questions and offer the following supplementary comment.
I
RCM 1001(b) establishes guidelines for the
prosecution’s presentation of presentencing evidence. The
rule contemplates the admission of five distinct types of
evidence, including evidence of prior convictions of the
accused.1 The non-binding Discussion following RCM
1001(b)(3)(C) allows that such information “may be proved
by use of the personnel records of the accused, by the
record of the conviction, or by the order promulgating the
result of trial.” As the lower court identified, the plain
language of the rule appears to contemplate, literally,
1
“The trial counsel may introduce evidence of military or civilian
convictions of the accused.” RCM 1001(b)(3)(A).
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
evidence of conviction – the fact of conviction – and not
an accounting of the underlying acts leading to conviction.
However, the Court of Criminal Appeals went too far in
holding that the underlying details of a prior conviction
are not admissible under RCM 1001(b)(3), even when
necessary to explain the nature of the offense. 55 M.J. 563,
566 (A.F.Ct.Crim.App. 2001).
Notwithstanding the differences regarding the result
in this case, the majority’s view of the law should now be
clear. A stipulation of fact from a prior conviction may
be admissible under RCM 1001(b)(3) where the military judge
determines the stipulation is necessary to explain the
nature of the prior conviction.2 However, this should only
occur on those rare occasions when the promulgating order
or Form 493 does not clearly state the prior offense.
Further, it may not be used as a vehicle to develop the
facts behind the prior conviction. Finally, even when
2
This may be illustrated with reference to offenses under Articles 133
or 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 933 and 934, where
citation to the article and formulaic citation to the elements would
not necessarily afford a member any understanding of the underlying
prior offense, from which to draw judgments regarding rehabilitation.
See, too, the Army Court’s statement in United States v. Nellum that
sometimes promulgating orders “are often so abbreviated that they
provide virtually no details regarding the offenses to which they make
reference.” 24 M.J. 693, 695 (ACMR 1987)(footnote omitted). In the
instant case, the Court of Criminal Appeals similarly observed, “We
understand that evidence of a civilian conviction often contains little
more than a citation to the statute the appellant was convicted of
violating and notice of the sentence
imposed.” 55 M.J. at 566.
2
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
reasonably necessary to understand the nature of the prior
conviction, the military judge must still determine
whether, in such a context, the stipulation’s probative
value outweighs any unfair prejudice to the defendant. See
Mil.R.Evid. 403, Manual, supra.
In the present case, the military judge identified the
correct framework3 and admitted the stipulation as
“necessary to explain the facts and circumstances
surrounding the offenses.”4 I disagree with this
conclusion, which is diminished by the judge’s subsequent
3
The Military Judge ruled:
. . . dealing with . . . the stipulation of facts from the
prior court-martial, what the Army Court of Criminal
Appeals in US v. Nellum[,] at 24 M.J. 693 and the Air Force
Court of Criminal Appeals in the unpublished case of United
States [v.] Bellanger, specifically authorized the
prosecution to present underlying details of a previous
conviction when necessary to explain the nature of the
offenses and when the probative value is not outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. I find that the
stipulation of fact offered by the prosecution is necessary
to explain the facts and circumstances surrounding the
offenses.
4
The judge determined:
Specifically, as to Charge I, the stipulation explains
that the assault occurred on duty but with an unloaded
weapon, facts that are not contained in the court-martial
order. In Additional Charge I, the stip shows how the
accused attempted to steal. In Additional Charge II, the
stipulation shows how the accused facilitated the larceny
by his relationship with the store clerk, again, matters
not contained in the court-martial promulgating order. As
to Additional Charges V and VI, the stipulation shows that
the accused is guilty as an aider and abettor rather than
the actual perpetrator of the offense. In Additional
Charge VII, the stipulation shows to whom the checks were
written, again, matters not contained in the promulgating
order.
3
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
admonishment to the members that, ”[i]f [the stipulation]
helps you in understanding the offenses for which the
accused was convicted in his first court-martial, then you
may use it for that purpose. If it does not assist you,
you are free to disregard it.”
The strongest argument for the need for additional
details rests with appellant’s prior conviction under
Article 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 928,
for committing an assault on one Airman Padron by pointing
an M-16 rifle at him. The stipulation alerted the members
that this offense occurred while appellant was on duty and
with an unloaded weapon. But these are details of
potential mitigation and aggravation that should have been
considered at appellant’s first trial. They are not
necessary as evidence of conviction or to explain what the
conviction was for at appellant’s second trial. Moreover,
the introduction of the more detailed stipulation that
overlapped the promulgating order ran the risk of directing
the members’ energy to the prior conviction, rather than
guiding them to an appropriate consideration of the present
sentence.
Nonetheless, for the reasons cited by Senior Judge
Sullivan, I find that the error was harmless. Since the
stipulation overlapped the promulgating order, any
4
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
additional detail that was provided was not of the sort
that might prejudice appellant. Some of these additional
details may even have been helpful to appellant, e.g., the
weapon used during the assault was unloaded; he was
convicted as an aider and abettor rather than a principal.
II.
While the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals
concluded that stipulations of fact are not admissible as
records of conviction, the court determined that in this
case, the stipulation of fact was admissible as a personnel
record of the accused under RCM 1001(b)(2). 55 M.J. at 567.
Leaving further regulation and interpretation to the branch
Secretaries, the President has authorized the prosecution
to introduce “from the personnel records of the accused
evidence of… character of prior service.” RCM 1001(b)(2).
Interpreting the term as it appears in all provisions of
RCM 1001(b), the Secretary of the Air Force has defined
“personnel records of the accused” as “includ[ing] all
those records made or maintained in accordance with Air
Force directives that reflect the past military efficiency,
conduct, performance, and history of the accused, as well
as any evidence of disciplinary actions, including
punishment under Article 15, UCMJ.” Para. 8.5.1, Air Force
5
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
Instruction (AFI) 51-201, Administration of Military
Justice (2 Nov. 1999).
Ordinarily, the views of the service courts
interpreting their own service regulations are due
deference. How much deference is due, and at what point
this deference dissipates, is subject to interpretation
under our case law. In Moultak and Manuel, this Court
suggested that “some deference” was due where the lower
court’s interpretation was persuasive. United States v.
Moultak, 24 M.J. 316, 318 (CMA 1987); United States v.
Manuel,
43 M.J. 282, 287 (1995). However, in United States
v. Shavrnoch,
49 M.J. 334, 338 n.2 (citing Moultak and
Manuel), this Court did “not find the court’s discussion of
the regulation so lacking in merit that we should depart
from our traditional approach of giving significant
deference to the Courts of Criminal Appeals in the
interpretation of the regulations issued by their own
departments.” Regardless of the standard of review, I do
not find the Air Force Court’s reasoning persuasive.
The Secretary of the Air Force has promulgated a
thorough Instruction on the operation of the personnel
records system within the Air Force, including where
pertinent information is kept. See AFI 36-2608, Military
Personnel Records (1 July 1996). The Instruction includes
6
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
a table of more than sixty pages listing the forms and
other material to be filed in a servicemember’s personnel
record. This table describes the disposition of only two
pieces of information pertaining to courts-martial: the
Charge Sheet (DD Form 458) and “[c]ourt-martial orders
containing or reflecting approved findings of guilt . . .
.” Id. at A2.1.78 and A2.1.347. There is no indication
that the Secretary intended the entire record of a previous
court-martial, or elements of such a record, to be included
as a part of an Air Force personnel record. The record is,
itself, an independent legal document from which
information is taken to supplement the personnel record.
Moreover, this question of law ultimately hinges on
the meaning of the Rules for Courts-Martial and not Air
Force regulations. The President’s decision to provide
separate rules addressing “character of service” and
“evidence of prior convictions” would be meaningless if
evidence of prior convictions could come in as personnel
records for the purpose of proving prior convictions.
Otherwise, RCM 1001(b)(2) would swallow all that is
referenced in 1001(b)(3), and there would be no need for a
more specific rule addressing prior convictions. Applying
the same logic, as Senior Judge Sullivan argues, there
would be no limitation on what might come into sentencing
7
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
evidence through the “personnel record” trap door. Among
other things, personnel regulations could permit not only
evidence of conviction, but the relitigation of marginally
relevant facts and, potentially, even relitigation of
acquittals.
Further, the Air Force Court's analysis depends on the
fortuitous fact that appellant's appeal was pending.
Reliance on this argument would lead to the anomaly that
not only would prior convictions receive different
treatment between services, but even within the Air Force
the nature of prior evidence of conviction would depend on
the timing of appeal. In the case of pending appeals, the
Government could extend the logic of the Court of Criminal
Appeals and seek admission of extensive and irrelevant
details to evidence a prior court-martial conviction,
whereas, in the case of a finally adjudicated conviction,
sentencing evidence would be limited to proof of the
conviction alone under RCM 1001(b)(3).
As this Court stated in United States v. Ariail, 48 M.J.
285, 287 (1998), “RCM 1001(b)(2) does not provide blanket
authority to introduce all information that happens to be
maintained in the personnel records of an accused.” It
still must be relevant, reliable, and credible for the
purpose for which it is offered. If that purpose is
8
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
evidence of prior conviction, then RCM 1001(b)(3) is the
applicable rule.
9
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
SULLIVAN, Senior Judge (concurring in the result):
Unlike the lead opinion, I conclude that the stipulation of
fact from appellant's prior court-martial was not admissible as
sentencing evidence at his second court-martial. The President
has given appropriate guidance as to the types of records
(subject to their relevance) that the parties may introduce at
this stage of the trial. He has clearly delineated between
"[e]vidence of prior convictions of the accused" (RCM 1001(b)(3))
and "[p]ersonal data and character of prior service of the
accused." RCM 1001(b)(2). I agree with the lead opinion that the
challenged stipulation was not admissible under RCM 1001(b)(3).
However, I disagree with the lead opinion that the challenged
evidence was admissible under RCM 1001(b)(2).
RCM 1001(b)(2) permits the admission of
evidence of the accused's marital status;
number of dependents, if any; and character
of prior service. Such evidence includes
copies of reports reflecting the past
military efficiency, conduct, performance,
and history of the accused and evidence of
any disciplinary actions including
punishments under Article 15 [UCMJ].
This evidence must be taken from “the personnel records of the
accused.” The plain language of this rule shows that the
President did not envision it permitting the introduction of
evidence of a prior criminal trial. The obvious intent was to
limit it to disciplinary documents traditionally maintained in a
servicemember's personnel file.
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
Moreover, the simple fact that service regulations require
that records of trial be kept through the appellate process did
not, somehow, magically transform the stipulation of fact from
the prior trial into a "personnel record." A record of trial is
not a record “made or maintained in accordance with Air Force
Directives . . .." See para. 8.5.1, Air Force Instruction 51-201,
Administration of Military Justice (2 Nov. 1999). Rather, a
record of trial has its own independent legal significance and
record-keeping requirement. See Article 54, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 USC § 854.
At trial, the Government made no argument that this document
was a personnel record. Moreover, I see nothing in any of the
materials presented in connection with this case that required
the maintenance of the proceedings of a court-martial in
appellant's personnel file (the traditional repository of such
records).
Finally, I am left to wonder as to the limits of the lead
opinion’s approach to this question. Will records of an
investigation under Article 32, UCMJ, 10 USC § 832, or other
pretrial proceedings (i.e., the staff judge advocate's pretrial
advice) be admitted? Should the Government be permitted to call
witnesses from the prior trial or introduce the entire
transcript, including exhibits excluded by the military judge?*
*
In response to a question I posed during oral argument, the Government
contended that a record of an acquittal would be admissible. This was
somewhat tantamount to a hoary and now discredited tradition that a record of
an acquittal should be included in a personnel record as a "favorable" matter.
2
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
Notwithstanding the above, I do not believe that appellant
suffered substantial harm from either this error or the failure
of the Government to redact portions of this exhibit and the
promulgating order as directed by the military judge. This was
appellant's second conviction for the same type of offenses
within a five-month period. The record shows that he had the
temerity to drive one of the fruits of his crimes, a used Lexus
car for which he had uttered a worthless check, to his prior
court-martial, thus demonstrating his contempt for the military
justice system. (Pros. Ex. 1) The very serious nature of the
present offenses, coupled with the admissible evidence of his
prior misconduct, rendered the errors noted above harmless under
any standard of review. See Art. 59(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 859(a).
3
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
EFFRON, Judge (dissenting):
In the present case, trial counsel sought to introduce
evidence of a prior conviction in support of the prosecution’s
sentencing case. The military judge admitted the evidence,
subject to the condition that the trial counsel redact
information that the military judge determined to be
inadmissible as either irrelevant or potentially confusing. The
trial counsel neglected to redact the information before
submitting it to the members of the court-martial. Contrary to
the ruling of the military judge, the unredacted information was
considered during the sentencing deliberation by the members.
The members adjudged a sentence that included a punitive
discharge, confinement for one year, and total forfeitures.
I agree with Judge Baker and Senior Judge Sullivan to the
extent they conclude that the document at issue was not
admissible in this case either as a personnel record under RCM
1001(b)(2), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2000 ed.),
or as a record of a prior conviction under RCM 1001(b)(3).
Assuming that the records in question fell within the category
of sentencing information potentially admissible under RCM
1001(b), the critical responsibility for determining whether the
records were admissible in this case rested with the military
judge. The military judge determined that the records were
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
admissible only if redacted. The Court affirms appellant’s
sentence on the ground that the failure to redact was harmless.
I respectfully dissent in view of the unique aspects of
sentencing by members in the military justice system, the
critical role of the military judge in ensuring fairness during
the adversarial sentencing process, and the adverse sentencing
impact of the information the military judge ordered redacted in
this case.
I. CONSIDERATION OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS AND
PERSONNEL RECORDS DURING SENTENCING
In U.S. district courts, the sentence in noncapital
criminal cases is imposed by the trial judge. The primary
source of sentencing information is a report prepared by a
probation officer rather than an adversarial evidentiary
proceeding. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32. Sentencing in courts-
martial is quite different, relying on an adversarial process.
See United States v. Cleveland, 29 M.J. 361 (CMA 1990). The
military judge plays a critical role in ruling on the
admissibility of evidence. Unless the accused has elected a
bench trial, the sentence is adjudicated by the members of the
court-martial. See RCM 1001. As the Drafters’ Analysis
accompanying RCM 1001 notes:
Sentencing procedures in Federal
civilian courts can be followed in courts-
2
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
martial only to a limited degree.
Sentencing in courts-martial may be by the
military judge or members. See Article 16
and 52(b), [Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), 10 USC §§ 816 and 852(b)]. The
military does not have -- and it is not
feasible to create -- an independent,
judicially supervised probation service to
prepare presentence reports. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 32(c).
Manual, supra at A21-69. In terms of the type of information
that may be considered during sentencing, the Analysis states:
This rule allows the presentation of much of
the same information to the court-martial as
would be contained in a presentence report,
but it does so within the protections of an
adversarial proceeding, to which rules of
evidence apply . . ., although they may be
relaxed for some purposes.
Id. (citation omitted).
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The current adversarial process reflects the historical
evolution of restrictions on the types of evidence admissible
during sentencing proceedings. Consideration of personnel
records during sentencing is a relatively recent development in
American military law. Until the late nineteenth century,
courts-martial did not receive evidence of prior convictions,
much less adverse administrative information, during the
sentencing process. See William Winthrop, Military Law and
Precedents 387 (2d ed. 1920 reprint). Regulations adopted in
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United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
1886 authorized consideration of recent convictions during the
member’s current enlistment for purposes of “inducing or
increasing punishment.” Id.
Prior to enactment of the UCMJ in 1950, consideration of
prior convictions during sentencing generally was limited to
offenses committed within an enlisted member’s current period of
service, or a previous period not terminated under honorable
conditions, with the Army imposing a further limitation to
convictions occurring within the previous year for enlisted
members and within the previous three-year period for others.
See paras. 306 and 307, Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army,
1917 and 1921; para. 79c, Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army,
1928 and 1949; paras. 436-41, Naval Courts and Boards, 1937.
The Manual did not authorize provision of information for
sentencing purposes from personnel records, except for records
of conviction, until 1928. Even then, the evidence was
restricted to the modest information provided on the first page
of the charge sheet regarding “age, pay, and service,” as well
as prior discharges and former nonjudicial punishment for the
same act or omission. Para. 79a and App. 3, 1928 and 1949
Manual.
The 1951 Manual, which implemented the newly enacted UCMJ,
imposed similar restrictions on sentencing information,
including a three-year limitation on consideration of prior
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United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
convictions. Para. 75b and App. 5, Manual for Courts-Martial,
United States, 1951.
Following enactment of the Military Justice Act of 1968,
the President issued a comprehensive revision entitled Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Rev. ed.). The 1969
Manual continued the authority for introduction of data from
page one of the charge sheet and use of prior convictions, while
increasing the time period for prior convictions from three to
six years, removing the current enlistment limitation, and
making it clear that convictions were not admissible until
appellate review was completed. Para. 75b, 1969 Manual.
Reflecting the establishment of the military judiciary by
the Military Justice Act of 1968, the 1969 Manual added a new
authority in paragraph 75d, entitled “Optional matter presented
when court-martial constituted with military judge.” Subject to
military departmental regulations, this provision authorized the
trial counsel to present to the military judge “any personnel
records of the accused,” a term defined to “include all those
records made or maintained in accordance with departmental
regulations which reflect the past conduct and performance of
the accused.” Id. The military judge was required to rule on
any objections by the accused, and the accused was permitted to
submit matter in rebuttal. In cases tried before members, the
military judge was authorized to “admit for their consideration
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United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
any information from these records which reflects the past
conduct and performance of the accused.” Id. The Drafters’
Analysis noted that this “new paragraph . . . broadens the
information to be considered by the sentencing agency in a
court-martial,” giving the military judge “broad discretion in
determining relevance and in ruling on objections to items
presented.” Dep’t. of the Army Pamphlet 27-2, Analysis of
Contents, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969,
Revised Edition, at 13-6 (July 1970). The Analysis added that
“[t]he procedure contemplated by this change is similar to that
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, dealing with
presentencing reports, but it limits items which may be
considered to items contained in official records and
accordingly puts the accused on notice of what may be considered
against him.”
Id.
The next comprehensive revision of the Manual, issued in
1984, retained the basic provisions of the 1969 Manual’s
presentencing procedure, while removing both the six-year
limitation on prior convictions and the restriction against
considering convictions that had not been subject to complete
appellate review. See RCM 1001 and A21-61, Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States, 1984. With minor changes, the current
provisions are similar to the 1969 rules, as modified in 1984.
See RCM 1001 and A21-69, Manual (2000 ed.). In the present
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United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
Manual, RCM 1001(b)(1) directs the trial counsel to “inform the
court-martial of the data on the charge sheet relating to the
pay and service of the accused and the duration and nature of
any pre-trial restraint.” RCM 1001(b)(2) provides:
Under regulations of the Secretary
concerned, trial counsel may obtain and
introduce from the personnel records of the
accused evidence of the accused’s marital
status; number of dependents, if any; and
character of prior service. Such evidence
includes copies of reports reflecting the
past military efficiency, conduct,
performance, and history of the accused and
evidence of any disciplinary actions
including punishments under Article 15.
“Personnel records of the accused”
includes any records made or maintained in
accordance with departmental regulations
that reflect the past military efficiency,
conduct, performance, and history of the
accused. If the accused objects to a
particular document as inaccurate or
incomplete in a specified respect, or as
containing matter that is not admissible
under the Military Rules of Evidence, the
matter shall be determined by the military
judge. Objections not asserted are waived.
With respect to prior convictions, RCM 1001(b)(3)(A) states:
The trial counsel may introduce
evidence of military or civilian convictions
of the accused. For purposes of this rule,
there is a “conviction” in a court-martial
case when a sentence has been adjudged.
Prior convictions and information from personnel records
also may be admissible as evidence of “any aggravating
circumstances directly relating to or resulting from the
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United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
offenses of which the accused has been found guilty,” RCM
1001(b)(4), evidence concerning the accused’s rehabilitative
potential, RCM 1001(b)(5), or evidence in rebuttal of sentencing
information provided by the defense, RCM 1001(d). RCM 1001(b)
also expressly authorizes defense objections to evidence of
prior convictions and other service records on the grounds of
inaccuracy, incompleteness, or inadmissibility under the
Military Rules of Evidence.
B. ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS UNDER RCM 1001(b)(3)
According to the nonbinding Discussion accompanying RCM
1003(b)(3)(C), “[n]ormally, previous convictions may be proved
by use of the personnel records of the accused, by the record of
the conviction, or by the order promulgating the result of
trial. See DD Form 493 (Extract of Military Records of Previous
Convictions).” The current version of DD Form 493, which has
been in effect since 1984, includes information regarding the
type of court-martial, a synopsis of the specifications, and the
sentence adjudged, as well as a “script” to be used for
introducing the form in courts-martial.
There is a split among the lower courts as to the extent of
information that may be introduced under RCM 1001(b)(3) as
evidence of a prior conviction. The Army court has held that a
stipulation of fact may be introduced to explain the
8
United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
circumstances of a prior conviction, United States v. Nellum, 24
M.J. 693 (ACMR 1987), while the Navy-Marine Corps court has held
that “evidence to explain the detailed facts underlying a prior
conviction is inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief
during sentencing.” United States v. Brogan,
33 M.J. 588, 593
(NMCMR 1991), aff’d on other grounds,
40 M.J. 270 (CMA 1994)
(summary disposition).
C. INTRODUCTION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING A PRIOR CONVICTION
AS A PERSONNEL RECORD UNDER RCM 1001(b)(2)
To be admissible under RCM 1001(b)(2), the record must be:
(1) a “personnel record [] of the accused” or a summary or copy
thereof; (2) within the category of records authorized by the
Secretary concerned to be considered for sentencing purposes;
(3) “made or maintained in accordance with departmental
regulations”; and (4) reflective of “the past military
efficiency, conduct, performance, and history of the accused.”
In United States v. Ariail, 48 M.J. 285, 287 (1998), we held that
“[t]he fact that [the prosecution’s sentencing evidence] may not
meet the criteria for admission under RCM 1001(b)(3) as a prior
conviction . . . does not prevent its admission under RCM
1001(b)(2) if relevant and reliable.” Our ruling permitted
introduction of a civilian conviction listed by the accused on a
security clearance form that was maintained as a personnel
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United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
record in accordance with departmental regulations, the validity
of which was not challenged by the defense. We cautioned,
however, that
RCM 1001(b)(2) does not provide blanket
authority to introduce all information that
happens to be maintained in the personnel
records of an accused. Personnel records
may contain entries of questionable
accuracy, relevance, or completeness.
Id.; cf. United States v. Harris, 56 M.J. 480 (2002) (noting the
role of RCM 1001(b)(2) in regulating the admissibility of
personnel records during sentencing); see also United States v.
Vasquez,
54 M.J. 303 (2001) (a personnel record containing an
admission of guilt in an unrelated request for discharge in lieu
of court-martial could not be considered during sentencing in
light of the prohibition in Mil.R.Evid. 410 against use of plea
discussions). The fact that a record might meet the criteria in
RCM 1001(b)(2) as a personnel record of the accused does not
relieve the military judge of the responsibility for determining
whether it is otherwise admissible under the Military Rules of
Evidence.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
During the sentencing proceedings in the present case,
trial counsel sought to introduce evidence of appellant’s prior
conviction for unrelated offenses under RCM 1001(b)(3)
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United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
("Evidence of prior convictions of the accused"). Trial counsel
did not offer a DD Form 493 or similar record of the
convictions, but instead offered the promulgating order and a
stipulation of fact from the prior court-martial.
Defense counsel opposed admission of the stipulation and
moved to redact portions of the promulgating order, contending
that the material at issue was irrelevant or, in the
alternative, that it presented a danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighing any probative value. See Mil.R.Evid.
402 and 403, Manual (2000 ed.).
The military judge, who granted the defense motion in part,
concluded that portions of the promulgating order should be
redacted as irrelevant. Specifically, the military judge
concluded that the information regarding the sentence and the
convening authority’s action should be redacted under the
particular circumstances of this case, citing the potential for
unnecessary speculation by the members as to reasons for the
convening authority's reduction of the sentence. See
Mil.R.Evid. 403. Without defense objection, the remainder of
the promulgating order was admitted as evidence of the prior
conviction. With respect to the stipulation of fact, the
military judge ruled that although it contained information
"necessary to explain the facts and circumstances surrounding
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United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
the offenses," it could be admitted only after redacting
material related to uncharged misconduct.
For reasons not explained in the record, trial counsel
failed to redact the material as ordered by the military judge.
The unredacted promulgating order and stipulation were both
provided to the members for consideration during sentencing.
The members sentenced appellant to a bad-conduct discharge,
confinement for one year, and total forfeitures.
III. DISCUSSION
The lead opinion would affirm this case on the ground that
the evidence, even if not admissible as a prior conviction under
RCM 1001(b)(3), was admissible as a personnel record under RCM
100(b)(2), and that any error in the failure to redact was
harmless. __ MJ at (2-3). Assuming the evidence came from a
properly maintained personnel record that was subject to
introduction for sentencing under Secretarial regulations, that
would answer only the question of whether the evidence could
have been introduced if it was otherwise admissible. It would
not answer the question that is at the heart of the case --
whether the unredacted records should have been used as a basis
for sentencing appellant. The latter question -- whether the
unredacted records should have been introduced -- was a matter
committed to the discretion of the military judge. As discussed
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United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
in Part I, supra, the rulings of the military judge on
sentencing evidence are particularly critical in view of the
military justice system’s reliance on lay members to adjudicate
the sentence in an adversarial setting. In this case, the
military judge ruled that the items of evidence at issue should
not be admitted without redactions because of the potential
prejudicial effect on appellant. Neither the lead opinion nor
the opinion of the lower court demonstrates that the military
judge abused his considerable discretion in reaching this
conclusion.
Despite the ruling of the military judge, the potentially
prejudicial information was introduced during the sentencing
proceeding with no corrective action at the trial level. There
were three distinct elements of appellant’s sentence -- a
punitive discharge, a year’s confinement, and total forfeitures.
Neither the lead opinion nor the opinion of the lower court
provides a substantial basis for concluding the uncharged
misconduct was so insignificant that the failure to redact had
no effect on any part of the sentence.
Appellant convinced the presiding judge at the trial of the
potential for prejudice, and the judge attempted to protect his
legitimate interests. We should ensure compliance with the
order of the military judge, which was designed to ensure the
basic fairness of the sentencing proceeding, by remanding this
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United States v. Douglas, No. 01-0777/AF
case for a rehearing on sentence. If the prosecution elected to
offer the redacted records at such a rehearing, the military
judge could make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to
whether the redacted records fall within the category of records
potentially admissible under RCM 1001(b)(2), whether the records
should be admitted into evidence, and whether any further
redactions should be made in such records.
14
