Filed: Apr. 19, 2002
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: Army, Civ.ruled in Woodricks favor on his contract claims.Parisi makes clear that there are many, reasons why it would be desirable if the, validity of Woodrick's enlistment, contract could be adjudicated in a, Federal District Court, rather than, before a court-martial.Woodrick v. Divich, supra.
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
David A. BECK, Captain
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 02-8010
Crim. App. No. 20020001
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Submitted January 28, 2002
Decided April 19, 2002
Counsel
For Appellant: Eugene R. Fidell and Debra D. Cooper (on
brief).
For Appellee: Colonel Steven T. Salata, Lieutenant Colonel
Paul H. Turney, and Captain Mark A. Visger (on brief).
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Beck, No. 02-8010/AR
PER CURIAM:
Appellant filed a writ-appeal petition for review of
the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision
on application for extraordinary relief in the nature of a
writ of prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, and stay of
proceedings. Additionally, appellant filed a motion for
stay of court-martial proceedings. Appellant argues his
order to active duty in the United States Army is void, and
he bases this argument on the conclusion that he was
fraudulently induced into signing a contract for service in
the Army. Appellant is also litigating this matter in the
United States District Court. See Beck v. Secretary of the
Army, Civ. No. 01-0529 (D.D.C.).
Citing Woodrick v. Divich, 24 M.J. 147 (CMA 1987),
appellant contends this Court should stay his court-martial
proceedings pending a resolution of the civil matter,
dismiss the court-martial charge against him, and direct
his discharge from the Army. We disagree. In Woodrick,
“‘[t]he district court, after a de novo review, accepted
the Magistrate’s findings and recommendations and denied
the Air Force’s motion to dismiss for’ failure to exhaust
remedies, concluding that a court-martial ‘could not
determine the merits of’ his ‘contractual claims.’ It also
ruled in Woodrick’s favor on his contract claims.”
Id. at
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United States v. Beck, No. 02-8010/AR
149, quoting Woodrick v. Hungerford,
800 F.2d 1413, 1415
(5th Cir. 1986). Thereafter, the Court of Appeals reversed
on the basis that Woodrick had not exhausted his military
remedies. 800 F.2d at 1418.
As a matter of comity given the posture of the
Woodrick case when it arrived at this Court, we refused to
resolve the merits of Woodrick’s claims because the
District Court previously had adjudicated the matter,
holding that Woodrick’s contract for military service was
void. This Court did, however, grant a stay of proceedings
pending further review in the District Court, so Woodrick
could obtain a reinstatement of the favorable District
Court ruling on his claim of an invalid contract. 24 M.J. at
155.
Issuance of an extraordinary writ staying court-
martial proceedings requires the careful exercise of
discretion. When a writ petition asks us to stay a court-
martial in deference to proceedings in a court outside the
military justice system, it would be inappropriate to issue
a stay absent a persuasive ruling from such a court or
similar prudential considerations.
The writ-appeal petition and motion for stay of court-
martial proceedings are denied.
3
United States v. Beck, 02-8010,AR
SULLIVAN, Senior Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in
part):
I agree with the majority’s decision to deny appellant’s
requests to both dismiss the court-martial charges against him
for a lack of jurisdiction and direct his discharge from the
United States Army. Such action is entirely consistent with this
Court’s opinion in Woodrick v. Divich, 24 M.J. 147, 155 (CMA 1987).
I disagree, however, with the majority’s decision to deny a
stay of court-martial proceedings until the pending proceedings
in federal district court are resolved. Such a stay was granted
in Woodrick v. Divich, supra, even though that petitioner’s civil
cause of action, along with the trial court’s factual findings in
his favor, had been dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Based on
principles of comity and the probable refiling of his action,
this Court granted a stay of “court-martial proceedings until
Woodrick’s claims have been finally adjudicated in the civilian
courts.”
Id. at 153. These same principles of comity should
also apply in Beck’s case, where the civil case is actually
pending.
This Court spoke to this precise issue in Woodrick v. Divich,
as follows:
Whether, as in [Parisi v. Davisdson,
405 U.S. 34 (1972)], a claim is made for
United States v. Beck, No. 02-8010/AR
release from military status by reason of
conscientious objection or whether
instead the claim is for release because
of a material misrepresentation, a court-
martial is not the most convenient forum
to handle the matter. These tribunals
“are not convened to review and rectify
administrative denials of” release from
active duty. Id. 405 U.S. at
42, 92
S. Ct. at 820. Furthermore, the issues of
contract law involved here are not those
in which courts-martial “have a special
competence.” Id. at 39 n.
6, 92 S. Ct. at
819 n.6.
Parisi makes clear that there are many
reasons why it would be desirable if the
validity of Woodrick's enlistment
contract could be adjudicated in a
Federal District Court, rather than
before a court-martial. Moreover, it
seems clear that, under the principles of
comity adverted to in Parisi, the
military justice system properly may
defer to proceedings in the Federal
civilian courts. Just as the Supreme
Court urged Federal civilian courts to
“give careful consideration to the
appropriate demands of comity,” id. at
46, 92 S.Ct. at 822, when related
proceedings are pending before courts-
martial, the military justice system
should consider the “demands of comity”
in connection with related proceedings in
a Federal District Court.
Id.
The majority denies the request for a stay of the court-
martial proceedings on the basis that the federal district court
has not yet made a persuasive ruling in the civil action and the
absence of “similar prudential considerations.” _____ MJ at (3).
It is uncontroverted, however, that the district court is
prepared to go forward and itself suggested to appellant that he
seek a stay of the court-martial proceedings before it further
2
United States v. Beck, No. 02-8010/AR
acts in his case. The principles of comity delineated in
Woodrick v. Divich, supra, strongly suggest that this Court
should not act in a way which fosters competing civilian and
military legal proceedings.
In sum, I would hold that appellant’s writ-appeal petition
should be resolved on the basis of this Court’s decision in
Woodrick v. Divich, supra. Accordingly, following our Court’s
precedent, I would vote to grant the requested stay.
3
