Filed: Mar. 05, 2003
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: fraudulent separation.predicate to proceeding on the abated charges.on the fraudulent separation charge.trial ruling in Appellants second court-martial.On 16 August 2001, [Appellant] failed to appear, at his Article 32, UCMJ, hearing [on the original, charges].Criminal Appeals, 57 M.J.
IN THE CASE OF
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Keith R. BREVARD, Sr., Sergeant
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 03-6002
Crim. App. No. 20020711
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued February 4, 2003
Decided March 5, 2003
EFFRON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
CRAWFORD, C.J., GIERKE, BAKER, and ERDMANN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Fansu Ku (argued); Colonel Robert D.
Teetsel, Lieutenant Colonel E. Allen Chandler, Jr., and
David Court, Esquire (on brief); Major Jeanette K. Stone.
For Appellee: Captain Mark A. Visger (argued); Lieutenant
Colonel Lauren B. Leeker and Lieutenant Colonel Paul H.
Turney (on brief).
Military Judges: Donna L. Wilkins and Stephen R. Henley
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Brevard, No. 03-6002/AR
Judge EFFRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
Charges against Appellant have been referred to two separate
courts-martial. The first court-martial, which has been abated,
involves charges that Appellant committed a variety of offenses
against persons, property, and military authority. The second
court-martial, which is the subject of the present appeal,
involves a separate charge of fraudulent separation, in
violation of Article 83, Uniform Code of Military Justice
[hereinafter UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. § 883 (2002). The military judge
at Appellant’s second court-martial dismissed the charge of
fraudulent separation on the grounds that the Government had
violated Appellant’s right to a speedy trial under Article 10,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 810 (2002). Upon appeal by the Government
under Article 62, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 862 (2002), the Army Court
of Criminal Appeals reversed the military judge’s ruling
dismissing the fraudulent separation charge, thereby allowing
the second court-martial to proceed. We granted Appellant’s
petition for review and hold that the military judge erred in
ruling that there was a speedy trial violation. Accordingly,
the record of trial is returned to the military judge so that
Appellant’s second court-martial may proceed on the charge of
fraudulent separation.
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United States v. Brevard, No. 03-6002/AR
I. BACKGROUND
A. Appellant's First Court-Martial
On February 13, 2002, Appellant was arraigned at a general
court-martial on charges alleging desertion, disobeying a lawful
order from his superior commissioned officer, damage to military
property, larceny, assault on a noncommissioned officer,
obstruction of justice, and false swearing, in violation of
Articles 85, 90, 108, 121, 128, and 134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 885,
890, 908, 921, 928, 934 (2002). Judge Donna Wilkins presided.
Before entering pleas, the defense moved to dismiss all charges,
contending that the court-martial did not have personal
jurisdiction over Appellant because he had been discharged from
the Army on August 11, 2001. See Article 2(a)(1), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 802(a)(1). Citing United States v. Melanson, 53 M.J. 1
(C.A.A.F. 2000), the Government responded that Appellant had not
received a lawful discharge because he had not received his
discharge certificate, he had not received a final accounting of
his final pay, and he had not completed the required
administrative clearing process.
After extensive litigation of the jurisdictional issue, the
military judge ruled by a preponderance of the evidence that
Appellant had been discharged upon expiration of his term of
service when Appellant successfully made fraudulent
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United States v. Brevard, No. 03-6002/AR
representations to separation officials that enabled him to
overcome steps that had been taken by his command to prevent his
discharge. In light of evidence that the discharge had been
obtained by fraud and upon consideration of applicable
legislation, she further ruled that the Government could not
proceed on the charges pending before that court-martial unless
the Government obtained a conviction for fraudulent separation.
See Article 3(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 803(b) (2002); United States
v. Reid, 46 M.J. 236 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
The military judge then abated the proceedings. Trial
counsel and the military judge agreed on the record that the
Government had three options at that point: (1) request
reconsideration of the military judge's ruling, (2) appeal that
ruling to the Court of Criminal Appeals under Article 62, or (3)
endeavor to convict Appellant of fraudulent separation as a
predicate to proceeding on the abated charges. The military
judge added that she would reconvene the court-martial at a
future date to assess actions taken in response to her ruling.
She explained, "That way I keep track of this case and it's not
sitting out there."
The Government did not seek reconsideration of the military
judge’s ruling, nor did it perfect an appeal of that ruling
under Article 62. Although the Government began the appeal
process by filing a timely written notice of appeal, the
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United States v. Brevard, No. 03-6002/AR
Government's Appellate Division "elect[ed] not to appeal" after
the Government "fail[ed] to timely file all necessary
documentation" in the Court of Criminal Appeals. United States
v. Brevard, 57 M.J. 789, 792 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2002).
B. Appellant's Second Court-Martial
On April 1, 2002, a charge of fraudulent separation in
violation of Article 83 was preferred against Appellant. On May
15, that charge was referred to a court-martial, Appellant’s
second court-martial. The fraudulent separation charge was the
sole charge referred to the second court-martial.
The military judge assigned to Appellant’s second court-
martial was Judge Wilkins, the same military judge who presided
at the first court-martial. Appellant was arraigned before the
second court-martial on May 23, 2002. In the course of
explaining Appellant’s rights to counsel, Judge Wilkins referred
to the first court-martial, emphasizing that the second court-
martial for fraudulent separation was “a new and separate
trial." While indicating confidence that it was appropriate for
her to preside over Appellant’s arraignment, she added that,
following arraignment, she would arrange for transfer of the
responsibility for the case to a different military judge.
Appellant’s second court-martial resumed on June 10, with
Judge Henley presiding. After Appellant moved to dismiss the
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United States v. Brevard, No. 03-6002/AR
fraudulent separation charge based on lack of speedy trial, the
parties presented evidence, and the military judge took the
matter under advisement.
When the session pursuant to Article 39(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§§ 839(a)(2002), reconvened on July 3, the military judge ruled
that Appellant's speedy trial rights under Article 10 had been
violated, and he dismissed the fraudulent separation charge with
prejudice. According to the military judge, the Government’s
decision to proceed on the larceny-related charges rather than
on fraudulent separation at Appellant’s first court-martial “was
based on a grossly negligent and unreasonable interpretation of
both the undisputed facts and the existing case law,” and the
Government “could have proceeded to trial on the fraudulent
separation charge much sooner than 1 April 2002 but negligently
chose not to do so."
C. The Government Appeal of the Speedy Trial Ruling at
Appellant's Second Court-Martial
The Government filed a timely appeal under Article 62 of
the military judge’s dismissal of the fraudulent separation
charge at Appellant’s second court-martial. The Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed the dismissal of the charge, holding
that the military judge erred in concluding that the Government
was grossly negligent and unreasonable in not proceeding first
on the fraudulent separation charge. Brevard, 57 M.J. at 794.
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United States v. Brevard, No. 03-6002/AR
II. DISCUSSION
A. Review of the Speedy Trial Ruling at Appellant's Second
Court-Martial
In Appellant’s first court-martial, the military judge made
a jurisdictional ruling that Appellant had been discharged, and
the Government did not appeal or seek reconsideration of that
ruling. The question of whether Appellant was discharged as a
matter of law or fact is not the subject of the present appeal,
which addresses the validity of the military judge’s speedy
trial ruling in Appellant’s second court-martial. The issue
before us is whether the Government, in not first proceeding
against Appellant on the fraudulent separation charge, failed to
act with reasonable diligence for speedy trial purposes. See
United States v. Cooper, 58 M.J. 54, 60 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
Although the present case does not call upon us to review
the validity of the military judge’s ruling as to Appellant’s
discharge in the first trial, it is appropriate for us to look
at the facts concerning the discharge issue in the first trial
to determine whether the Government was reasonably diligent in
the manner in which it chose to proceed. Under these
circumstances, we may consider whether the Government had a
reasonable, good faith belief that Appellant had not been
lawfully or fraudulently discharged when it decided to proceed
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United States v. Brevard, No. 03-6002/AR
initially on the underlying charges rather than on the issue of
fraudulent separation.
In Melanson, this Court stated that one of the conditions
precedent to a lawful discharge is that "the member's final pay
or a substantial part of that pay is ready for delivery to the
member.” 53 M.J. at 2 (citations and internal quotations
omitted). In that regard, we note the following facts from the
record of trial in Appellant’s first court-martial, as outlined
by the court below:
[T]he installation-level Finance personnel computed an
estimate of [Appellant’s] final pay on a Separations
Worksheet and reviewed the results with him . . . .
On 16 August 2001, [Appellant] failed to appear
at his Article 32, UCMJ, hearing [on the original
charges]. Later that day, at trial counsel's request,
the Finance commander directed no further processing
of [Appellant’s] final pay. Installation-level
Finance had not yet conducted their required computer
check with the Department of Defense Finance and
Accounting Service (DFAS) to determine if [Appellant]
owed money to the government. Moreover, the
installation-level Finance auditor had not yet
conducted the final audit before payment of 80% of
[Appellant’s] pay. An authorizing official at
installation-level did not approve any payments to
[Appellant], and no money was, in fact, transferred or
deposited into [Appellant’s] bank account until after
he returned to military control.
Id. at 791 (footnote omitted).
We need not reach the question in the present appeal of
whether Appellant was lawfully or fraudulently discharged.
Likewise, we need not decide whether, or in what manner,
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United States v. Brevard, No. 03-6002/AR
Melanson might apply to the present case. The facts outlined by
the court below demonstrate that the Government had a
reasonable, good faith basis, in light of Melanson, for
proceeding on the basis that Appellant had not been discharged.
Under these circumstances, the Government did not violate its
reasonable diligence responsibilities when it decided to proceed
against Appellant in the first trial without initially obtaining
a fraudulent separation conviction. Accordingly, the military
judge in Appellant’s second court-martial erred in dismissing
the fraudulent separation charge for a speedy trial violation.
B. Status of the Pending Courts-Martial
Appellant’s second court-martial may proceed on the charge
of fraudulent separation, the only charge pending before that
court-martial. That court does not have jurisdiction over
Appellant’s first court-martial, a distinct legal proceeding.
Accordingly, we do not agree with the suggestion by the Court of
Criminal Appeals, 57 M.J. at 794 n.15, that the military judge
in the second case may take action with respect to the charges
pending in the first trial.
The posture of Appellant’s first court-martial is that the
trial on the merits stands abated -- a posture from which the
Government did not seek recourse either through a motion for
reconsideration or through an interlocutory appeal under Article
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United States v. Brevard, No. 03-6002/AR
62. Although it was appropriate for the Court of Criminal
Appeals to consider matters from the first trial for the limited
purpose of reviewing the speedy trial ruling in the second
trial, the Court of Criminal Appeals in an appeal from a ruling
at Appellant’s second court-martial did not have jurisdiction
over Appellant’s first court-martial -- a separate trial. See
Article 62(a)(1).
We express no opinion as to the validity of the rulings
made in that first court-martial, in which the trial on the
merits remains abated. In ruling on the question of law as to
whether the court-martial had jurisdiction over Appellant, the
military judge at Appellant’s first court-martial determined by
a preponderance of the evidence that Appellant had been
discharged. Whether Appellant committed the offense of
procuring a fraudulent separation is a matter that must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt at Appellant's second court-
martial. See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2002
ed.), Part IV, para. 7.b(2). The issue of what, if any, action
may be taken with respect to the charges in the first court-
martial is not before this Court in the present appeal.
III. DECISION
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals, which reversed the military judge’s dismissal of the
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United States v. Brevard, No. 03-6002/AR
fraudulent separation charge, is affirmed. The record of trial
of Appellant’s second court-martial is returned to the Judge
Advocate General of the Army for remand to the court-martial.
Appellant’s second court-martial may proceed on the fraudulent
separation charge in a manner not inconsistent with this
opinion.
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