Filed: Jun. 10, 2004
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: In, short, although the appellant did not supply the, adjectives real or actual, and although the judge, defined pornography in pre-Free Speech Coalition, terms, this Court inferred from the language the, appellant did use – young females and minors –, that the images involved actual minors.
IN THE CASE OF
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Robert L. MASON, Jr., Major
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 02-0849
Crim. App. No. 34394
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued March 2, 2004
Decided June 10, 2004
ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
GIERKE, EFFRON, and BAKER, JJ., joined. CRAWFORD, C.J., filed a
separate opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part.
Counsel
For Appellant: Major Rachel E. Vanlandingham (argued); Colonel
Beverly B. Knott, Major Terry L. McElyea, and Captain Jennifer
K. Martwick (on brief).
For Appellee: Major Shannon J. Kennedy (argued); Colonel
LeEllen Coacher, Lieutenant Colonel Robert V. Combs, Lieutenant
Colonel Lance B. Sigmon, and Captain Lane A. Thurgood (on
brief).
Military Judge: Thomas G. Crossan, Jr.
This opinion is subject to editorial correction before final publication.
United States v. Mason, Jr., No. 02-0849/AF
Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Major Robert L. Mason, Jr., entered guilty pleas and was
convicted by a general court-martial of violating a lawful
general order, engaging in conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman and knowingly receiving child pornography in violation
of Articles 92, 133 and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice
[UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. §§ 892, 933 and 934 (2000), respectively. He
was sentenced by the military judge to a dismissal, confinement
for two years and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. In
accordance with the terms of a pretrial agreement, the convening
authority approved only so much of the sentence as provided for
dismissal and six months’ confinement.
Mason assigned several errors in his appeal to the Air
Force Court of Criminal Appeals, including a claim that his
guilty plea to the Article 134 charge was improvident in light
of the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). The Court of Criminal Appeals
reviewed Mason's claims, rejected all of them and affirmed his
conviction and sentence.
Mason petitioned this Court for review of the Court of
Criminal Appeals' decision and we granted review of the
following assigned Issue I and specified review of Issue II:
I. WHETHER APPELLANT'S PLEAS OF GUILTY TO OFFENSES UNDER
18 U.S.C. SECTION 2252A WERE INVOLUNTARY BECAUSE HE HAD AN
INCOMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF THE OFFENSES WHEN THE MILITARY
JUDGE EXPLAINED THE OFFENSES USING THE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
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United States v. Mason, Jr., No. 02-0849/AF
VAGUE AND OVERBROAD DEFINITIONS OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
CONTAINED IN 18 U.S.C. SECTION 2256.
II. IN THE EVENT THAT APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEAS ARE
IMPROVIDENT TO CHARGE III AND ITS SPECIFICATION UNDER
CLAUSE 3 OF ARTICLE 134, WHETHER HIS PLEA IS PROVIDENT AS
TO A LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE UNDER CLAUSE 1 OR CLAUSE 2 OF
ARTICLE 134 IN LIGHT OF ASHCROFT V. FREE SPEECH COALITION,
535 U.S. 234 (2002) AND UNITED STATES V. O'CONNOR,
58 M.J.
450 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
We hold that while Mason's guilty plea to the clause 3, Article
134 offense was improvident, his plea was provident to a lesser-
included offense under clauses 1 and 2 of Article 134.
BACKGROUND
Mason served as a contracting officer assigned to the
Defense Supply Center Columbus (DSCC), an arm of the Defense
Logistics Agency. The DSCC routinely handles highly sensitive
and classified procurement matters, including multi-million
dollar contracts. It is primarily staffed with over 2,500
civilian employees, but is also staffed by a small contingent of
military members, of which Mason was a part.
The DSCC monitored its employees' access to the Internet
and during the course of that general monitoring process, Mason
was identified as having accessed inappropriate websites.
Subsequent monitoring and investigation disclosed that Mason had
utilized two different DSCC computers to (1) view and/or
download from the Internet various items with pornographic and
obscene images or language; (2) participate in teen "chat rooms"
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and engage in discussions of a sexual nature; and (3) receive
images of child pornography.
Mason was ultimately charged under Article 92 with three
specifications of violating a general regulation pertaining to
use of government computers, under Article 133 with one
specification for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman
based on certain activities that he engaged in on the computers1
and under clause 3 of Article 134 with one specification of
violating the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA),
18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2000).2
The present appeal concerns the providence of Mason's
guilty plea to the Article 134 charge. For this Court to reject
a guilty plea on appellate review, the record of trial must show
a substantial basis in law and fact for questioning the plea.
United States v. Jordan, 57 M.J. 236, 238 (C.A.A.F. 2002)(citing
United States v. Prater,
32 M.J. 433, 436 (C.M.A. 1991)).
DISCUSSION
A. The Providence Inquiry and Record of Trial
1
This specification involved Mason's conduct in participating in
teen chat rooms on the Internet and in storing, viewing,
displaying, or processing various items on both government
computers, including pornography, erotic stories containing
obscene language and certain "thumbnail" images of naked
children.
2
This specification involved a set of images specifically
characterized as "child pornography" and distinct from the ones
referred to in the Article 133 charge.
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United States v. Mason, Jr., No. 02-0849/AF
Under the clause 3 Article 134 specification, Mason was
charged with a violation of the CPPA. The military judge
explained that the statutory offense involved the knowing
receipt of child pornography that had been transported in
interstate or foreign commerce and was "assimilated into the
[UCMJ] as another crime or offense not capital" under Article
134. The military judge advised Mason that the definitions for
the CPPA offense were found in 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2000) and went
on to define numerous terms, specifically including the
alternative definitions of "child pornography" under §§
2256(8)(A)-(D):
Child pornography means any visual depiction, including any
photograph, film, video picture, or computer, or computer
generated image or picture, whether made or produced by
electronic, mechanical or other means for [sic] sexually
explicit conduct where: a) the production of such visual
depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct; b) such visual depiction is or appears to
be of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; c)
such visual depiction has been created, adapted or modified
to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in
sexually explicit conduct; or, d) such visual depiction is
advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed
in such a manner that conveys the impression that the
material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
In addition to advising Mason of the definitional elements
of the CPPA offense, the military judge included what he termed
a “fourth element”:
Fourth -- and I instruct on this only in this case if it is
determined that your plea is improvident on the charged
offense, since the crime has been charged as an other crime
or offense not capital -- such conduct was of a nature to
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bring discredit upon the armed forces or was to the conduct
[sic] of good order and discipline in the armed forces.
He went on to specifically ask Mason if he understood that
"fourth element" and why it had been included. After consulting
with his defense counsel, Mason answered in the affirmative and
indicated that he understood the element required that "his
conduct must also be such to bring discredit upon the Air
Force." The military judge then further explained to Mason why
it had been included:
Now, it's my position with the charged offense as it is
charged in Charge III, that is not an element of the
charged offense. However, in the abundance of caution, I
add that as an element in case for some reason the
appellate courts, if this case goes to the appeals system,
determines your plea to the. . . [CPPA] charge is
improvident, it would find that it was service discrediting
or armed forces discrediting. That is why I have added
that element.
Mason indicated his understanding as to why that element
had been added, indicated that he had no questions about any of
the elements and acknowledged that he believed and admitted that
the elements and definitions he had been given, taken together,
correctly described what he had done. He explained to the
military judge that he had viewed several pictures of "minors
doing lascivious poses" on his government computers and that he
understood the movement of those images over the Internet was
considered movement through interstate commerce. He admitted
during his discussion with the military judge and in his
stipulation of fact that the images were "child pornography."
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United States v. Mason, Jr., No. 02-0849/AF
He also admitted during his discussion with the military judge
that his conduct was of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces or was to the prejudice of good order and
discipline.
B. The Impact of Free Speech Coalition and O'Connor
The granted issue asks whether Mason's plea to the charged
offense under clause 3 of Article 134 is provident in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Free Speech Coalition and our
subsequent decision in O'Connor. The specified issue asks
whether, in the event of a negative answer to the granted issue,
Mason's guilty plea can nonetheless be upheld as provident to a
lesser-included offense under clauses 1 or 2 of Article 134. We
turn first to the granted issue.
1. The Providence of the Plea Under Clause 3
As explained to him by the military judge, Mason's conduct
in receiving "child pornography" was charged as a "clause 3"
offense under Article 134, with the "crime or offense not
capital" being a violation of the CPPA. Thus, the criminal
nature of Mason's conduct, as charged, derived from violating an
independent federal criminal statute proscribing the receipt of
"child pornography." O'Connor, 58 M.J. at 452.
The military judge defined the elemental term "child
pornography" to Mason by using portions of its statutory
definition that were later struck down by the Supreme Court in
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United States v. Mason, Jr., No. 02-0849/AF
Free Speech Coalition. As occurred in O'Connor, the military
judge's explanation to Mason of the elements of the CPPA offense
utilized terms that were constitutionally overbroad. The
judge’s explanation made specific reference to visual depictions
that "appear to be" of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct and materials that were pandered in a manner that
"conveys the impression" that they include images of minors
engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Finally, as was also the
case in O'Connor, the record here contains no clear focus or
discussion on those aspects of the CPPA not affected by the
Supreme Court's ruling, i.e., "actual" child pornography under
18 U.S.C. §§ 2256(8)(A)-(B) or "computer morphed" images of an
identifiable minor under § 2256(8)(C). O'Connor, 58 M.J. at
452.
Under our decision in O'Connor, a provident guilty plea to
a violation of the CPPA must reflect that the accused violated
those portions of the statute not affected by the Supreme
Court's ruling in Free Speech Coalition. 58 M.J. at 454. The
absence of any focus on or discussion concerning those aspects
of the statute in the present record coupled with the use of the
unconstitutionally overbroad definition during Mason's plea
colloquy render this case indistinguishable from O'Connor.
Accordingly, we cannot view Mason's plea of guilty to violating
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the CPPA, and thus to violating clause 3 of Article 134, as
provident.
2. The Providence of the Plea Under Clauses 1 and 2
That conclusion leads us to the specified issue -- can
Mason's guilty plea nonetheless be viewed as provident to a
lesser-included offense under clauses 1 and/or 2 of Article 134?
As noted in O'Connor, we have recognized in the past that an
improvident plea to a clause 3 offense based on a federal child
pornography statute may be upheld as a provident plea to a
lesser-included offense under clause 2 of Article 134. 58 M.J.
at 454 (citing United States v. Augustine,
53 M.J. 95 (C.A.A.F.
2000); United States v. Sapp,
53 M.J. 90 (C.A.A.F. 2000)).
In O’Connor, we ultimately concluded that the guilty plea
could not be viewed as provident to a lesser-included offense
under the approach embodied in Sapp and Augustine. While
O'Connor had stipulated to the service-discrediting character of
his conduct, there was no discussion of that element by the
military judge during the plea inquiry. Both Sapp and Augustine
involved admissions by the accused during the plea inquiry as to
the service-discrediting character of their conduct and we
characterized those discussions as demonstrating that the
accused "clearly understood the nature of the prohibited
conduct." 58 M.J. at 454 (quoting
Sapp, 53 M.J. at 92).
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United States v. Mason, Jr., No. 02-0849/AF
The plea colloquy in O'Connor was focused solely on "the
nature of the prohibited conduct" under the CPPA, without any
discussion or acknowledgement of the criminal nature of the
conduct deriving alternatively (and independently) from its
character as service-discrediting or prejudicial to good order
and discipline. 58 M.J. at 455. Absent any discussion with the
military judge as to how his conduct might be criminal under
clause 1 or 2 as distinct from criminal under clause 3, we could
not view O'Connor's guilty plea as provident to a lesser-
included offense under clause 2.
The record here is clearly distinguishable from O'Connor in
terms of the discussion between Mason and the military judge
concerning the character of his conduct as service-discrediting
and prejudicial to good order and discipline. The military
judge openly explained that those were not elements of the
"crime or offense not capital" that Mason was charged with under
clause 3 and explained why he was including the additional
element. Mason indicated his understanding as to why the
element had been added. In the context of his explanations that
he had viewed pictures of "minors doing lascivious poses" and
the images of "child pornography" on his government computer,
Mason then went on to affirmatively admit to the military judge
that his conduct in doing so was both service-discrediting and
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United States v. Mason, Jr., No. 02-0849/AF
to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed
forces.
The record here thus contains what was missing in O'Connor
and was present in both Sapp and Augustine. The plea colloquy
between the military judge and Mason demonstrates that he
"clearly understood the nature of the prohibited conduct" in
terms of that conduct being service-discrediting and prejudicial
to good order and discipline. O'Connor, 58 M.J. at 455. Those
clause 1 and clause 2 elements were explained to him as a basis
for finding his conduct criminal apart from clause 3 and his
discussions with and admissions to the military judge were made
in that context.
Absent some other distinguishing factor, we could deem
Mason's guilty plea provident as to a lesser-included offense
under clause 1 and clause 2 under the principles embodied in
Sapp and Augustine. We recognized in O'Connor, however, that
there is a distinguishing factor at play here: the impact of
Free Speech Coalition and its creation of "a constitutional
dimension that was not at issue in Sapp or Augustine." 58 M.J.
at 454.
That constitutional dimension flows from the Supreme
Court's extension of First Amendment protection to certain
depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct,
i.e., "virtual" as opposed to "actual" images. Id. at 454-55.
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United States v. Mason, Jr., No. 02-0849/AF
We expressly acknowledged in O'Connor, but did not answer, the
question as to whether, in the wake of Free Speech Coalition,
the possession, receipt or distribution of images of minors
engaging in sexually explicit conduct (regardless of their
status as "actual" or "virtual") could constitute service-
discrediting conduct for purposes of Article 134.
Id. at 455.
Such inquiry must necessarily be undertaken on a case-by-case
basis.
In analyzing this constitutional dimension, the ultimate
question is whether the status of the images in the present case
as "virtual" or "actual" is of consequence in the context of
assessing the providence of Mason's guilty plea under clauses 1
and 2. We conclude that it is not. The receipt or possession
of "virtual" child pornography can, like "actual" child
pornography, be service-discrediting or prejudicial to good
order and discipline. Even if we were to assume that the
specific images that serve as the basis for Mason's "child
pornography" charge are "virtual" in nature, this still involves
a commissioned officer of the United States Air Force receiving
and viewing such images on a government computer in his
workplace. Under those circumstances, the distinction between
"actual" child pornography and "virtual" child pornography does
not alter the character of Mason's conduct as service-
discrediting or prejudicial to good order and discipline.
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United States v. Mason, Jr., No. 02-0849/AF
Mason stipulated to a sexual maturity assessment of the
images at issue here as depicting children between the ages of
12 and 16. He acknowledged to the military judge that the
images depicted "minors doing lascivious poses" and constituted
"child pornography." While the issue as to whether the images
are "virtual" or "actual" may have a potentially dispositive
effect in prosecutions under the CPPA in both civilian and
military settings, it is not inherently dispositive of their
impact on the esteem of the armed forces or good order and
discipline. Those are the yardsticks by which the criminality
of conduct under clauses 1 and 2 are measured. As the Supreme
Court recognized:
While the members of the military are not excluded
from the protections granted by the First Amendment, the
different character of the military community and of the
military mission requires a different application of those
protections. The fundamental necessity for obedience, and
the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may
render permissible within the military that which would be
constitutionally impermissible outside it.
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974). Even assuming the
images at issue here are “virtual,” Mason's conduct in receiving
those images on his government computer can constitutionally be
subjected to criminal sanction under the uniquely military
offenses embodied in clauses 1 and 2 of Article 134.
Accordingly, we answer the specified Issue II in the
affirmative and conclude that neither Free Speech Coalition nor
our subsequent decision in O'Connor provide a substantial basis
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United States v. Mason, Jr., No. 02-0849/AF
in law or fact for questioning the providence of Mason's guilty
plea to a lesser-included offense under clauses 1 and 2 of
Article 134.
CONCLUSION
The specification of Charge III is amended to read as
follows:
In that MAJOR ROBERT L. MASON, JR., United States Air
Force, 88th Mission Support Squadron, Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, Ohio, did, at or near Defense Supply Center,
Columbus, Ohio, on divers occasions between on or about 8
July 1998 and on or about 2 November 1999, knowingly
receive one or more images of child pornography that had
been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A.
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals is affirmed as to Charge III and its specification as
amended, as well as to the remaining Charges and their
specifications and the sentence.
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United States v. Mason, Jr., 02-0849/AF
CRAWFORD, Chief Judge (dissenting in part and concurring in part):
Because I agree that Appellant’s plea was provident to a
lesser-included offense under clauses 1 and 2 of Article 134,
Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter UCMJ], 10 U.S.C.
§ 934 (2000), I concur in the majority’s affirmation of
Appellant’s conviction. Nevertheless, I disagree that
Appellant’s guilty plea was improvident to the clause 3, Article
134 offense.
First, Appellant waived the Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), issue by failing to address it
at trial.
When Appellant learned of his charge under Article
134, clause [3], for violating the Child Pornography
Prevention Act (CPPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2000), he
neither took exception to the charge generally, nor
alleged that the basis for the charge – the CPPA – was
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. In so doing,
Appellant cannot now be afforded relief on the very
grounds he himself failed to raise, and therefore
waived.
United States v. O’Connor, 58 M.J. 450, 456 (C.A.A.F. 2003)
(Crawford, C.J., dissenting).
Moreover, the record establishes Appellant’s understanding
that the pornographic images based on which he was convicted
depicted actual minors.
When evaluating the providence of a guilty plea,
“[r]ather than focusing on a technical listing of the
elements of an offense, this Court looks at the
context of the entire record to determine whether an
accused is aware of the elements, either explicitly or
United States v. Mason, Jr., 02-0849/AF
inferentially.” United States v. Redlinski, 58 M.J.
117 (C.A.A.F. 2002)(emphasis added). “[T]here need
only be ‘factual circumstances’ on the record ‘which
“objectively” support’ the guilty pleas, i.e., that
actual minors were in appellant’s pictures.” United
States v. James, 55 M.J. 297, 300 (C.A.A.F. 2001)
(quoting United States v. Shearer, 44 M.J. 330, 334
(C.A.A.F. 1996)).
In James, this Court considered the following
colloquy in evaluating the providence of the
appellant’s guilty plea to violating the pre-Free
Speech Coalition CPPA:
Q. The term “child pornography” [under the CPPA]
means any visual depiction . . . involv[ing] the
use of a minor engaging in sexual [sic] explicit
conduct. Such visual depiction is or appears to
be of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct[.]
. . . .
Q. Now, why do you believe that - as far as
describes those files - why you believe the files
to be described as child pornography?
A. Well, they depicted young females under the
age of eighteen, which as you stated, that they,
uh, they are minors. I believe that the pictures
depicted minors under the age of eighteen and at
least four contained minors engaged in sexual
activity.
. . . .
Q. Do you believe that one of those persons
involved in that conduct was a minor?
A. I believe the person in the picture was under
eighteen, yes, sir.
55 M.J. at 301 (emphasis added). The Court noted that
through these words, the appellant “admitted that
actual minors were in the charged pictures” and that
these admissions were “amply supported by the pictures
themselves.” Id. at 300-01. The Court then concluded
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United States v. Mason, Jr., 02-0849/AF
that “the factual circumstances reflected in the
record ‘objectively support’ appellant's guilty pleas
to possessing and transporting child pornography
depicting actual minors.” Id. (emphasis added). In
short, although the appellant did not supply the
adjectives “real” or “actual,” and although the judge
defined “pornography” in pre-Free Speech Coalition
terms, this Court inferred from the language the
appellant did use – “young females” and “minors” –
that the images involved actual minors. See
Redlinski, 58 M.J. at 117 (noting that providence may
be confirmed by the record inferentially).
Id. at 456-57.
In the instant case, Appellant admitted during the
providence inquiry that “[s]everal of the pictures [he’s] looked
at were child pornography, that is, minors doing lascivious
poses” and that the pictures he viewed on his computer were
“images of naked children.” Moreover, in his stipulation of
fact, Appellant listed the internet sites from which he obtained
child pornography. He then admitted as follows: “All of the
images listed directly above and as attached to this stipulation
of fact depict children who are between the ages of 12 and 16
according to a sexual maturity assessment.” The descriptive
terminology Appellant used – “naked children,” “minors,” and
“children who are between the ages of 12 and 16” – was very
similar to the terminology in James, particularly given the near
equivalency in meaning of the words “minor” and “child.” See
Black’s Law Dictionary 1011 (7th ed. 1999)(defining “minor” as
“[a] person who has not reached full legal age; a child or
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United States v. Mason, Jr., 02-0849/AF
juvenile”)(emphasis added). Finally, as in James and O’Connor,
the pictures attached to the record in this case amply support
Appellant’s awareness that the images involved actual minors.
For these reasons, I would hold Appellant’s plea provident
to the clause 3, Article 134 offense. In any event, I concur in
the majority’s result, as I would also hold Appellant’s plea
provident to a lesser-included offense under clauses 1 and 2 of
Article 134.
4
