Filed: May 27, 2004
Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2017
Summary: the service plan attached to the Family Courts May 7 order.Appellants wife to the Ward residence.At Ms. Wongs request, SSgt Walker came to the office. See Boyd, 27 M.J.the immunized testimony.Walker, that Appellant wanted to make a statement to NCIS.untainted by Appellants statement to Ms. Wong.
IN THE CASE OF
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Carson L. ALLEN, Staff Sergeant
U.S. Marine Corps, Appellant
No. 03-0691
Crim. App. No. 9800849
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued March 16, 2004
Decided May 27, 2004
EFFRON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
CRAWFORD, C.J., GIERKE, BAKER, and ERDMANN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Rolando R. Sanchez, USMC (argued);
Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Evans Jr., JAGC, USNR, and
Lieutenant Commander Eric J. McDonald, JAGC, USN.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Timothy E. Curley, JAGC, USNR
(argued); Lieutenant Frank L. Gatto, JAGC, USNR (on brief);
Colonel M. E. Finnie, USMC.
Military Judge: W. P. Hollerich
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Allen, No. 03-0691/MC
Judge EFFRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
At a general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted
members, Appellant was convicted, contrary to his pleas, of
maiming and assault with intent to commit grievous bodily harm,
in violation of Articles 124 and 128, Uniform Code of Military
Justice [hereinafter UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. §§ 924 and 928 (2000). He
was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 12
months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to
pay grade E-1. The convening authority approved the sentence as
adjudged, but deferred and suspended both the adjudged and
automatic forfeitures under specified conditions. The Navy-
Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the
findings were multiplicious, dismissed the assault conviction,
approved the conviction for maiming, and approved the sentence.
United States v. Allen, 59 M.J. 515 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2003).
On Appellant’s petition, we granted review of the following
issues:
I. WHETHER THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE COURT-MARTIAL’S
DECISION ADMITTING A STATEMENT DERIVED
FROM OTHER STATEMENTS COVERED BY A
GRANT OF IMMUNITY.
II. WHETHER THE DECISION TO PROSECUTE WAS
BASED ON STATEMENTS APPELLANT MADE
UNDER A GRANT OF IMMUNITY.
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
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United States v. Allen, No. 03-0691/MC
I. BACKGROUND
At the time of the events at issue in this appeal,
Appellant was a staff sergeant (SSgt) in the Marine Corps,
stationed in Hawaii. The findings of the court-martial were
based on injuries sustained by CJ, Appellant’s infant son.
A. THE INITIAL INJURY AND STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS
In late February and early March, 1996, Appellant’s wife
and CJ traveled to Baltimore, Maryland, while Appellant remained
in Hawaii. They returned to Hawaii on March 6. Later that
evening, Appellant and his wife brought CJ, who was then three
months old, to Kapiolani Medical Center in Hawaii. CJ was
transferred to Tripler Army Medical Center where he was treated
for injuries consistent with Shaken Baby Syndrome. Medical
personnel estimated that the injury probably occurred during the
period in which Appellant’s wife and CJ were in Baltimore and
Appellant was in Hawaii.
The Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) opened an
investigation into the incident. Based upon the initial medical
examination, NCIS viewed Appellant’s wife as the source of the
injury, and did not maintain an active investigation of
Appellant.
As a result of this incident, the Hawaii Department of
Human Services placed CJ in foster care and initiated civil
proceedings in Family Court under Hawaii’s Child Protective Act,
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United States v. Allen, No. 03-0691/MC
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 587-1 (2003). The court issued an order on
April 8 limiting Appellant’s wife to supervised contact with CJ.
The order also provided that Appellant would regain custody of
CJ, subject to a number of conditions. These conditions
included a requirement that Appellant’s wife “secure[] a
separate residence from [Appellant],” and that both Appellant
and his wife participate “in therapy services, including
parenting education, with Geraldine Wong, M.A.”
The April 8 order also stated that “[t]he protections of
[Haw. Rev. Stat.] § 587-42(a) are invoked on behalf of Mr. and
Mrs. Allen.” Under § 587-42(a),
[a]ny testimony by or other evidence
produced by a party in a child protective
proceeding under this chapter, which would
otherwise be unavailable, may be ordered by
the court to be inadmissible as evidence in
any other state civil or criminal action or
proceeding, if the court deems such an order
to be in the best interests of the child.
Appellant subsequently regained custody of CJ. Following a
hearing on May 7, the Family Court issued a further order,
attaching a service plan prepared by the Department of Human
Services and agreed to by Appellant and his wife. The service
plan provided that Appellant’s wife would participate in
“individual/family therapy with Gerry Wong,” that Appellant
would provide for the daily care of CJ, and that Appellant would
“attend therapy with Gerry Wong, M.A. when requested by Ms.
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United States v. Allen, No. 03-0691/MC
Wong.” The order stated that “all prior consistent orders shall
remain in full force and effect until further order,” and
directed the parties to return to court for a review hearing on
November 1, 1996.
B. THE SECOND INJURY
On August 8, CJ was hospitalized with serious injuries,
including a fractured skull and swelling of the brain.
Appellant explained to medical personnel that on the morning of
August 8, he had been carrying CJ in his arms when CJ arched his
back and fell onto the concrete floor. At that time, CJ was
eight months old, and Appellant was the sole custodian. The
most recent visit of Appellant’s wife to the family had been on
August 7.
While both Appellant and his wife were at the hospital,
they were approached by an NCIS agent. After consulting with an
attorney, they told the agent that they would not answer her
questions, but they would permit the agent to monitor their
conversations with the doctors and social workers at the
hospital.
The hospital convened a Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect
meeting on August 14. Appellant’s supervisor, Colonel Charles
Jackson, and NCIS Special Agent (SA) Bruce Warshawsky, attended
the meeting. The medical personnel who treated CJ stated that
the injuries were likely the result of non-accidental trauma,
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United States v. Allen, No. 03-0691/MC
and were not consistent with Appellant’s explanation that CJ had
fallen from his arms by accident. Appellant and his wife then
joined the meeting, and they were advised that CJ’s injuries
were consistent with Shaken Baby Syndrome.
Following the meeting, Colonel Jackson had a further
conversation with Appellant, and told him that the medical
personnel suspected that he had injured CJ by shaking him in an
abusive manner. As the discussion came to an end, Colonel
Jackson said to Appellant, “If your son dies, I believe they are
going to prosecute you for murder.” According to Colonel
Jackson, Appellant was visibly upset as a result of this
conversation.
C. THE INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS
On the evening of August 15, Appellant and his wife
attended a family counseling session with Ms. Wong pursuant to
the service plan attached to the Family Court’s May 7 order.
Appellant told Ms. Wong of the following sequence of events
concerning CJ. First, he placed CJ in bed with him, and fell
asleep. While sleeping, he dreamed that CJ had been taken from
him. When he awoke, he forgot that CJ was in the same bed.
Appellant went to check CJ’s crib, discovered that the crib was
empty, and panicked. Then he heard CJ cry. Appellant returned
to the bed, grabbed CJ, and shook him.
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United States v. Allen, No. 03-0691/MC
Appellant’s wife became upset upon hearing Appellant’s
narrative. Ms. Wong phoned a friend of Appellant’s wife, Carol
Ward, who came to Ms. Wong’s office and eventually drove
Appellant’s wife to the Ward residence. Before leaving,
Appellant’s wife advised Ms. Wong to call Appellant’s friend,
SSgt Samuel Walker, to assist Appellant.
At Ms. Wong’s request, SSgt Walker came to the office.
Appellant, who spoke privately to SSgt Walker, told SSgt Walker
that he had caused CJ’s injuries, and demonstrated how he had
shaken CJ. Appellant told SSgt Walker that he wanted to turn
himself in to NCIS. SSgt Walker asked Appellant if he would
prefer to wait until the following morning before turning
himself in to NCIS. Appellant indicated that he wanted to
surrender himself that night. Appellant and SSgt Walker then
returned to Ms. Wong’s office.
At that point, Ms. Wong contacted an official of the Hawaii
Child Protective Services, Ms. Kathleen Reeber, and told her
that Appellant had confessed. Ms. Reeber, who spoke with
Appellant by telephone, advised him that anything he said to her
would not be treated as confidential. She also suggested that
he might wish to consult with an attorney before speaking with
NCIS. While Appellant was on the phone with Ms. Reeber, SSgt
Walker pressed the mute button and told him that he should not
speak to a Child Protective Services official until he obtained
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United States v. Allen, No. 03-0691/MC
“some more advice.” Appellant rejected SSgt Walker’s
suggestion, stating that “everything [was] all right.” In the
course of his subsequent conversation with Ms. Reeber, Appellant
made a number of incriminating statements.
While Appellant was speaking to Ms. Reeber, SSgt Walker
attempted to contact his chain of command. SSgt Walker reached
his commander’s wife, who called Appellant’s commander, Colonel
Jackson. Colonel Jackson, who was concerned that Appellant
might harm himself, proceeded to Ms. Wong’s office. SSgt Walker
intercepted Colonel Jackson before he met with Appellant, and
informed him that Appellant wanted to surrender to NCIS.
Colonel Jackson then overheard a portion of Appellant’s
conversation with Ms. Wong. After walking into Ms. Wong’s
office, Colonel Jackson observed that Appellant appeared to be
“shell-shocked” and “emotional.” Appellant told Colonel Jackson
that it was all part of a bad dream. When Colonel Jackson
commented to Appellant that he “was going to go freely and turn
himself in or I was going to call the [Military Police],”
Appellant responded, “[Y]ou don’t have to do that, I know I did
this, and that I am not trying to deny it.”
Appellant told Colonel Jackson that he wanted to speak with
his wife before going to NCIS. Colonel Jackson, along with SSgt
Walker, drove Appellant to meet with his wife. During the
drive, Appellant repeated the incriminating remarks that he had
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United States v. Allen, No. 03-0691/MC
made earlier in the evening to Ms. Wong, Ms. Reeber, and SSgt
Walker. Soon after they arrived, a chaplain also arrived, along
with the wife of SSgt Walker’s commanding officer. Appellant
repeated his incriminating remarks to them, and demonstrated how
he had shaken CJ.
Eventually, Colonel Jackson and SSgt Walker drove Appellant
to the NCIS office, where Colonel Jackson told SA Warshawsky
that Appellant wanted to confess. SA Warshawsky took Appellant
into an interview room and administered a cleansing warning,
which informed Appellant that “any prior illegal admissions or
other improperly obtained evidence which incriminated [him could
not] be used against [him] in a trial by court-martial.” SA
Warshawsky also advised Appellant of his self-incrimination
rights under Article 31(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 831(b)(2000), and
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See Military Rule of
Evidence 305 [hereinafter M.R.E.]. Appellant indicated that he
understood both the cleansing warning and his right against
self-incrimination, and that he still desired to speak to NCIS.
He then made a detailed incriminating statement.
D. DEVELOPMENTS AT TRIAL
At a pretrial hearing, Appellant moved to suppress the
multiple statements that he made on the evening of August 15,
1996, citing among other protections, the privilege against
self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment and Article 31. He
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United States v. Allen, No. 03-0691/MC
contended that his statements to Ms. Wong did not constitute a
voluntary waiver of the privilege because he was compelled to
speak to her as a result of the order issued by the Family
Court, and that the other statements were derived from his
admissions to Ms. Wong. The military judge determined that the
state statute referenced in the Family Court order provided
Appellant with immunity for any statements that he made to Ms.
Wong, as well as any derivative statements. Based on that
determination, the military judge suppressed Appellant’s
statements to Ms. Wong, SSgt Walker, Ms. Reeber, Colonel
Jackson, and the chaplain, but concluded that the statement made
at the NCIS office following the cleansing warning by SA
Warshawsky was not tainted. At trial, Appellant’s statement to
SA Warshawsky was a key aspect of the prosecution’s evidence
that resulted in Appellant’s conviction.
II. DISCUSSION
A. IMMUNITY
The Government may not compel a person to make an
incriminating statement. U.S. Const. amend. V; Article 31,
UCMJ; M.R.E. 301. Through a grant of immunity coextensive with
the privilege against self-incrimination, the Government may
require a person to make a statement that would otherwise be
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United States v. Allen, No. 03-0691/MC
incriminating. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
As noted in M.R.E. 301(c)(1):
The minimum grant of immunity adequate to
overcome the privilege is that which under
[Rule for Courts-Martial] 704 or other
proper authority provides that neither the
testimony of the witness nor any evidence
obtained from that testimony may be used
against the witness at any subsequent trial
other than in a prosecution for perjury,
false swearing, the making of a false
official statement, or failure to comply
with an order to testify after the military
judge has ruled that the privilege may not
be asserted by reason of immunity.
If a person provides information under a grant of immunity,
the Government in a subsequent criminal prosecution must
affirmatively demonstrate “that the evidence it proposes to use
is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the
compelled testimony.” Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460. See United
States v. Boyd, 27 M.J. 82, 84 (C.M.A. 1988). A grant of
immunity by one jurisdiction within the federal structure, such
as a State, provides equivalent protections against use of the
information by other jurisdictions, such as another State or the
Federal Government. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New
York,
378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
The underlying principle furthered by a grant of
testimonial immunity is that the witness and the Government
should be left “in substantially the same position as if the
witness had claimed [the] privilege [against self-
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United States v. Allen, No. 03-0691/MC
incrimination].” Id. See Boyd, 27 M.J. at 84. We have
recently described this principle as “extract[ing] a ‘quid pro
quo’ from the Government for the information it compels from the
citizen.” United States v. Mapes, 59 M.J. 60, 67 (C.A.A.F.
2003). In addition to requiring that the Government abstain
from using the compelled information in any way to prosecute the
citizen, this “quid pro quo” also requires that “the Government,
if challenged in court, demonstrate that it has followed a
process to ensure it has not exploited the compelled
information.” Id.
The Government may not rely upon or use immunized testimony
in making the decision to prosecute. See United States v.
Olivero, 39 M.J. 246, 249 (C.M.A. 1994); United States v.
Kimble,
33 M.J. 284 (C.M.A. 1991). The burden is upon the
Government in such a case to demonstrate “by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the prosecutorial decision was untainted by
the immunized testimony.” Olivero, 39 M.J. at 249. See Mapes,
59 M.J. at 67.
As noted in Part I, the military judge in the present case
determined that Appellant’s statements to Ms. Wong were made
pursuant to a grant of immunity under state law. See Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 587-42(a). The parties in this appeal have not
identified an opinion by the Hawaii state courts that reaches a
conclusion as to whether the statute provides a grant of
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United States v. Allen, No. 03-0691/MC
immunity. For purposes of this appeal, we shall assume without
deciding that the military judge correctly interpreted the
Family Court order and the state statute as providing a grant of
testimonial immunity to Appellant.
B. THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Under Kastigar, the Government must demonstrate that
Appellant’s incriminating statement to NCIS was “derived from a
legitimate source wholly independent of” his earlier inculpatory
statement to Ms. Wong. 406 U.S. at 460. The record in the
present case demonstrates that Appellant’s statement was the
product of his own desire to confess, and was not derived by the
Government from his earlier statement to Ms. Wong.
The idea of confessing to NCIS on August 15 originated with
Appellant, and he steadfastly resisted the advice of others who
urged him to defer making a statement to NCIS. SSgt Walker, who
heard Appellant’s confession shortly after he arrived at Ms.
Wong’s office, asked Appellant if he would not rather wait to
speak with NCIS until the following morning, but Appellant
insisted that he do so that evening. Ms. Reeber, the Child
Protective Services official who spoke to Appellant that night,
told Appellant that he should consult with his attorney before
speaking to NCIS. Appellant did not take her advice. SSgt
Walker, upon learning that Appellant was speaking with a Child
Protective Services official, interrupted Appellant’s
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United States v. Allen, No. 03-0691/MC
conversation to advise him to remain silent. Again, he rejected
that advice.
The record further demonstrates that Colonel Jackson, who
came to Ms. Wong’s office to protect Appellant from harming
himself, was told upon arrival by Appellant’s friend, SSgt
Walker, that Appellant wanted to make a statement to NCIS.
Appellant expressed no reluctance to Colonel Jackson about
turning himself in to NCIS. When Colonel Jackson remarked that
he would call the police if Appellant did not go freely,
Appellant said “[Y]ou don’t have to do that, I know I did this,
and that I am not trying to deny it.” Under other
circumstances, a statement similar to Colonel Jackson’s remarks
might be problematic in terms of assessing the derivative nature
of any subsequent statement. In the present case, however,
there is no evidence of record that Colonel Jackson’s remarks
prompted Appellant to make a statement that he otherwise did not
want to make or that it was used to overcome any reluctance
manifested by Appellant. On the contrary, Appellant repeatedly
insisted to both friends and officials that he wanted to make a
statement to NCIS that night, even when they cautioned him about
doing so.
Against this backdrop, SA Warshawsky administered a
cleansing warning to Appellant, informing him that “any prior
illegal admissions or other improperly obtained evidence which
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United States v. Allen, No. 03-0691/MC
incriminated [him could not] be used against [him] in a trial by
court-martial.” SA Warshawsky also advised Appellant of his
Article 31(b) and Miranda rights. Appellant indicated that he
understood these rights and that he desired to waive them. Only
at that point did SA Warshawsky allow Appellant to make a
statement.
In summary, the evidence shows that Appellant wanted to
make a statement to NCIS, that he was determined to confess that
evening, that he did not waver from that course, and that his
confession to NCIS was knowingly and voluntarily made. His
decision to confess did not result from Government exploitation
of his immunized testimony. Under these circumstances, the
Government has met its burden of affirmatively demonstrating
that his statement was derived from a legitimate source wholly
independent of the compelled testimony.
C. THE DECISION TO PROSECUTE
Although Appellant moved to suppress the testimonial use of
his confession to NCIS, he did not move to dismiss the charges
or otherwise allege at trial that the Government improperly used
immunized testimony in the course of making the decision to
prosecute. Under Rule for Courts-Martial 907(b)(2)(D)(ii), an
allegation of improper use of immunized testimony in the
prosecutorial decision constitutes a waivable basis for a motion
to dismiss. In that context, we conduct a plain error review;
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United States v. Allen, No. 03-0691/MC
that is, we assess (1) whether there was an error; (2) if so,
whether the error was plain or obvious; and (3) if the error was
plain or obvious error, whether it was prejudicial. See United
States v. Powell, 49 M.J. 460, 464-65 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
Although the investigation initially focused on Ms. Allen
because of the estimated time of the abuse that resulted in CJ’s
hospitalization on March 6, 1996, Appellant became a suspect
following the events of August 8 at which time CJ was in his
sole custody. At the hospital team meeting on August 14 the
focus shifted sharply to Appellant, a day before he made his
statements to Ms. Wong and the others. Moreover, his statement
to NCIS, which we have determined to be otherwise admissible,
provided an independent basis for making the decision to
prosecute. Under these circumstances, the preponderance of the
evidence demonstrates that the prosecutorial decision was
untainted by Appellant’s statement to Ms. Wong. Olivero, 39
M.J. at 249; see also Mapes, 59 M.J. at 67. There was no error,
much less plain error, in not dismissing the charges.
III. CONCLUSION
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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