Filed: Mar. 30, 2004
Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2017
Summary: The specification of possession of OxyContin should, be dismissed as a lesser included offense of use of, OxyContin;As a result [of failing in his drug and alcohol, rehabilitation program], LCDR Bowers canceled, [Appellees] leave and reinstated a previous order to, pre-trial restriction.
UNITED STATES, Appellant
v.
David A. HUDSON, Fireman Apprentice
U.S. Coast Guard, Appellee
No. 03-5005
Crim. App. No. 1159
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued December 9, 2003
Decided March 30, 2004
CRAWFORD, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which GIERKE, EFFRON, BAKER, and ERDMANN, JJ., joined.
Counsel
For Appellant: Lieutenant Commander John S. Luce, Jr. (argued).
For Appellee: Lieutenant Commander Mike Cunningham (argued).
Military Judge: Mark R. Higgins
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
United States v. Hudson, No. 03-5005/CG
Chief Judge CRAWFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to his pleas, Appellee was convicted on July 26,
2001, by a special court-martial consisting of a military judge
alone, of wrongful use and possession of a controlled substance
(OxyContin), unauthorized absence, failure to obey a lawful
order and regulation, wrongful appropriation, and breaking
restriction, in violation of Articles 112a, 86, 92, 121, and
134, Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter UCMJ], 10
U.S.C. §§ 912a, 886, 892, 921, and 934 (2000), respectively.
The military judge sentenced Appellee to confinement for six
months, reduction to pay grade E-1, and a bad conduct discharge.
Pursuant to Appellee’s pretrial agreement, the convening
authority approved the sentence as adjudged, but suspended
execution of confinement in excess of five months.
On appeal to the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals,
Appellee raised three assignments of error:
1. The specification of possession of OxyContin should
be dismissed as a lesser included offense of use of
OxyContin;
2. The specification of unauthorized absence should be
dismissed as a lesser included offense of breaking
restriction; and
3. A bad conduct discharge is inappropriately severe
for a junior enlisted member who self-referred for
addiction to OxyContin when the OxyContin was
initially prescribed by a Coast Guard contract
physician.
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The court affirmed on the first and third assignments of error,
but held that it was plain error not to dismiss the unauthorized
absence specification as a lesser-included offense of the
breaking restriction specification. United States v. Hudson, 58
M.J. 830, 831 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2003). The court set aside
the finding of guilty for the unauthorized absence offense,
reassessed the sentence in light of the dismissed charge, and
found that the sentence would have been the same if the offense
had been dismissed at trial. Id. at 833.
On July 28, 2003, the Judge Advocate General of the Coast
Guard certified the case for review by this Court to consider
the following issue:
WHETHER THE COAST GUARD COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
ERRED IN DECIDING THAT IT WAS PLAIN ERROR NOT TO
DISMISS A TWO DAY UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE AS A LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF BREAKING RESTRICTION?
For the reasons set forth below, we answer the certified issue
in the affirmative, and reverse the decision of the lower court.
FACTS
Appellee was originally stationed in Morgan City,
Louisiana, where in March 2000 a Coast Guard civilian physician
prescribed for him the drug OxyContin. In September 2000,
Appellee was transferred to Integrated Support Command New
Orleans (ISCNO), where he illegally obtained and continued to
use OxyContin after his initial prescription expired. Appellee
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eventually sought treatment for his addiction, and was placed in
an inpatient treatment program at Methodist Hospital in New
Orleans. After completing the inpatient program, Appellee
entered into a daily outpatient rehabilitation program.
Appellee missed several meetings that were required as part of
the outpatient program.
Having learned that Appellee had failed some requirements
of his outpatient treatment program, the chief of the Personnel
Division at ISCNO, Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) John Bowers,
cancelled Appellee’s leave, ordered him restricted to the limits
of ISCNO, and required him to report for restricted muster.
LCDR Bowers imposed the restriction to ensure Appellee’s
presence at trial for illegal possession and use of OxyContin.
While under restriction, Appellee requested a urinalysis to
show that he was not using OxyContin. Appellee failed to report
for the urinalysis, and instead took a command vehicle and drove
off the base. A New Orleans police officer stopped Appellee the
next day for driving erratically, and arrested him upon noticing
that the vehicle was reported stolen.
DISCUSSION
The Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy
provides that an accused cannot be convicted of both an offense
and a lesser-included offense. See Article 44(a), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 844(a) (2000); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
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United States v. Hudson, No. 03-5005/CG
299 (1932); United States v. Teters,
37 M.J. 370 (C.M.A. 1993).
Charges reflecting both an offense and a lesser-included offense
are impermissibly multiplicious. See Brown v. Ohio,
432 U.S.
161, 165-66 (1977)(noting that offenses charged are
multiplicious when they stand in the relationship of greater and
lesser offenses). On these grounds, “a specification may be
dismissed upon timely motion by the accused.” Rule for Courts-
Martial 907(b)(3)(B) [hereinafter R.C.M.].
Absent a timely motion, an unconditional guilty plea, such
as Appellee’s, waives a multiplicity claim absent plain error.
United States v. Heryford, 52 M.J. 265, 266 (2000). “Appellant
may show plain error and overcome [waiver] by showing that the
specifications are facially duplicative,” United States v.
Barner,
56 M.J. 131, 137 (C.A.A.F. 2001), “that is, factually
the same,” United States v. Lloyd,
46 M.J. 19, 23 (C.A.A.F.
1997). The test to determine whether an offense is factually
the same as another offense, and therefore lesser-included to
that offense, is the “elements” test. United States v. Foster,
40 M.J. 140, 142 (C.M.A. 1994). Under this test, the court
considers “whether each provision requires proof of a fact which
the other does not.” Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. Rather than
adopting a literal application of the elements test, this Court
stated that resolution of lesser-included claims “can only be
resolved by lining up elements realistically and determining
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United States v. Hudson, No. 03-5005/CG
whether each element of the supposed ‘lesser’ offense is
rationally derivative of one or more elements of the other
offense – and vice versa.” Foster, 40 M.J. at 146. Whether an
offense is a lesser-included offense is a matter of law that
this Court will consider de novo. United States v. Palagar, 56
M.J. 294, 296 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
To determine whether the offenses are factually the same,
we review the “factual conduct alleged in each specification,”
United States v. Harwood, 46 M.J. 26, 28 (C.A.A.F. 1997), as
well as the providence inquiry conducted by the military judge
at trial, Lloyd, 46 M.J. at 23. The specification for
Appellee’s unauthorized absence read as follows:
In that [Appellee] . . . did, at or near New Orleans,
Louisiana, on or about 11 May 2001, without authority,
absent himself from his unit to wit: Coast Guard
Integrated Support Command New Orleans, and did remain
so absent until . . . on or about 12 May 2001.
During the providence inquiry, the military judge described the
elements of this offense as follows:
That on or about 11 May 2001 at or near New
Orleans, Louisiana, you went from or remained absent
from your unit, that is, Integrated Support Command
New Orleans;
That the absence was without proper authority
from someone who could give you that leave;
And that you remained absent until 12 May of
2001;
And that your absence was terminated by
apprehension.
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United States v. Hudson, No. 03-5005/CG
(Emphasis added.) To examine the providence of Appellee’s
guilty plea, the judge then elucidated the facts consistent with
this charge:
Q: On 11 May 2001 what was your assigned unit?
A: Integrated Support Command New Orleans, sir.
Q: How did you know that was your assigned unit?
A: Because I had been told by supervisors, Chief
Murray, that’s where I had been stationed in New
Orleans, sir.
Q: On 11 May 2001 were you at your unit at any
time?
. . . .
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you leave while you were still supposed to
be there?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did anyone who was authorized to give you
leave authorize your absence?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did you believe at the time you departed that
you had the authority to be absent?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did you remain absent until 12 May 2001?
A: Yes, sir.
(Emphasis added.) Appellee had previously stipulated to the
facts of his unauthorized absence as follows: “[Appellee’s]
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United States v. Hudson, No. 03-5005/CG
absence began on 11 May 2001 when he failed to report [to] an
1100 urinalysis at the Integrated Support Command. Instead,
[Appellee] took a command vehicle without permission and drove
off the base.”
The specification for Appellee’s offense of breaking
restriction read as follows:
In that [Appellee] . . . having been restricted to the
limits of the Integrated Support Command New Orleans,
by a person authorized to do so, did, at or near New
Orleans, Louisiana, on or about 11 May 2001, break
said restriction.
(Emphasis added.) Following the providence inquiry into
Appellee’s guilty plea for unauthorized absence, the military
judge outlined for Appellee the elements of breaking
restriction:
That a certain person ordered you to be
restricted to the limits of Integrated Support Command
New Orleans;
That said person was authorized to order this
restriction;
That you knew of the restriction and the limits
thereof;
That on or about 11 May 2001 you went beyond the
limits of the restriction[] before you had been set
free by proper authority; and
That under the circumstances your conduct[] was
to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the
armed forces or of a nature to bring discredit upon
the armed forces.
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United States v. Hudson, No. 03-5005/CG
(Emphasis added.) The judge then gleaned from Appellee the
facts consistent with this charge:
Q: Did a certain authority on 11 May 2001
appoint a certain place of duty?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you know what that place was?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that place of duty?
A: ISC New Orleans, sir.
Q: And so, you were in a restricted status at
that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you believe that placing you in a
restricted status was directly connected with
maintaining good order and discipline in ISC New
Orleans?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you believe that his order was lawful?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How long were you to be restricted?
A: There was no cap put on it, sir. I was
thinking that probably until I went to trial, sir.
Q: So your understanding was that you would be
restricted until you went to trial?
A: That’s what I was thinking, sir. I wasn’t
told. Basically I was told I was going to take a
urinalysis. And the results probably wouldn’t be back
for a number of weeks or something. I was never -- I
was never told. I was just told I was back on
restriction.
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United States v. Hudson, No. 03-5005/CG
. . . .
Q: Do you believe that you were being restricted
so that you would be present for trial and wouldn’t
commit further drug abuse, or were you being
restricted as punishment for missing the meetings?
Which do you believe?
A: So I would be present at trial, sir.
Q: So it’s your understanding that you were
restricted so that your presence at trial would be
guaranteed, and that was acceptable under the law?
A: Yes, sir.
(Emphasis added.) Appellee had previously stipulated regarding
this offense:
As a result [of failing in his drug and alcohol
rehabilitation program], LCDR Bowers canceled
[Appellee’s] leave and reinstated a previous order to
pre-trial restriction. . . . The pre-trial restriction
order was lawful. [Appellee] was restricted to the
limits of the Integrated Support Command New Orleans
and was required to report for restricted muster.
(Emphasis added.)
On the face of this record, particularly the emphasized
language above, it is clear that Appellee’s offenses of breaking
restriction and unauthorized absence were factually
distinguishable in two respects. First, Appellee’s offense of
breaking restriction required that Appellee had been ordered to
restriction in some specific manner by an authorized individual.
In this case, the imposed restriction required Appellee’s
indefinite presence at ISCNO, in a status of restricted muster.
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United States v. Hudson, No. 03-5005/CG
By contrast, Appellee’s unauthorized absence offense did not
require proof of a specific restriction order. Instead, it
required Appellee’s admission that he departed his assigned unit
without authority for a two day period. There was a distinct,
independent obligation to be present for duty at the unit
regardless of the terms of his restriction order.
Moreover, Appellee’s offense of unauthorized absence
contained a temporal component which was not present in the
breaking restriction offense. Appellee’s breaking restriction
offense required proof that Appellee departed his unit at a
single point in time on May 11. By contrast, Appellee’s
unauthorized absence offense required proof that Appellee
remained absent from his unit for a specified two-day period of
time, spanning May 11 and May 12. In fact, returning to
Appellee’s unit on May 12, thereby terminating the unauthorized
absence offense, was an element that was both noted in the
unauthorized absence specification and discussed in the
corresponding providence inquiry.
Given these distinctions, Appellee’s offenses of breaking
restriction and unauthorized absence were not factually the
same. Accordingly, it was not plain error not to dismiss
Appellee’s two-day unauthorized absence as a lesser-included
offense of breaking restriction.
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DECISION
The decision of the United States Coast Guard Court of
Criminal Appeals is reversed.
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