Filed: May 10, 2005
Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2017
Summary: similar act by Berry eight years earlier.military judge had conducted a balancing test., However, the issue of whether less prejudicial evidence was, available was not raised by the defense at trial and Berrys, statement was not admitted by the Court of Criminal Appeals.drunken state.relevance.
IN THE CASE OF
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Bartholomew M. BERRY, Sergeant
U.S. Army, Appellant
No. 04-0240
Crim. App. No. 20000960
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 20, 2004
Decided May 10, 2005
ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
GIERKE, C.J., and EFFRON and BAKER, JJ., joined. CRAWFORD, J.,
filed a separate opinion concurring in the result.
Counsel
For Appellant: Captain Charles A. Kuhfahl Jr. (argued); Colonel
Robert D. Teetsel, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Tellitocci, and Major
Sean S. Park (on brief); Colonel Mark Cremin.
For Appellee: Captain Michael D. Wallace (argued); Colonel
Steven T. Salata and Major Natalie A. Kolb (on brief).
Military Judge: William T. Barto
This opinion is subject to editorial correction before final publication.
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the court.
After entering a guilty plea to the lesser included offense
of sodomy, Sergeant (SGT) Bartholomew M. Berry was tried by a
general court-martial on a number of offenses. Berry was
convicted of the greater offense of committing sodomy by force
and without consent, making a false official statement,
committing an indecent act with another, and fraternization, in
violation of Articles 125, 107, and 134, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 907, 925, 934 (2000),
respectively. Berry’s sentence, which was approved by the
convening authority, included a bad-conduct discharge,
confinement for twelve months, and forfeiture of all pay and
allowances.
The sole issue before this court involves the admission of
evidence of a prior sexual assault under Military Rule of
Evidence (M.R.E.) 413. At trial, Berry’s defense to the charge
of forcible sodomy was that Sergeant T (SGT T) had consented to
the oral sex incident that was the basis for the charge. To
counter this defense the Government sought to introduce
testimony from LS, who testified he had been the victim of a
similar act by Berry eight years earlier. The military judge
found that the testimony was relevant and admissible under
M.R.E. 413 and that ruling was affirmed by the United States
2
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
Army Court of Criminal Appeals in an unpublished opinion.
United States v. Berry, ARMY 20000960 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Dec.
18, 2003).
We granted review of the Army court’s decision to determine
whether the military judge erred in admitting LS’s testimony
under M.R.E. 413. We find that although the testimony was
relevant, the military judge erred in admitting it because he
failed to do an adequate balancing test under M.R.E. 403 and
that under a proper M.R.E. 403 balancing test, the testimony was
inadmissible. We also find the error to be prejudicial.
BACKGROUND
Berry’s conviction flows from events that occurred after a
barbecue at his residence attended by Berry, SGT T, and Private
First Class (PFC) H. They drank a few beers at the barbecue and
then went to a bar in town where they continued drinking. After
they had been at the bar a few hours, SGT T fell out of his
chair while reaching for a cigarette and the three decided to
return to Berry’s residence. SGT T became sick when they
arrived at Berry’s residence and he threw up several times. The
evidence at trial gave two different versions of the events that
followed.
In Berry’s sworn statement, in which he admitted to
consensual sodomy with SGT T, Berry said that he helped SGT T
clean himself up and helped him into Berry’s bed. He then
3
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
stated that he and SGT T began kissing and Berry “brought [SGT
T’s] pants down, and that’s when [the oral sex] happened.” SGT
T did not tell Berry to stop, and Berry claimed that SGT T was
awake at the time although “he was going in and out, he was
pretty drunk.” After the oral sex, Berry went to sleep and woke
up later to drive SGT T to pick up his daughter from day care.
SGT T testified to a different version of events. He
stated that he felt very dizzy and very sick when they left the
bar and that he threw up a number of times when they got back to
Berry’s residence. After lying on Berry’s bed to sleep it off,
the next thing he remembered was looking up and seeing Berry on
top of him and kissing him. He testified that he tried to stop
Berry, but that he could not move. Berry then asked him if he
“wanted to f[---],” and he said no. Berry told SGT T that he
had some condoms, and SGT T again said no.
The next thing he remembered was that Berry’s “head started
moving down towards my genital area.” Again SGT T “tried to
move and tried to push him off, but I couldn’t . . . . I felt
like I was paralyzed and I just could not move.” The last thing
he remembered was “a warm sensation on my genital area, but I am
not sure because I don’t remember seeing him being on it . . .
I just remember him going down towards that area, and then a
sensation there of feeling that he was putting his mouth on my
genital area.” SGT T also remembered someone trying to get his
4
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
underwear back on him and that Berry then woke him up to pick up
his daughter.
In addition to the two conflicting accounts of the evening,
LS testified at trial over the objections of Berry’s defense
counsel. LS was fifteen at the time of his testimony and he
testified regarding an encounter he had with Berry eight years
earlier when he was six and Berry was thirteen. He and Berry
both resided in military housing in Hawaii. According to LS,
one day they were playing with a group of children and Berry
called him over behind a tree. Berry pulled his own pants down,
and “tried to get me to such [sic] on his penis.” When LS said
no, Berry reached over and pulled his pants down and “said he’d
do it to me first.” LS hesitated, but Berry convinced him and
then proceeded to suck on his penis. Berry then said it was his
turn, and LS began to suck on Berry’s penis. They were
interrupted when “a guy ran out,” and both of them ran away. On
cross examination, LS admitted that there was no force used by
Berry but that Berry talked him into participating.
The prosecution sought to have LS’s testimony admitted
under M.R.E. 413, stating that “it is relevant to Sergeant
Berry’s propensity to sexually assault those who are in a
position of vulnerability.” Trial counsel also stated that the
evidence satisfied the M.R.E. 403 balancing test established by
5
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
this court in United States v. Wright, 53 M.J. 476 (C.A.A.F.
2000), and therefore was not overly prejudicial.
Berry’s defense counsel objected to the admission of this
testimony on the basis that it was “extremely distracting, and
. . . extremely prejudicial.” The defense argued that LS’s
memory of the event, on a scale of one to ten (with ten being
very clear), was only about a six. With regard to the probative
value of the evidence, the defense counsel argued that it was
childhood sexual experimentation and that it took place eight
years prior to the event in question with no evidence that
anything of the kind happened in between. He further argued
that there was no evidence of physical force or lack of consent.
The military judge found the testimony to be relevant and
admissible under M.R.E. 413.
The military judge denied Berry’s motion to exclude LS’s
testimony as follows:
The accused is charged with an offense of
sexual assault . . . . The proffered
evidence is evidence that the accused
committed another act of or offense of
sexual assault, and the evidence is
relevant, under Military Rule of Evidence
401 and 402. The proffered evidence involves
conduct that occurred over eight years ago.
The proffered evidence is similar to
the charged misconduct because it involves
taking advantage of a vulnerable victim.
[LS] was, approximately, 6[]years old at the
time of the alleged sexual assault by the
accused, who, despite his own youth, is
considered by the court to have acted upon
6
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
someone of tender years who was unable to
consent at the time.
[SGT T] was also, apparently,
vulnerable in that he was apparently
unconscious or sleep [sic], or experiencing
periods of partial consciousness, based on
the government’s proffered [sic] at the time
of the alleged assault by the accused.
Both offenses involve homosexual
fellatio performed by the accused on
another; and this proffered evidence
involves only a single act, potentially,
established by a single witness. As such,
the defense motion to exclude the testimony
of [LS] is denied.
In both his opening and closing statements, trial counsel
referred to Berry’s acts with LS and reminded the members that
the encounter could be considered relevant “because [Berry] took
advantage of a person in a vulnerable position just like he did
here in the case that you’re deciding.” The military judge’s
instruction to the members with regard to LS’s testimony stated
that it could be considered “for the purpose of its tendency, if
any, to show that the accused has a propensity to commit
nonconsensual sexual acts against unusually vulnerable persons.”
The Army court affirmed the ruling of the military judge
that LS’s testimony was relevant under M.R.E. 401 and 402.
Although the military judge did not articulate an M.R.E. 403
balancing test on the record, the Army court found that the
military judge had conducted a balancing test. That conclusion
was based on the factual findings made by the military judge and
the arguments raised by the trial counsel regarding the factors
7
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
that must be considered in an M.R.E. 403 balancing test.
Because it found that the military judge had conducted the
required balancing test, the Army court reviewed his ruling for
abuse of discretion and found that he had not abused his
discretion in admitting the testimony of LS under M.R.E. 413.
On appeal before this court, Berry argues that LS’s
testimony does not meet the threshold test for admissibility
because it is not logically relevant. Berry further argues that
even if LS’s testimony is relevant, neither the military judge
nor the Army court did a proper balancing test as required by
M.R.E. 403 and by this court’s decision in Wright. He suggests
that had they done so they would have concluded that the
testimony should not be admitted. Berry concludes by arguing
that he was prejudiced by the erroneous admission of this
testimony. In response, the Government argues that the
testimony is relevant and the military judge conducted the
required balancing test under M.R.E. 403 and properly concluded
that LS’s testimony should be admitted.
8
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
DISCUSSION
The granted issue1 asks whether the military judge erred in
admitting evidence of uncharged sexual acts between Berry and LS
that occurred eight years earlier when Berry was thirteen and LS
was six. This court has noted that inherent in M.R.E. 413 is a
general presumption in favor of admission. See Wright, 53 M.J.
at 482-83. However, we have also noted that it is a
“constitutional requirement that evidence offered under Rule 413
be subjected to a thorough balancing test” under M.R.E. 403.
United States v. Dewrell, 55 M.J. 131, 138 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
Where that balancing test requires exclusion of the evidence,
the presumption of admissibility is overcome. See Wright, 53
M.J. at 482-83.
M.R.E. 413 Threshold Requirements
This court has held that to admit evidence under M.R.E.
413, three threshold determinations must be made:
1. The accused is charged with an offense
of sexual assault -– [M.R.E.] 413(a);
2. “The evidence proffered is ‘evidence of
the defendant’s commission of another
offense of . . . sexual assault’”; and
3. The evidence is relevant under [M.R.E.]
401 and 402. United States v. Guardia,
135 F.3d 1326, 1328 (10th Cir. 1998).
1
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED IN ADMITTING
EVIDENCE OF UNCHARGED HOMOSEXUAL ACTS BETWEEN
APPELLANT WHEN HE WAS THIRTEEN YEARS OLD, AND A SIX-
YEAR-OLD BOY, EIGHT YEARS BEFORE THE CHARGED OFFENSE
OF FORCIBLE SODOMY WITH AN ADULT SOLDIER.
9
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
Wright, 53 M.J. at 482.
As the military judge noted, the first and second threshold
requirements were met because Berry was charged with forcible
sodomy without consent, which is an offense of sexual assault
under the UCMJ, and Berry’s conduct with LS falls under that
same definition. See M.R.E. 413(d)(1) (defining “sexual
assault”). Moving to the third threshold requirement, we must
determine whether the military judge abused his discretion in
finding LS’s testimony relevant under M.R.E. 401. See United
States v. Gilbride, 56 M.J. 428, 430 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (citing
United States v. Ayala,
43 M.J. 296 (C.A.A.F. 1995)). A
military judge abuses his discretion “if his application of the
correct legal principles to the facts . . . is clearly
unreasonable.” United States v. Williams,
37 M.J. 352, 356
(C.M.A. 1993).
Relevant evidence under M.R.E. 401 is “evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.” The
military judge found that “[t]he proffered evidence is similar
to the charged misconduct because it involves taking advantage
of a vulnerable victim.” From strictly a propensity viewpoint,
the evidence does show that Berry had participated in similar
conduct in the past. This evidence, therefore, does have some
10
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
tendency to make it more probable that Berry committed a
nonconsensual act against a vulnerable person and we conclude
that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in finding
the testimony to be relevant. See Wright, 53 M.J. at 480
(noting legislative history shows that Federal Rule of Evidence
(F.R.E.) 4132 creates an exception to M.R.E. 404(b)’s general
prohibition against the use of a defendant’s propensity to
commit crimes).
M.R.E. 403 Balancing Test
Once the evidence meets these threshold requirements, a
military judge must apply the balancing test of M.R.E. 403 under
which the testimony may be excluded if its “probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the members.” M.R.E.
403. In conducting the M.R.E. 403 balancing test a military
judge should consider the following factors: the strength of
the proof of the prior act; the probative weight of the
evidence; the potential to present less prejudicial evidence;
the possible distraction of the fact-finder; the time needed to
prove the prior conduct; the temporal proximity of the prior
2
M.R.E. 413 was adopted from F.R.E. 413, and the analysis of
M.R.E. 413 in the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2002
ed.)(MCM), references the legislative history of F.R.E. 413
regarding congressional intent for the rule. MCM, Analysis of
the Military Rules of Evidence A22-37.
11
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
event; the frequency of the acts; the presence of any
intervening circumstances; and the relationship between the
parties. Wright, 53 M.J. at 482.
The military judge made minimal findings relating to the
Wright factors and did not articulate any balancing of those
factors on the record. Where the military judge is required to
do a balancing test under M.R.E. 403 and does not sufficiently
articulate his balancing on the record, his evidentiary ruling
will receive less deference from this court. See Dewrell, 55
M.J. at 138 (citing United States v. Manns, 54 M.J. 164, 166
(C.A.A.F. 2000)); United States v. Bailey,
55 M.J. 38, 41
(C.A.A.F. 2000) (citing Manns, 54 M.J. at 166).
The Wright elements addressed by the military judge tend to
support admission of the testimony: the proof of the prior
similar act was strong because it involved the testimony of the
only witness who had first-hand knowledge about the event; there
was only one prior act which, as noted, could be established by
a single witness and would not take an inordinate amount of
time; and the act occurred eight years ago between acquaintances
where the victim was in a vulnerable position.
12
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
The military judge failed to address the relevant remaining
Wright factors:3 the probative weight of the evidence, the
frequency of the acts, the temporal proximity of the prior act
and the presence of intervening circumstances, and the
distraction of the fact-finder.
While the military judge noted that the prior incident
occurred eight years earlier where the victim was in a
vulnerable position, he failed to analyze further the
circumstances of the two incidents with regard to the probative
weight of the previous incident. The incident with LS occurred
outside during the day between children, while the incident with
SGT T occurred at night in private quarters between two adults
after an evening of drinking.
3
We note that one of those factors not considered by the
military judge is whether it would have been possible to admit,
for the same purpose, evidence that was less prejudicial than
LS’s testimony. The defense argued on appeal before the Court
of Criminal Appeals and before this court that a statement by
Berry admitting to the encounter with LS was available for that
purpose and should have been considered by the military judge.
However, the issue of whether less prejudicial evidence was
available was not raised by the defense at trial and Berry’s
statement was not admitted by the Court of Criminal Appeals. We
make no decision as to whether this statement would have been
admissible at the trial level, we simply note that the statement
is not part of the record on appeal. We must evaluate the
military judge’s ruling based on what was known to him at the
time of trial. Accordingly, we have denied Berry’s “Motion to
Attach Defense Appellate Exhibit A,” filed with this court on
October 18, 2004, and will not consider the substance of Berry’s
statement concerning the prior event.
13
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
The incident with LS occurred only once, eight years prior
to Berry’s encounter with SGT T, when Berry was thirteen years
old. The length of time between the events alone is generally
not enough to make a determination as to the admissibility of
the testimony. The circumstances surrounding the individual and
the events that transpired in the intervening period must be
taken into consideration. Where a defendant was an adult at the
time he committed the prior sexual assault, this court has found
incidents occurring more than eight years prior to the charged
incident to be relevant under M.R.E. 413. See Dewrell, 55 M.J.
at 137-38 (finding incidents occurring approximately seven to
ten years earlier admissible); Bailey, 55 M.J. at 41 (finding
incidents occurring three and one-half and ten years prior
admissible). A similar finding is not readily made where a
prior incident is between children or adolescents.
In United States v. McDonald, 59 M.J. 426 (C.A.A.F. 2004),
we evaluated whether evidence of sexual acts that occurred
twenty years prior to the charged act, when the defendant was
thirteen, was erroneously admitted for the purpose of showing
intent or a common plan under M.R.E. 404(b). We concluded that
the evidence was not relevant under that rule, and in so doing
we noted the absence of “evidence of that 13-year-old
adolescent’s mental and emotional state, sufficient to permit
14
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
meaningful comparison with Appellant’s state of mind as an adult
20 years later.” Id. at 430.
During the eight years between the two incidents Berry grew
from a child of thirteen to an adult of twenty-one. There was
no evidence introduced to show that Berry engaged in similar
acts between the time he was thirteen and the time of the
incident with SGT T eight years later. Consistent with
McDonald, we also note here that there is no evidence suggesting
that Berry’s mens rea at twenty-one was the same as it was when
he was a child of thirteen. As one scholar has stated:
Between the ages of twelve and seventeen,
adolescents undergo a critical period of
transition during which they experience
rapid transformations in emotional,
intellectual, physical, and social
capacities. Even older adolescents, whose
raw intellectual capacities may rival those
of adults, have less experience on which to
draw in making and evaluating choices. In
short, adolescents are not simply miniature
adults.
Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14
Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 143, 152-53 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
When projecting on a child the mens rea of an adult or
extrapolating an adult mens rea from the acts of a child,
military judges must take care to meaningfully analyze the
different phases of the accused’s development rather than treat
those phases as being unaffected by time, experience, and
maturity. Where a military judge finds that the prior “sexual
15
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
assault” acts of a child or adolescent are probative to an act
later committed as an adult, such a determination must be
supported in the record by competent evidence. Consequently the
passage of eight years in this case constitutes a notable
intervening circumstance between the two events at issue when
coupled with Berry’s growth from childhood to adulthood during
that time.
We then turn to another of the Wright factors not addressed
by the military judge -- the possible distraction of the fact-
finder that could result from admission of the testimony. In
Bailey we noted that the danger considered by this factor is
that admission of the evidence may “result in a distracting
mini-trial on a collateral issue.” Bailey, 55 M.J. at 41.
The prosecution’s opening statement did not begin with a
reference to the facts of the present case but rather with a
reference to the earlier incident: “[I]n 1992, the accused was
a 13-year old living in Hawaii on a military installation. He
called a neighborhood child, a six-year old boy behind a tree,
he pulled down the little boy’s pants and he convinced him to
allow him to suc[k] on the child’s penis.”
In his closing statement the prosecutor reminded the
members that Berry “convinced [a] little boy to try to suck on
his penis[]” even though “the little boy said, no.” He noted
that the encounter with LS could be considered relevant “because
16
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
[Berry] took advantage of a person in a vulnerable position just
like he did here in the case that you’re deciding.”
Under these circumstances it is evident that a “distracting
mini-trial” on the collateral issue of the LS incident resulted
from the admission of LS’s testimony and the prosecution’s
pointed references. The emphasis on “a neighborhood child,” “a
little boy,” and “a six year-old boy” all characterized Berry in
the eyes of the members as a child molester, one of the most
unsympathetic characterizations that can be made.
Considering the already limited probative value of LS’s
testimony, that value clearly was outweighed by the danger that
the members were distracted from considering his testimony for
its proper purpose. Applying the appropriate deference to the
ruling of the military judge, we find that LS’s testimony fails
the M.R.E. 403 balancing test and that the military judge’s
decision to admit LS’s testimony was in error.
Prejudice
“A finding or sentence of court-martial may not be held
incorrect on the ground of an error of law unless the error
materially prejudices the substantial rights of the accused.”
Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 859(a) (2000). For a
nonconstitutional error such as this one, the Government has the
burden of demonstrating that “the error did not have a
substantial influence on the findings.” United States v.
17
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
McCollum, 58 M.J. 323, 342 (C.A.A.F. 2003); see also United
States v. Gunkle,
55 M.J. 26, 30 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
In evaluating whether erroneous admission of Government
evidence is harmless, this court uses a four-part test,
weighing: (1) the strength of the Government’s case, (2) the
strength of the defense case, (3) the materiality of the
evidence in question, and (4) the quality of the evidence in
question. See McDonald, 59 M.J. at 430 (citing United States v.
Kerr, 51 M.J. 401, 405 (C.A.A.F. 1999)).
The central question with regard to this specification was
whether SGT T had in fact consented to the sodomy or whether
Berry had taken advantage of him when he was in a vulnerable
drunken state. The Government evidence on this issue consisted
of expert testimony speculating that SGT T had been drugged and
SGT T’s vague testimony regarding the incident. The defense
submitted no evidence, but set forth Berry’s version of events
through cross-examination of the witnesses and his sworn
statement in which he admitted to consensual sodomy. The result
was a “he said/he said” case, where SGT T’s credibility and the
effectiveness of the defense cross-examination were all that the
members had to rely upon.
LS’s testimony added the first-hand account by a fifteen-
year-old boy that he was sodomized at the age of six by Berry.
Even though the testimony was admitted for the limited purpose
18
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
of showing that Berry had a propensity to commit nonconsensual
sexual acts against unusually vulnerable persons, due to the
inflammatory nature of the testimony and the emphasis given the
testimony by the Government, it was likely considered by the
members as much more than propensity evidence. Berry became not
just a soldier who stood accused of forcible sodomy, but rather
a child molester who was charged with the offense of forcible
sodomy. Based upon our review of the record, it appears that
LS’s testimony improperly tipped the balance of the evidence and
the Government has not met its burden of demonstrating that this
improperly admitted evidence “did not have a substantial
influence on the findings.” McCollum, 58 M.J. at 342.
Finding that Berry was prejudiced by the military judge’s
error we turn to whether, if a rehearing on the affected
findings is deemed impracticable, reassessment would be
appropriate. We find that, considering the inflammatory nature
of the evidence to which the members were erroneously exposed,
it would not be possible to “reliably determine what sentence
would have been imposed at the trial level if the error had not
occurred.” United States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305, 307 (C.M.A.
1986). Reassessment, therefore, is not appropriate.
19
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
DECISION
The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal
Appeals is reversed. That part of the finding of the
specification of Charge II stating “by force and without the
consent of the said Sergeant [T]” and the sentence are set
aside. The remainder of the specification of Charge II and the
remaining findings of guilty are affirmed. The record of trial
is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Army. A
rehearing on the affected finding and sentence is authorized.
If a rehearing on the affected finding is deemed impracticable,
a rehearing may be held on the sentence alone.
20
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
CRAWFORD, Judge (concurring in the result).
I agree that the military judge abused his discretion by
conducting a flawed analysis under Military Rule of Evidence
(M.R.E.) 403, and would reverse on that ground. However, I
cannot join in the majority’s reasoning because the judge also
abused his discretion by determining evidence of Appellant’s
childhood act to be logically relevant under M.R.E. 401.
To be legally relevant, evidence must first be logically
relevant. If Appellant’s childhood sexual act is not legally
relevant to show his propensity to commit similar acts as an
adult because “there is no evidence suggesting that Berry’s mens
rea at twenty-one was the same as it was when he was a child of
thirteen,” __ M.J. (15), then it was not logically relevant to
show his propensity to commit similar acts in the first place.
Relevant evidence under M.R.E. 401 is “evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.” In this
case, the military judge found that “[t]he proffered evidence is
similar to the charged misconduct because it involves taking
advantage of a vulnerable victim.” Without elaboration, the
majority accepts that similarity of conduct as sufficient to
establish logical relevance. Given the facts of this case,
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
however, and considering the purpose for which the evidence was
offered, logical relevance requires more.
The Government offered Appellant’s childhood act under
M.R.E. 413, which permits introduction of so-called “propensity
evidence,” i.e., “[t]he rule permits the prosecution to use
evidence of the accused's uncharged past sexual assaults for the
purpose of demonstrating his propensity to commit the charged
offenses.” United States v. Parker, 59 M.J. 195, 198 (C.A.A.F.
2003)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
military judge denied the defense’s motion to exclude LS’s
testimony and instructed the members that they may consider LS’s
testimony “for the purpose of its tendency, if any, to show that
the accused has a propensity to commit nonconsensual sexual acts
against vulnerable persons.” To be logically relevant to this
purpose, the evidence must have some “tendency to make the
existence of” appellant’s propensity “more probable . . . than
it would be without the evidence.” M.R.E. 401. As we
recognized in United States v. Wright,
53 M.J. 476 (C.A.A.F.
2000), M.R.E. 413 opens with a reminder that, while generally
admissible, evidence must first be “relevant”:
In a court-martial in which the accused is charged
with an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the
accused’s commission of one or more offenses of sexual
assault is admissible, and may be considered for its
bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
2
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
M.R.E. 413(a)(emphasis added);1 Wright, 53 M.J. at 480.
Conceding that the military judge did not cite propensity
as the “fact” to which this evidence was relevant, the majority
then concludes that “[f]rom strictly a propensity viewpoint, the
evidence does show that Berry had participated in similar
conduct in the past. This evidence, therefore, does have some
tendency to make it more probable that Berry committed a
nonconsensual act against a vulnerable person[.]” __ M.J. (10-
11). This statement is particularly troubling in light of the
later conclusion that “there is no evidence suggesting that
Berry’s mens rea at twenty-one was the same as it was when he
was a child of thirteen.” __ M.J. (15). From these statements,
one must conclude that the mere happenstance of a similar,
earlier act demonstrates per se relevance to propensity, even
1
We noted in Wright that M.R.E. 413 and Fed. R. Evid. 413 “are
virtually the same.” Wright, 53 M.J. at 480 n.4. Accordingly,
analysis of Fed. R. Evid. 413 also illuminates M.R.E. 413. In
a discussion of Fed. R. Evid. 413, two scholars commented:
The evidence permitted is broadly defined as any act
that would be either a state or federal crime related
to either sexual assault or child molestation. The
limitations appear to be only relevance and the
requirement that the prosecution provide fifteen days
notice of its intent to use evidence pursuant to
these rules.” 1 Barbara E. Bergman and Nancy
Hollander, Wharton’s Criminal Evidence (15th ed.
1997)(footnotes omitted)(commenting on the nearly
identical text of Fed. R. Evid. 413 and 414).
§ 4.42 at 458-59.
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absent evidence or presumption of a similarity of mens rea,2 or,
presumably, character. Such a conclusion strongly suggests that
even differences in mental competence (and certainly differences
in cognitive and emotional development) are inapplicable to a
threshold analysis under M.R.E. 401 -- a departure from the
application of that rule that I cannot embrace, for it leads to
the conclusion that the mindless act of an infant is per se
logically relevant to prove the state of mind or character of
that infant as an adult and would be admissible unless excluded
for some other reason. “[Evidence] may also be inadmissible as
irrelevant because a link in the chain of facts is missing that
is required to give probative value to the evidence.” 1
Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 4-5 at 298-99 (footnote omitted);
see also M.R.E. 104(b); c.f. Johnson v. Elk Lake School
District, 283 F.3d 138, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2002)(applying Fed. R.
Evid. 104(b) to Fed. R. Evid. 413(d)). In applying M.R.E. 413,
I believe the majority has confused evidence relevant to state
of mind and character3 with evidence relevant to happenstance,
and in so doing, has departed from our recently announced
analysis in United States v. McDonald,
59 M.J. 426 (C.A.A.F.
2
Of course, mens rea and character are not congruent concepts,
but in the context of this evidence and the purpose for which it
was offered, the two are logically indistinguishable.
3
“Propensity evidence” is a form of character evidence. See 2
Stephen A. Salzburg et al., Federal Rules of Evidence Manual §
413.02[2] (8th ed. 2001).
4
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
2004),4 rejecting evidence for its failure to satisfy M.R.E. 401.
In McDonald, this Court stated:
The military judge found, and the court below agreed,
that the evidence was logically relevant both as to
“common plan” and “intent.” We disagree. Applying
the second prong of Reynolds, we hold that the
evidence of Appellant's uncharged acts was not
logically relevant to show either a common plan or
Appellant's intent.
59 M.J. at 429-30 (internal citation omitted).
Because M.R.E. 413, as employed in this case, demands
logical relevance to a character trait –- propensity to commit
sexual acts with vulnerable persons –– I would again conclude
that evidence of sexual acts that occurred when the defendant
was thirteen is not logically relevant to prove character or
cognition of that child as an adult, absent “evidence of that
13-year-old adolescent’s mental and emotional state, sufficient
to permit meaningful comparison with Appellant’s character as an
adult.” McDonald, 59 M.J. at 430. While Appellant’s case
presents a gap of only eight years between the acts, as opposed
to the twenty years in McDonald, those intervening years share
the same evidentiary deficiency: failure to account for the
effects of puberty and adolescence on either cognitive
development or character. In McDonald, we required the
4
Although McDonald addressed M.R.E. 404(b), the concept of legal
and logical relevance runs through the military evidentiary
rules, including M.R.E. 401, 402, 403, 404(b), 413, and 14,
along with the other § IV rules.
5
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
appellant to establish the logical relevance of a thirteen-year-
old’s “mental and emotional state” to the state of mind of that
child as an adult. In this case, we examine the logical
relevance of a thirteen-year-old’s acts to the “propensity” of
that child as an adult to engage in similar acts. I recognize
that there is no meaningful distinction between the relevance we
required in McDonald and the relevance we should require here.
Happenstance vs. character and state of mind. In our
practice, as in the federal district courts, the undertaking of
an act is frequently relevant in and of itself, without regard
to the state of mind of the actor in performing the act. See,
e.g., M.R.E. 304 (confessions and admissions), M.R.E. 321
(eyewitness identification), and M.R.E. 406 (habit and routine).
In the course of a trial, innumerable other contexts arise in
which proof of an act is relevant merely to show that the act
occurred (e.g., facts establishing nonvolitional elements of
offenses). In other contexts, relevance requires that
happenstance be paired with a specific purpose (e.g., M.R.E.
608(b)(evidence of prior conduct must be probative of
truthfulness or untruthfulness); M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(prior
consistent statement must precede motive to fabricate).
Character or state of mind evidence. When intent, plan,
purpose, or character are involved -- when the fact made more or
less probable is a quality of cognition -- mere happenstance may
6
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
not be sufficient to establish logical relevance. McDonald, 59
M.J. at 430; United States v. Humpherys, 57 M.J. 83, 89-90
(C.A.A.F. 2002); United States v. Tanksley,
54 M.J. 169, 175
(C.A.A.F. 2000); United States v. Matthews,
53 M.J. 465, 473
(C.A.A.F. 2000). M.R.E. 413 and 414 freed prosecutors from the
restraints of M.R.E. 404(b) and for the first time permitted
evidence of an accused’s past acts to demonstrate the propensity
of the accused to commit other such acts. Although “propensity”
has been defined in slightly differing terms by various sources,
the common theme is the focus on “nature” as the source of the
inclination,5 reinforcing the classification of such evidence as
“character evidence.” In short, the evidence is offered to show
that the character or nature of the accused is such that he or
she is predisposed to commit the charged offense, based on
similar conduct undertaken by the accused in the past. As I see
it, in the context of any comparative “state of mind” or
character evidence, there is a roughly graduated scale -- with
mere unity of identity at one end and absolute identity of
cognitive state at the other -- along which such evidence will
generally fall. While I agree that mere unity of identity may
5
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language (1961)(“a natural inclination”). See, e.g., Merriam
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003)(defining
propensity as “an often intense natural inclination or
preference); Webster’s New Word College Dictionary (4th ed.
1999)(propensity is a natural inclination or tendency”).
7
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
be sufficient to establish relevance when reasonable identity of
cognitive state can be assumed (as in the acts of most adults),
I do not believe we should apply that assumption to bridge the
frequently vast chasm of puberty and adolescence. With this in
mind, I believe our logic in McDonald must control our
examination of this even more powerful evidence.
As the majority notes, children are not miniature adults.
Evidence that an accused possessed some cognitive characteristic
at age twenty-one might logically be presumed relevant to
whether the accused had that same characteristic at age twenty-
nine; however, consistent with our logic in McDonald, I cannot
agree that evidence of a cognitive characteristic at age
thirteen can be assumed to be logically relevant to whether the
accused had that same cognitive characteristic at age twenty-
one.
For most teens, [risky or antisocial] behaviors are
fleeting; they cease with maturity as individual
identity becomes settled. Only a relatively small
proportion of adolescents who experiment in risky or
illegal activities develop entrenched patterns of
problem behavior that persist into adulthood.
Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished
Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 American
Psychologist 1009, 1014 (2003). Professors Steinberg and Scott
also note that:
8
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
studies of criminal careers indicate that the vast
majority of adolescents who engage in criminal or
delinquent behavior desist from crime as they mature
into adulthood (Farrington, 1986). Thus the criminal
choices of typical young offenders differ from those
of adults not only because the choice, qua choice, is
deficient as the product of immature judgment, but
also because the adolescent’s criminal act does not
express the actor’s bad character.
Id. at 1015.
In addition to the concerns we expressed in McDonald, we
have also recognized that, even absent the complicating factors
of puberty and adolescence, “[e]ven an individual with certain
characteristics may have internal self-monitoring which may or
may not cause them to act similarly in various situations.”
United States v. Dimberio, 56 M.J. 20, 27 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
While I agree that M.R.E. 413 has significantly reduced
the analytical importance of temporal proximity between the
charged acts and prior, similar acts introduced under that rule,
I cannot agree that the rule creates a bypass around M.R.E. 401
and 402 or creates a “happenstance equals relevance” equation.
Discussing Fed. R. Evid. 413, which uses language similar to
that of M.R.E. 413, the Eighth Circuit noted that: “We have
previously stated that this rule supersedes Rule 404's
prohibition against character evidence, allowing testimony of
prior bad acts in sexual assault cases, provided that it is
relevant.” United States v. Bird, 372 F.3d 989, 992 (8th Cir.
2004). In sexual assault and child molestation cases, evidence
9
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
that the defendant committed a prior similar offense “may be
considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant,” including the defendant’s propensity to commit such
offenses. Fed. R. Evid. 413(a), 414(a). “If relevant, such
evidence is admissible unless its probative value is
‘substantially outweighed’ by one or more of the factors
enumerated in Rule 403, including ‘the danger of unfair
prejudice.’” United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir.
2001)(quoting United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d, 769 (8th Cir.
1997).
This is not to say here, nor did we so hold in McDonald,
that the acts of a child cannot be relevant to determination of
the state of mind of that child as an adult. 59 M.J. at 430.
Rather, in this arena of great potential probity and great
potential prejudice, we must follow the rule and require that
threshold relevance to the specified “fact” be demonstrated with
the same level of scrutiny we would apply to any other evidence
offered for any other purpose. Expressed another way, we should
not be so confident in the crucible of M.R.E. 403 that we
assume, for purposes of M.R.E. 413, that happenstance equals
relevance. This is particularly so, given that in Wright we
emphasized the importance of M.R.E. 401 and 402, and in McDonald
we denounced the assumption that happenstance equals relevance
with regard to similar evidence offered under M.R.E. 404(b).
10
United States v. Berry, No. 04-0240/AR
Because I am not convinced that the military judge made that
critical comparison in this case, I cannot express confidence in
the lower court’s conclusion that there was no abuse of
discretion in this quarter.
11
