BEN T. BARRY, Bankruptcy Judge.
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Corrected and Substituted First-Amended Complaint and Memorandum in Support Thereof filed by the "Participating Defendants" on July 1, 2016; the Plaintiff's Opposition to Participating Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed by the trustee on July 29, 2016; and the Participating Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Corrected and Substituted First-Amended Complaint filed on August 19, 2016. The motion and responses relate to the trustee's first amended complaint and comply with the Court's Order Granting Motion For an Order Staging Procedures entered on June 2, 2016. In that order, the Court ordered Participating Defendants to file any motions to dismiss the trustee's claims for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024, and 11 U.S.C. § 363(n), including, but not requiring, the inclusion of any Rule 12(b) defenses.
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and 28 U.S.C. § 157, and it is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (H), and (O). For the reasons stated below, the Court grants the defendants' motion to dismiss as it relates to the trustee's allegations of fraud on the court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3), which is made applicable by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024, and collusion under § 363(n) and denies without prejudice the defendants' motion to dismiss to the extent it relates to all other counts alleged by the trustee.
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7008 incorporates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008. Under Rule 8, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To meet this standard and survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The plausibility standard referenced by the Supreme Court "requires a plaintiff to show at the pleading stage that success on the merits is more than a `sheer possibility.'" Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a plausible claim for relief. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. When the facts that are pled "do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not show[n]—`that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
The debtor filed its voluntary chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on October 28, 2013. On February 12, 2014, the Court entered its sale order that approved the debtor/debtor-in-possession [DIP]'s sale of substantially all of its assets to Sager Creek. On June 6, 2015, the debtor converted its case to a case under chapter 7 and a chapter 7 trustee was appointed. The trustee filed his initial complaint in this adversary proceeding on February 26, 2016, more than two years after the conclusion of the sale, and his first-amended complaint on April 28, 2016. It is the amended complaint that is currently before the Court.
The Court will first address the trustee's allegations of fraud on the court in this proceeding. The sale order that is the subject of the trustee's complaint was entered on February 12, 2014, and the trustee's initial complaint was filed on February 26, 2016, more than two years later. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c) requires that a motion for relief from final judgment be filed within a year of the entry of the judgment if the grounds for relief are fraud. However, according to subsection (d), Rule 60 "does not limit a court's power to . . . set aside a judgment for fraud on the court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d).
The trustee pleads, or at least mentions, fraud on the court either specifically or as a "sub-category" or attachment to five of his fourteen claims.
According to the trustee, exhibits that should have been introduced at the hearing to approve the sale were not introduced, information concerning adjustments to the purchase price was not disclosed to the Court, funding agreements between one of the qualified bidders and its suppliers were not disclosed to the Court, and the fact that the undisclosed suppliers were also members of the unsecured creditors' committee was not disclosed to the Court. In ¶ 80, the trustee states that "[t]he absence of the material and candid disclosures by the Defendants not only reduced the value received by the estate of the assets sold, but likewise constituted a fraud on the Court under applicable bankruptcy and Arkansas state law." Additionally, in the trustee's second claim-Fraudulent Transfer-at ¶ 120, the trustee states specifically that "Defendants' conduct and lack of candor constitutes a fraud on the Court." Despite these allegations of fraud on the court, the Court cannot glean from the trustee's statement of alleged facts exactly what egregious misconduct was directed to the Court itself by the defendants.
Specifically, the Court is not able to identify or locate in the trustee's complaint any allegation that indicates any attempt to defile the Court itself or that an officer of the Court fabricated evidence or made an affirmative misrepresentation to the Court.
Vogel, 46 F.3d at 14 (emphasis added).
The trustee has also alleged collusion under § 363(n), the remedy for which is either avoiding the § 363 sale or recovering the amount by which the value of the property exceeds the sale price. 11 U.S.C. § 363(n). The trustee states in ¶ 102 of his complaint (but not in his prayer for relief) that the "Defendants collectively owe the estate $74 million in un-rebutted avoidance actions," among other damages. To state a claim under § 363(n), the trustee must plead that (1) there was an agreement, (2) between potential bidders, (3) that controlled the price at bidding. See, e.g., Birdsell v. Fort McDowell Sand and Gravel (In re Sanner), 218 B.R. 941, 944 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1998); Ramsay v. Vogel, 970 F.2d 471, 474 (8th Cir. 1992) (trustee may avoid sale under § 363(n) if price was controlled by an agreement among potential bidders).
The Court can identify three specific agreements alleged in the trustee's voluminous complaint that may be relevant. The first is an allegation in ¶ 43 that "Defendant Ball executed an undisclosed agreement with the Second Lien Holders [Sager Creek] . . . ." The second is an allegation in ¶ 56 that "Defendant Ball executed an undisclosed agreement . . . ." The third is an allegation in ¶ 61 that "Sager Creek admitted on the record to reaching a side-agreement with Defendant Ryder." On its face, the complaint supports the first element of § 363(n).
The second element requires that the agreement be between potential bidders. Sager Creek was a qualified bidder at the auction of the debtor's property and the Court finds that it meets the requirement of being a potential bidder. In ¶ 57, the trustee also characterizes Defendant Ball and the Committee Defendants, of which Ryder and Ball are members, as potential bidders that did not submit qualifying bids.
The trustee would like the Court to find that the term "potential bidders" refers to any entity that has the ability to offer a bid without regard to the remoteness of that possibility. Although the Court believes the term is expansive, the Eighth Circuit has established parameters under which to determine the scope. The Eighth Circuit defines "potential bidders" as "all persons who are contemplating making an offer to purchase property of a bankrupt estate that the trustee seeks to sell, whether such sale be private or at public auction." Vogel, 46 F.3d at 1419. The Court cannot identify any allegation in either the trustee's fifty-page complaint or the attachments to the complaint that indicate that Ball or any other member of the unsecured creditors' committee contemplated making a bid, intended to qualify under the bidding procedures, gave any indication to the debtor/DIP of its intent to bid, or even had any communication with the debtor/DIP about the bidding procedure such that the Court could conclude that Ball or the committee were potential bidders.
The trustee also raises § 363(m) in his response to the defendants' motion to dismiss.
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants the defendants' motion to dismiss as it relates to the trustee's allegations of fraud on the court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d) and collusion under § 363(n) but denies the defendants' motion to dismiss as it relates to all other counts alleged by the trustee.
IT IS SO ORDERED.