SUSAN O. HICKEY, District Judge.
Before the Court is an Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 72) filed on behalf of Plaintiff Canopius US Insurance, Inc. ("Canopius"). Separate Defendant-Claimants Amy Eddy, Nicole Farr, Summer Hagan, Desiree Kolbek, Jeanette Orlando, Jamie Rodriguez, Pebbles Rodriguez have filed a response. (ECF No. 75).
The First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 70) and the present Motion for Summary Judgment seek a declaration from the Court regarding Canopius' contractual obligations to defend and indemnify Defendant-Insureds Steve Johnson and Donn Wolf in cases before this Court and Arkansas state courts. The underlying cases referenced in the First Amended Complaint are: Kolbek, et al. v. Twenty First Century Holiness Tabernacle Church, et al., Case No. 4:10-cv-4124; Kolbek, et al. v. Twenty First Century Holiness Tabernacle Church Inc., et al., No. 46CV-14-8-2, Circuit Court of Miller County, Arkansas; Ondrisek, et al. v. Hoffman, Case No. 4:08-cv-4113; and Ondrisek, et al. v. Kolbek, Case No, 4:09-cv-4100. The Court will summarize the underlying cases in turn.
In August 2010, Desiree Kolbek, Amy Eddy, Jeannette Orlando, Nicole Farr, Summer Hagan, Jamie Rodriguez, and Pebbles Rodriguez
In 2013, through mediation, several insurance companies entered into a Confidential Settlement Agreement with the Kolbek plaintiffs on behalf of several Kolbek defendants. The settlement resulted in the voluntary dismissal of claims against many of the defendants in the Kolbek suit. Thereafter, the Court dismissed with prejudice all federal law claims against the remaining defendants in the Kolbek suit (Case No. 4:10-cv-4124, ECF No. 716) and dismissed without prejudice all state law claims asserted by the Kolbek plaintiffs. (Id., ECF No. 722).
Since the filing of Canopius' First Amended Complaint, the Kolbek state suit has been voluntarily nonsuited with prejudice. (ECF No. 76, Exh. 1).
In November 2008, Defendant-Claimants Spencer Ondrisek and Seth Calagna filed suit in this Court against Tony Alamo and John Kolbek.
Defendant-Insureds Donn Wolf and Steve Johnson were not named as defendants in the Ondrisek suit. However, in connection with the judgment against Tony Alamo in the Ondrisek suit, the Court granted a Writ of Execution authorizing seizure of property owned by certain Defendant-Insureds in this case. (ECF No. 74, Exh. 19). Some of these properties are covered by the policies issued by Canopius to Defendant-Insureds. In a letter dated May 31, 2013, Defendant-Insured Donn Wolf forwarded the Court's Writ of Execution to Canopius and demanded "a defense and full indemnity for Steven Johnson, [himself], and the property as well as any interest in any other property to which the insurance may apply." (ECF No. 74, Exh. 20). Canopius seeks a declaration from the Court that they owe no coverage to any Defendant for the alleged misconduct that forms the basis of the claims in the Ondrisek suits and that they have no duty to provide a defense to any of the Defendants in this case.
The standard of review for summary judgment is well established. When a party moves for summary judgment, "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Krenik v. County of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 1995). This is a "threshold inquiry of ... whether there is a need for trial—whether, in other words, there are genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); see also Agristor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1987). A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party. Id. at 252.
The Court must view the evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enterprise Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The nonmoving party must then demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik, 47 F.3d at 957. A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
As an initial matter, the Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Unigard Security Ins. Co., 61 S.W.3d 807, 812 (Ark. 2001). In other words, where there is no duty to defend, there is generally no duty to indemnify. See id. Therefore, if the Court finds that Canopius has no duty to defend under the policies, then it also has no duty to indemnify.
As a general rule, an insurer's duty to defend is determined by the allegations in the pleadings against the insured. Id. "[T]he duty to defend arises when there is a possibility that the injury or damage may fall within the policy coverage." Id. at 813. However, "where there is no possibility that the damage alleged in the complaint may fall within the policy coverage, there would be no duty to defend." Id. The Court will separately address Canopius' duty to defend in the Kolbek and Ondrisek suits.
Before discussing the substance of the policies and whether Canopius has a duty to defend or indemnify in the Kolbek state suit, the Court must first determine whether a justiciable controversy still exists in light of the suit's dismissal.
For a declaratory judgment action to be justiciable, there must be a disputed coverage issue of sufficient imminency to constitute an actual controversy. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). An actual controversy exists when "the facts alleged, under all the circumstances show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." Ringo v. Lombardi, 677 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
In February and March 2014, default judgments were entered against Twenty First Century Holiness Tabernacle Church and Tony Alamo in the Kolbek state suit. Subsequent to the default judgments being entered and Canopius' First Amended Complaint being filed in this case, the Kolbek plaintiffs voluntarily nonsuited with prejudice their remaining claims against Jeanne Estates Apartments, Inc. (ECF No. 76, Exh. 1). With this dismissal, the Kolbek plaintiffs have no claims pending against any party affiliated with TACM and no Defendant-Insured in this case. Moreover, none of the Defendant-Insureds in this case made a demand for coverage for the claims in the Kolbek state case. The Court cannot justify making coverage declarations in an underlying case where there have been no demands for coverage and there are no longer any claims to defend or defendants to indemnify.
Like the Kolbek state suit, the Court must first determine whether a justiciable controversy still exists as to the Ondrisek suit before discussing the substance of the policies and whether Canopius has a duty to defend or indemnify.
As noted above, Defendant-Insureds Donn Wolf and Steve Johnson were not named as defendants in the Ondrisek suit, but Donn Wolf has made a request to Canopius for defense and/or indemnification. The request for defense and/or indemnification is based on the Court's Writ of Execution that authorized the seizure of certain property to satisfy the judgment against Tony Alamo.
While Donn Wolf has made this demand and Canopius is seeking a declaration, Defendant-Claimants maintain that there is no justiciable controversy as to the Ondrisek suit. Defendant-Claimants state that "the only proceedings remaining [in Ondrisek] concern the enforcement of the judgments, which have now been final for years. The last Writ of Execution was issued on April 18, 2013." (ECF No. 76, p. 5). Importantly, the Ondrisek plaintiffs— Defendant-Claimants Spencer Ondrisek and Seth Calagna—state that they "have not sought and do not seek Canopius US Insurance proceeds in the collection of their judgment, and stipulate as such." Id.
Given this stipulation by Ondrisek and Calagna, the Court finds that they are not pursuing claims against Canopius for any insurance proceeds arising from the Ondrisek suit and the execution of the judgment in that suit. In light of this stipulation, the Court finds that there is no actual controversy of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment as to coverage issues in the Ondrisek suit. Because there is no longer a justiciable controversy as to the claims in the Ondrisek suit, Canopius' request for summary judgment on this issue is denied
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Canopius' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 72) should be and hereby is