SUSAN O. HICKEY, District Judge.
On December 22, 2017, the Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 54. The remaining claims in this case are as follows: (1) Plaintiff's § 1983 retaliatory discharge claim against the Individual Defendants
On January 3, 2018, Defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration requesting that the Court reconsider its order denying summary judgment as to the § 1983 retaliatory discharge claim. ECF No. 58. The Court granted the Motion to Reconsider and ordered further briefing from the parties. ECF No. 60. Defendants filed a brief (ECF No. 63), and Plaintiff filed a responsive brief. ECF No. 64. Defendants filed a reply. ECF No. 65. Presently before the Court is the issue of whether Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to the remaining claims.
The Court will set forth an abbreviated statement of the material facts pertinent to Plaintiff's remaining claims.
On August 3, 2013, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the ADPT complaining of discriminatory conduct by Donihoo. Mark Steindl, Procurement Manager and Hearing Officer of the ADPT, presided over a grievance hearing on August 26, 2013, and determined that Donihoo's conduct was improper for a supervisor. On August 28, 2013, the ADPT received an anonymous letter stating that there was an "air of hostility" in Historic Washington State Park and that witnesses in the grievance hearing feared being retaliated against. ECF No. 44-6.
Plaintiff testified in his deposition that around the second week of December 2014, he contacted the "state ranger" by telephone.
On January 6, 2015, Plaintiff was terminated for "lack of work," which, according to the ADPT, means that there was not enough work to be done to justify the part-time maintenance position. A full-time maintenance employee was hired in August 2015.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that when a party moves for summary judgment:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Krenik v. Cnty. of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has issued the following guidelines for trial courts to determine whether this standard has been satisfied:
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); see also Agristor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1987); Niagara of Wis. Paper Corp. v. Paper Indus. Union-Mgmt. Pension Fund, 800 F.2d 742, 746 (8th Cir. 1986). A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party. Id. at 252.
The Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The nonmoving party must then demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik, 47 F.3d at 957. A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
As stated earlier, the claims presently before the Court are as follows: (1) Plaintiff's § 1983 retaliatory discharge claim against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities; (2) Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for prospective injunctive relief against the Individual Defendants in their official capacities; and (3) Plaintiff's claim for a declaratory judgment regarding his § 1983 retaliation claim.
Plaintiff claims he was terminated by the Individual Defendants for filing a grievance that complained of discriminatory conduct and for calling a park ranger to complain of discriminatory conduct. Plaintiff brings this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. The Individual Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim because Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
"To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must allege and prove that: (1)[]he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) that the defendant took an adverse employment action against [him]; and (3) the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's decision to take the adverse employment action." Davison v. City of Minneapolis, Minn., 490 F.3d 648, 657 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). Typically, in determining whether speech is constitutionally protected, the Court would consider whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Id. The Individual Defendants, however, do not challenge the fact that Plaintiff engaged in the protected activities as a citizen and that they involved a matter of public concern. Further, there is no dispute as to whether Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action. Thus, the only issue before the Court with respect to establishing a prima facie case is whether Plaintiff's filing of a grievance and his contacting the ranger were a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to terminate him.
In its previous Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court found that Plaintiff's Title VII retaliatory discharge claims should be dismissed because "Plaintiff has not shown a causal connection between his filing of a grievance and his termination," and because "Plaintiff has not shown a causal connection between his contacting the ranger and his termination." ECF No. 54, pp. 16-17. Both Title VII retaliation claims and First Amendment retaliation claims are analyzed under the same framework, Tyler v. Univ. of Ark. Bd. of Trs., 628 F.3d 980, 986 (8th Cir. 2011), and require that a plaintiff engage in a protected activity that is "causally connected" to the adverse employment action taken against him. Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 395 F.3d 872, 878 (8th Cir. 2005). Both Plaintiff's Title VII and First Amendment retaliation claims are based on the same conduct by Plaintiff. Thus, for the same reasons
Plaintiff requests that the Court enjoin Defendants from engaging in "unlawful employment practices." ECF No. 1, p. 16. The Court, however, declines to do so. Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation, and thus the Court cannot find that he is entitled to injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment. Plaintiff requests that the Court declare that "Richard Davies, Edward Donihoo, Mike Rogers, [and] Shea Lewis . . . conspired to harass and discriminate against the Plaintiff in violation of . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . .; that such conduct violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights in accordance with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and, that Plaintiff sustained damages as a result." ECF No. 1, pp. 12-13. Because the Court has determined that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court declines to enter a declaratory judgment regarding this claim.
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 35) as to the following claims is