FREDERICK J. MARTONE, District Judge.
We have before us defendant's motion for attorneys' fees and non-taxable expenses (doc. 73), defendant's memorandum in support (doc. 77), plaintiffs' response (doc. 82), and defendant's reply (doc. 83). Plaintiffs' counsel also filed a separate response on his own behalf (doc. 81). Defendant requests an award of $99, 531.73, based on 287.3 hours of work at rates between $100 and $415 per hour. This includes electronic research costs of $4,283.23.
Plaintiffs Calvin Matthews, Tyrone Hunt, and Michael Buckner ("Matthews") sought a judgment against defendant NPMG Acquisition Sub, LLC ("NPMG") for racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiffs were former employees of NPMG. The EEOC filed an action against NPMG, naming the three plaintiffs in this case as charging parties.
Plaintiffs proceeded to file this § 1981 action less than two months later. We granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. Order of September 13, 2011 (doc. 68). Defendant now requests fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), A.R.S. § 12-341.01, and 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
In any case brought under § 1981, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Attorneys' fees may be recovered by a prevailing defendant in a civil rights action only upon finding that the action was "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so."
The facts of this case do not meet the onerous standard necessary for fees for defendants under § 1988. Although plaintiffs' claims clearly overreach, Judge Murguia held that it was possible for both the EEOC and individual plaintiffs to proceed. Therefore, plaintiffs' action could not be unreasonable or frivolous within the meaning of this one-sided statute.
A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) provides for fee shifting "[i]n any contested action arising out of a contract, express or implied." This is not an action arising out of contract. The plaintiffs here brought a federal statutory claim to which § 1988 occupies the field. A.R.S. § 12-341.01 has no application to a claim under § 1981.
Defendant also seeks fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which provides that an attorney "who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct." This provision "applies only to unnecessary filings and tactics once a lawsuit has begun."