ORDER

JAMES A. TEILBORG, District Judge.

Pending before the Court are: Defendant Quality Loan Service Corporation's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29), Defendants Citibank, N.A. and Bear Stearn's Mortgage Corporation's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 30) and JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A's Joinder thereto (Doc. 57), Plaintiff's Second Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. 31), Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Doc. 40), Plaintiff's First Motion to Clarify Preliminary Injunction Order (Doc. 79), and Plaintiff's First Motion for New Trial (Doc. 80). The Court now rules on the Motions.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2006, Plaintiff borrowed $544,000 through two separate loans. The loans were secured by Deeds of Trust on the real property located at 39658 N. Schnepf Road, Queen Creek, Arizona 85242 (the "Property"). MERS, as nominee for Bear Stearns, was named the beneficiary under the Deeds of Trust.

On January 14, 2008, a Notice of Substitution of Trustee was recorded, in which Quality Loan Service Corporation ("Quality Loan") was appointed successor Trustee. (Doc. 1-1 at 2). The same day, Quality Loan recorded a Notice of Trustee's Sale. (Id. at 4). That Trustee's Sale was postponed a number of times.

On August 24, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court against Defendants. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an application for a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the Trustee's Sale of the Property. Plaintiff argued that, when the original Trustee's Sale did not occur on April 24, 2008, Defendants failed to comply with Arizona Revised Statutes section 33-810(B) by not making the required declaration pertaining to the status of the Trustee's Sale on the noticed sale date.1 The Court granted the temporary restraining order without prejudice to the Trustee properly re-noticing the sale under Arizona law. (Doc. 19).

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 20) and sought a preliminary injunction of the Trustee's Sale (Doc. 45). After Defendants certified that the Trustee's Sale of the Property was to occur on April 9, 2012, despite this Court's prior finding that the current Notice/Postponements were likely defective, this Court set a preliminary injunction hearing for March 21, 2012 at 10:00 a.m. (Doc. 55). After considering the evidence at the preliminary injunction hearing, the Court found that Plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claim that the Trustee's Sale was not properly postponed in accordance with Arizona Revised Statutes section 33-810(B), and, thus, the Court denied the motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc. 74).2

On May 2, 2012, Defendants cancelled the Notice of Trustee's Sale recorded on January 14, 2008. (Doc. 88-1). Plaintiff responded to the Notice of Cancellation and asserted that a new Notice of Trustee's Sale was recorded the same day. (Doc. 89).

In his Amended Complaint (Doc. 20), Plaintiff alleges that (1) Defendants failed to comply with Arizona Revised Statutes sections 33-810(B) and 33-808(A)(3)3 in noticing the Trustee's Sale; and (2) Defendants do not have standing to conduct a Trustee's Sale of the Property and are required to produce a Promissory Note before they can conduct such a Sale.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be dismissed because (1) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and (2) Plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet the requirements of Rule 8. Rule 8(a)(2) requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," so that the defendant has "fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

Although a complaint attacked for failure to state a claim does not need detailed factual allegations, the pleader's obligation to provide the grounds for relief requires "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). The factual allegations of the complaint must be sufficient to raise a right to relief above a speculative level. Id.

Rule 8's pleading standard demands more than "an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint that offers nothing more than blanket assertions will not suffice. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is "plausible on its face." Id. Facial plausibility exists if the pleader pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. Plausibility does not equal "probability," but plausibility requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are `merely consistent' with a defendant's liability, it `stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must construe his Complaint liberally, even when evaluating it under the Iqbal standard. Johnson v. Lucent Technologies Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir. 2011).

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must construe the facts alleged in a complaint in the light most favorable to the drafter of the complaint, and the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, the Court does not have to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation, Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286, or an allegation that contradicts facts that may be judicially noticed by the Court, Shwarz, 234 F.3d at 435.

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims relating to Defendants' standing to conduct a Trustee's Sale and demanding that Defendants prove their standing by producing the note should be dismissed because Plaintiff's claims have been rejected by the Pinal County Superior Court and the Arizona Bankruptcy Court and are thus barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Defendants further argue that, even if these claims had not been rejected by two prior actions, they are not viable under Arizona law.

As the Pinal County Superior Court has already ruled on Plaintiff's standing and "show me the note" claims (Doc. 7-1 and Doc. 30-1), Plaintiff is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from asserting these claims in this action.4

Even if res judicata did not apply to bar Plaintiff's standing and "show me the note" claims, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Arizona law because nothing in the non-judicial foreclosure statutes imposes an obligation on the Bank or the Trustee to demonstrate their rights before a non-judicial foreclosure may proceed. See Hogan v. Washington Mutual Bank, N.A., 277 P.3d 781, 783 (Ariz. 2012). Accordingly, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss will be granted with respect to these claims.

The Court notes that the remainder of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is premised on Defendants' failure to provide him the statutorily required Notice of Trustee's Sale pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes sections 33-810(B) and 33-808(A)(3). Because Defendants have cancelled the original Trustee's Sale and have re-noticed the Trustee's Sale, Plaintiff's claims related to the prior Notice as defective are moot.5 See Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Baker, 22 F .3d 880, 896 (9th Cir.1994) (A case is moot when there is no longer "a present controversy as to which effective relief can be granted.") (quoting Vill. of Gambell v. Babbitt, 999 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims relating to the Notice of Trustee's Sale recorded on January 14, 2008 are dismissed as moot.

Because the only remaining claims in Plaintiff's Complaint are claims for injunctive relief that are necessarily dependant on Plaintiff's success on the merits of the claims in his Complaint, Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief are also dismissed.6 See In re MERS Litig., 744 F.Supp.2d 1018, 1032 (D. Ariz. 2010) (When all other claims are dismissed, declaratory or injunctive relief that is premised on those claims likewise must fail).

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Quality Loan Service Corporation's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29) is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Citibank, N.A. and Bear Stearn's Mortgage Corporation's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 30) and JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A's Joinder thereto (Doc. 57) are granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Second Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. 31) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Doc. 40) is denied as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's First Motion to Clarify Preliminary Injunction Order (Doc. 79) is denied as moot.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiff's First Motion for New Trial (Doc. 80) is denied.

This case is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment for Defendants.